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INTRODUCrIoN

T

he turbulent environmental regulatory climate of the last decade
has included criticisms from all sides, as well as reform proposals from the executive branch,' Congress,2 and a number of public
and private organizations. These proposals have ranged from incremental
reforms to calls for development of a "new paradigm" for environmental
law.3 Although a number of innovations have been added to the
command and control regulatory system during this period, the proposals
and reforms have not calmed the waters of the regulatory debate. They
have neither forestalled the criticisms and backlash against environmental
regulation, nor generated confidence that the environment will be
protected in the long run.'
The turbulence of the regulatory debate and the limited success of
reform efforts are the product of a deeper crisis in environmental law: the
dominant command and control approaches have addressed many of the
most obvious environmental problems, but they are not well suited for the
remaining "second generation" problems. Reform proposals aimed at
addressing these second generation problems understandably face
resistance unless they can demonstrate that they will achieve clearly
defined environmental targets. The current command and control system,
however, has not produced defined environmental goals against which to
measure the potential results of these reform proposals. Like Oakland,
when it comes to effective national environmental goals, "there is no
5
there there."1
'See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, REINVENTING ENvI-

RONMENTAL REGULATION (1995); see also Clinton Plan Sets Program to Lift
Rules Burdening Those Who Exceed Standards, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) AA-1
(Mar. 17, 1995).
2 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 104-9 (1995); S. REP. No. 104-291 (1995); S.
REP. No. 104-333 (1995); S. REP. No. 104-334 (1995); Unfunded Mandates

Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995).
3 See infra Part mH.A-B (notes 217-51 and accompanying text).
4 See infra Part m.C (notes 252-64 and accompanying text). For a review
describing the new proposals as part of a "revolution in federal environmental
policy," see Margaret Kriz, The New Abolitionists: A New Shade of Green,
NAT'L J., Mar. 18, 1995, at 661, 661-65.
5

GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY'S AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1937). As discussed

infraPart II.A.3 (notes 158-60 and accompanyingtext), numerous environmental
goals exist, but they have little impact on most environmental decisions.
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In lieu of environmental outcomes, the reform debate has focused on
the implementing mechanisms for environmental law - principally the
command and control model, as implemented through best available
technology requirements, and the market model.6 This focus on the
means of environmental law has occurred despite the absence of anything
approaching a consensus on the ends: the desired state of the environment
and the resulting public and private responsibilities for achieving that
state.7 In the process, neither the market-driven environmental law
reforms popular in legal scholarship nor other proposed reforms have
developed into a genuine new construct for environmental law.' With no
dominant new approach to define objectives, the debate over environmental law is acrimonious and shows little prospect for producing substantial
change.9
6 See infra Part II.A.2 (notes 147-57 and accompanying text).
7 The absence of a linkage between a regulatory system and its performance

measurements extends to many regulatory fields and is not limited to environmental law. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57
U. Cm. L. REV. 407, 408 (1990) [hereinafter Sunstein, Paradoxes].
8 See infra Part HI (notes 217-65 and accompanying text). Although widely
used and misused, the concepts of paradigms and paradigm shifts are valuable
to understanding environmental law reform. These concepts were first presented
by Thomas Kuhn. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS (1961). For a discussion of the recent search for a paradigm in
environmental law, see Amanda G. Birrell, Brother, Can You Paradigm?,
SONREEL NEws (A.B.A. Sec. Nat. Resources, Energy, and Envtl. L.), Fall
1994, at 1. See also CAROL ROSE & BRUCE ACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE
PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE

(1993) (recommending that the federal government set broad effluent guidelines
and contract with states for implementation); David A. Farber, Revitalizing
Regulation, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1278 (1993) (book review) (providing overview
of recent books analyzing new approaches); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the
Beginning,A FundamentalShift of Paradigms:A Theory and Short History of
EnvironmentalLaw, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 981 (1994). Most recently, the EPA

has embraced both the command and control and market models, implementing
both the technology-based requirements and market mechanisms of the 1990
Amendments to the Clean Air Act, while promoting a new focus on voluntary
approaches, sectors, and ecosystems. See U.S. ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION
AGENCY,

STRATEGIC PLAN:

THE NEW GENERATION

OF ENVIRONMENTAL

(1994). The 104th Congress, to the extent it was characterizedby
the "Contractwith America,"renewedthe de-regulatory fervor of the early 1980s
through legislation on risk, takings, and regulatory reform. See, e.g., Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48 (1995).
9 See, e.g., David Clark, The Elusive Middle Ground in Environmental
PROTECTION
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This Article asserts that although the focus of the current environmental law reform debate on the means of environmental regulation is
misplaced, the elements of a new approach are beginning to emerge.
Several recent studies have recognized the need to identify environmental
outcomes or environmental indicators,1" and a number of legal scholars
have identified the ends-versus-means problem. 1 These scholars also
' that arises from the limited
have identified the "democracy deficit" 12
citizen participation in the debate regarding command and control
regulations.13 In doing so, the scholars have provided a foundation in
democratic theory for the use of environmental outcomes as the starting.
point for environmental law reform.
Developments abroad, particularly in the Netherlands, reinforce the
notion that environmental law reform may arise from a greater focus on
ultimate environmental objectives, such as desired ambient environmental
conditions. Indeed, an explicit allocation of the burdens of achieving
those conditions may be critical to reform. The underlying concept of the
Dutch approach is an explicit determination of environmental ends at
three levels: (1) the desired state of the environment (which I call the
"Level r' goal); (2) a translation of the desired state of the environment
into more specific environmental conditions and the emission reductions
Policy, ISSUES iN Sci. AND TECH., Spring 1995, at 63. See infra Part IH.D (note

265 and accompanying text).
10 See infra note 251 and accompanying text.
1 These scholars include Professors Bruce Ackerman, Richard Stewart, and
Cass Sunstein. One of the first works to identify the ends-versus-means problem
was BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN CoALJDIRTY AIR
5, 54-57, 117-21, 123-27 (1981). See also Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B.
Stewart, Reforming EnvironmentalLaw, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1333, 1340 (1985)
[hereinafterAckerman& StewartReformingEnvironmentalLaw](distinguishing
between reform of "criteria and procedures which Congress, agencies, and the
courts use in setting environmental goals" and reform of "the means by which
the goals ... are implemented in the real world") (emphasis omitted).
12 Richard B. Stewart, Antidotes for the "AmericanDisease," 20 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 85, 85 (1993) [hereinafter Stewart, Antidotes].
13 See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming
EnvironmentalLaw: The DemocraticCasefor MarketIncentives, 13 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 171, 185 (1988) [hereinafter Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming
Environmental Law: The Democratic Case]. But see Lisa Heinzerling, Selling
Pollution,ForcingDemocracy, 14 STAN. ENvTL. L.L 300 (1995) (maintaining
that, in enacting the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments acid rain precursor trading
provisions, Congress did not actually debate the desired level of total allowable
emissions).

1996-97]

TARGETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

and other actions necessary to achieve that state (the "Level IP' goals);
and (3) an allocation of these emission reduction responsibilities among
economic and geographic sectors (the "Level IP' goal). 4 The identification of ends in this approach (which I call the "Framework Approach")
may illuminate many of the problems with the environmental reform
debate and environmental law in the United States.
The insight of the Framework Approach is not that a restatement of
environmental goals will lead to environmental law reform. Environmental laws in the United States already include a broad aspirational goal in
the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"),' 5 similar
broad goals in other environmental statutes, 16 and provisions for more
specific ambient goals.' 7 Instead, the insight arises from two important

1' See infra Part IV.A.2 (notes 273-317 and accompanyingtext). In addition
to the domestic environmental reform efforts underway, elements of this new
ends-based approach abroad can be found in the writings of a number of
scholars. See, e.g., ALLEN HAMMOND ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS: A
SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO MEASURING AND REPORTING ON ENVIRONMENTAL

POLICY PERFORMANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (1995)
[hereinafter HAMMOND Er AL., ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS] (noting the

potential for expanding the role of environmental indicators); HUEY D. JOHNSON,
GREEN PLANS: GREENPRINT FOR SUSTAINABILrrY (1995); Richard B. Stewart,

Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J.
2039, 2090-93 (1993) [hereinafter Stewart, Environmental Regulation]
(reviewing the use of voluntary agreements in several European countries); Brad
Crabtree, Make a New "Contract for the Environment," CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Feb. 1, 1995, at 18; Hans Van Zijst, A Changein the Culture, ENVTL.
F., May/June 1993, at 13, 14 (reviewing the Dutch covenant approach).
"542 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1994) (corresponds to Pub. L. No. 91-190, Jan.
1, 1970, as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-525 July 3, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-83,
Aug. 9, 1975, and Pub. L. No. 97-258, Sept. 13, 1982). NEPA expresses a
national goal "to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can
exist in productive harmony." Id. § 4321. See infranotes 86-89 and accompanying text.
16 See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251
(1994) (establishing a national goal "to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical and biological integrity of the Nation's waters," along with an initial,
interim goal of making waters fishable and swimmable "wherever attainable" by
1983, and eliminating the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985).
"7Examples of ambient environmental goals include the National Ambient
Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS") of the Clean Air Act, Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970 § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7404 (1994), and the water quality
standards of the Clean Water Act, Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972
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distinctions between the comprehensive system based on environmental
conditions and allocated responsibilities developed in the Netherlands, and
the patchwork of broad and narrow goals that has been cobbled together
over the last thirty years in the United States." First, the patchwork of
goals in the United States provides little or no context in which to debate
environmental law reform. 9 Second, in the absence of the Framework
Approach goals at all three levels, environmental law reform measures in
the United States are blocked by several false choices that arise from
commonly accepted lessons about the early development of environmental
20
law.
This Article begins with a brief overview of the state of the
environment and the lessons learned from the early development of the
command and control system.2 It then explores recent reform proposals
and the scholarship on the democratic impact of means-based approaches. 22 The Article next examines the new model that is emerging in the
Netherlands and other countries, and identifies the critical feature of the
new model: the development of context for environmental decisionmaking at each of the three levels discussed above.23 The Article
concludes by analyzing the implications of this Framework Approach for

§ 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1994). In fact, several scholars have argued that
Congress's use of broad goals statutes underlies many of the current problems
by appearing to address environmental problems without resolving the many
difficult trade-offs implicit in their implementation. See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra
note 13, at 338-39 ("One failing of environmental law in this country has been
its tendency to establish ends without specific means."); David Schoenbrod,
Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L.
REV. 740 (1983). Many of these commentators suggest that Congress should be
more prescriptive and delegate less to the EPA. This Article suggests that greater
congressional decisionmaking may be beneficial, but that the d6cisions made by
Congress should be the Level I, II, and m goals or ends, not the specific
implementing mechanisms or means of environmental regulation.
'a See infra Part ll.A (notes 86-160 and accompanying text).
'9 See infra Part Ill.C (notes 252-64 and accompanying text). For a
discussion of the role of factions in the debate and in the development of
command and control regulations, see, for example, Richard B. Stewart,
Madison's Nightmare, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 335 (1990) [hereinafter Stewart,
Madison s Nightmare].
20 See infra Part m.C.2 (notes 262-64 and accompanying text).
21 See infra Parts I-II (notes 1-216 and accompanying text).
22 See infra Part I (notes 217-65 and accompanying text).
23 See infra Part IV (notes 266-322 and accompanying text).
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the environmental debate and for environmental law reform in the United
States.24
Although the Framework Approach would be difficult to implement
in the United States, its core principles may reveal many of the underlying problems both with the environmental reform debate and with
environmental law reform in the United States.25 Ironically, although the
ends-based concepts adopted abroad stem from a European tradition of
governmental involvement in social planning that is not favored in the
United States, the identification of ends in the Framework Approach may
be a prerequisite for reducing the intrusiveness and costs of the command
and control system while improving environmental protection.
The Framework Approach discussed in this paper is unquestionably
utopian. As one author noted in a recent article, however, environmental
law reform has suffered from an absence of scholarship that explores
"'relevant utopias." 26 I invite the reader to suspend disbelief on the
practical feasibility of the Framework Approach long enough to assess
whether its underlying concepts reveal a new perspective on the
environmental law reform debate and a new set of questions to be
answered about environmental law reform.27

I. THE ENVIRONMENT
Despite a paucity of data on long-term trends in the state of the
environment, it has become axiomatic that the environmental statutes of
the 1970s led to substantial improvements in the quality of the environment in many areas. Unfortunately, a second proposition also has become
axiomatic: that the existing command and control environmental
24

See infra Part V (notes 323-74 and accompanying text).

For a discussion of how the FrameworkApproach may show these lessons
to be false, see infra Part VI (notes 375-410 and accompanying text).
25

26

See William F. Pedersen, "Protectingthe Environment" - What Does

That Mean?, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 969, 970 (1994) [hereinafter Pedersen,
"Protectingthe Environment"] (quoting STANLEY HOFFMAN, CONTEMPORARY
THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 184 (1960)); see also Cass R. Sunstein,
DemocratizingAmericaThrough Law, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 949, 950 (1991)
[hereinafter Sunstein, DemocratizingAmerica] (noting that "in thinking about

reform of American public law, the general defects of the system have been lost
too often, in favor of discussion of unnecessarily incremental changes").
27 In launching the now over-used concept of a paradigm shift, Thomas
Kuhn observed that a principal effect of such a shift is to reveal a new universe
of questions to be asked and research to be conducted. See KUHN, supra note 8.
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regulatory system has addressed many of the environmental problems
most amenable to regulation, but is not well suited to address the
problems that remain.2 8 This Part briefly surveys major indicators of the
state of the environment and identifies the remaining challenges.
A.

Assessments of the Environment

Surprisingly few assessments of the status and long-term trends of the
environment in the United States are available, and those that exist have
played a limited role in the debate over the environmental regulatory
system.29 The Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ') is required by
NEPA to publish an annual report on the status and trends in the
condition of the environment." The annual CEQ reports are a valuable
source of information, but the CEQ has acknowledged that its reports
provide only a limited understanding of the status and trends in the
condition of the environment.3 1 For example, in 1992 the CEQ concludSee, e.g., Regulating Regulation, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1995, at A18
(maintaining that some regulations "have gone way too far or are monuments to
illogic").
29 See, e.g., HAMMOND ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS, supra note
14 (noting that "there are virtually no... national experimental indicators to
help decision makers or the public evaluate environmental trends or assess the
effectiveness of environmental policy"). For example, many of the most recent
articles in the popular press rely on anecdotal information about environmental
quality and do not reference the Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ")
reports discussed infra. See, e.g., Gregg Easterbrook, Here Comes the Sun, NEW
REPUBLIC, Nov. 11, 1996, at 34 [hereinafter Easterbrook, Here Comes the Sun].
Similarly, the trends discussed by the CEQ are rarely mentioned in Congressional
floor debates or committee or conference reports.
30 See NEPA § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 4322 (1994). The EPA also publishes
annual reports of air and water quality. See infra notes 44-45. In addition, several
private organizations also publish periodic reports on the state of the environ28

ment. See, e.g., CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, STATE OF THE ENVIRONMENT:

A VIEW TOWARD THE NINETIES (1987) [hereinafter CONSERVATION FOUNDATION]; WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, THE 1994 INFORMATION PLEASE
ENVIRONMENTAL ALMANAC (1994) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL ALMANAC].
31 See, e.g., COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrIY, ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY: THE TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 187 (1992) [hereinafter 1992 ENVIRONMENTAL

QUALITY REPORT]. The CEQ assembles much of the current data on the state of
the environment from the EPA and other federal agencies. The National Oceanic

and Atmospheric Administration, the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
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ed that "[]imited data on U.S. water quality conditions preclude assessing
an overall national water quality trend., 32 Similarly, the national
ambient air quality has been described as
monitoring system to '3identify
3
"surprisingly limited.

In many areas, the problem may be less an absence of data than an
absence of meaningful environmental indicators derived from the data.
For example, although the environmental legislation of the 1970s and
1980s established extensive data collection efforts for air, water, and
toxins, only limited efforts are devoted to assembling, analyzing, and
communicating the overall state and trends of the environment.3 4

tration, the Department of Energy, and the Department of Interior also play a
substantial role in collecting and analyzing environmental data, although data
collection and analysis efforts have been blocked on occasion. For example, the
Department of the Interior's recent effort to establish a National Biological
Survey was opposed by many in Congress. See Fiscal 1996 R & D Funding
PictureBleak; Could Get Worse, Scientific Group Says, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA)
A13 (Aug. 30, 1995). Resistance to environmental surveys has a long history in
the United States extending back to John Wesley Powell's expeditions in the
1880s. See SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: INTEGRATING NATURAL
RESOURCE AND POLLUTION ABATEMENT LAW FROM RESOURCES TO RECOVERY
18-19 (Celia Campbell-Mohn et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter SUSTAINABLE
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW].
32 1992 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrrY REPORT, supra note 31, at 187. For a

general
discussion of the status of environmental monitoring, see id. at 43-56.
33

ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,

SCIENCE AND POLICY

793 (1992) (citing AIR POLLUTION POLICY IN PUBLIC
27,40 (P. Portney ed., 1990)); see

POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

also U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL AIR POLLUTANT
EMIsSION ESTIMATES 1940-1990 (1992); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: MEETING PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS WiTH LIMITED
RESOURCES, REPORT TO CONGRESS (1991); Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming

EnvironmentalLaw,supranote 11, at 1344-45, 1358 (noting that "[w]ithout such
an ongoing system of data collection and analysis, there can be little hope of
designing regulatory systems which are sensitive to regional ecological and

economic realities"); Farber, supra note 8, at 1293 (describing the state of
monitoring as "strikingly inadequate").
14 With the exception of CEQ, no agency or department in the federal
government is responsible for what is arguably one of the federal government's
most important functions: assessing the current state and long-term trends of the
environment. In the recent years, the EPA has focused greater attention on longterm environmental trends. See, e.g., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING AND EVALUATION, PROPOSED ENVIRON-
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Analyses of long-term trends toward sustainability, or any other long-term
environmental objective, are particularly hard to find. The absence of
analyses is both a symptom and a cause of the limited role of environmental objectives in the command and control regulatory system. The
system rarely requires the development of such analyses or performance
indicators, and their absence discourages reform.35
B., The State of the Environment
1. First GenerationProblems
Despite the absence of comprehensive analyses of environmental
trends, substantial progress unquestionably has been made on a number
of the most obvious problems identified in the 1960s and 1970s.36 With
notable exceptions (e.g., automobile emissions), many of these "first
generation" problems arose from large, point-source emissions, such as
air and water emissions from factories and effluent from publicly-owned

MENTAL

GOALS

FOR AMERICA WITH BENCHMARKS

FOR THE YEAR

2005

(Feb. 1995) (Draft Summary); Agency Outlines 13 Goalsfor Achieving Clean
Environment,PollutionPrevention,25 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2036 (Feb. 24, 1995).
31 See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, supra
note 11, at 1347 (noting that the command and control system has not encouraged environmental agencies to compile accurate data on total allowable
emissions). In many cases, the means of determining compliance (e.g., the
number of fines collected and other enforcement activity counts) have developed
but the means of assessing progress toward a desired state of the environment
(e.g., environmental conditions) have not. For example, the success of the EPA's
environmental enforcement program is evaluated less by its impact on the state
of the environment than by its activity counts, such as the number of cases filed
and the value of penalties assessed. See Michael M. Stahl, Enforcement in
Transition, ENVTL. F., Nov./Dec. 1995, at 19, 19-20. These activity counts are
commonly referred to within the EPA as enforcement"beans." See infra note 390
and accompanying text. This bean counting as a performance measure inevitably
creates incentives for greater activity, but makes it difficult for managers to
defend actions that may produce greater environmental benefits but fewer activity
counts. In recent years, the EPA has begun to develop new enforcement
performance measures. See, e.g., HermanMemo DetailsStrategyforDeveloping
New PerformanceMeasures, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) A-7 (Dec. 20, 1996).
36 The idea that many of the worst environmental problems have been
addressed also has been the subject of attention in the popular press. See, e.g.,
Attack on Clean Air, Water Laws Crashes into the Facts,USA TODAY, Nov. 9,
1995, at A12; Easterbrook, Here Comes the Sun, supra note 29.
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wastewater treatment works.37 Assessments of water quality commonly
note that rivers no longer catch on fire,38 and more scientific indicators
of water quality demonstrate that reductions in emissions from point
sources have led to improvements in several water quality indicators. 9
For example, in 1990, seventy percent of all rivers met water quality
standards and sixty percent of all lakes met water quality standards, up
from approximately one-third in 1972.40 Rivers demonstrating significant
improvements include the Hudson, the Potomac, and parts of the
Mississippi.'" In the Great Lakes, levels of organics such as PCBs and
DDT have declined sharply.42
Air quality in many areas also has improved substantially. Many
cities are in compliance with the National Ambient Air Quality
Standards ("NAAQS")43 for the six Clean Air Act criteria pollutants.
With several notable exceptions, both ambient levels"4 and emis-

37 See 1992 ENVIRONMENTAL

supra note 31, at 187
(noting the conclusion of United States Geological Survey studies that point
source reductions account for water quality improvements). For example, Clean
Water Act § 502(14) defines a point source to be "any discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance ... from which pollutants are or may be discharged." 33
U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1994).
38 The Cuyahoga River near Cleveland, Ohio, made national news when it
caught on fire in 1969. For a discussion of the Cuyahoga River fire, see David
R. Hodas, Enforcement ofEnvironmentalLaw in a TriangularFederalSystem:
Can Three Not Be a Crowd When EnforcementAuthorityIs Sharedby the United
States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REv. 1552, 1554 n.7 (1995).
The absence of rivers burning as a symbol of environmental progress has been
mentioned in numerous sources. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative
Substance, 1991 DuKE L.J. 607, 623-24 [hereinafter Sunstein, Administrative
Substance].
39 See, e.g., 1992 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REPORT, supra note 31, at 187
(reductions were recorded for "dissolved oxygen deficits, fecal bacteria, and
phosphorous, all of which are attributable to improved wastewater treatment").
40 See id.
QUALrrY REPORT,

41 See CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, supra note 30.
42 See 1992 ENVIRONMENTAL QuALITY REPORT, supra note

31, at 263-65.
See Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1994) (directing the EPA
Administrator to set national ambient air quality standards for air pollutants that
endanger public health or welfare). The EPA set a NAAQS for a seventh
pollutant, hydrocarbons, but rescindedthe standard in 1982 after determining that
no standard was necessary.
4Between 1975 and 1989, reductions in national ambient levels occurred
for each of the six criteria pollutants: (1) sulfur dioxide (an acid rain precursor)
43
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sions45 of these major air pollutants in the United States have decreased
substantially since 1970.46 Between 1970 and 1994, the combined
emissions of the six criteria pollutants decreased twenty-four percent.47
In addition, air toxics releases are expected to decline as much as eighty
percent as a result of the combined impact of the 1990 Clean Air Act
decreased46%; (2) carbon monoxide (a component of smog) decreased47%; (3)
particulates (lung irritants) decreased20%; (4) nitrogen dioxide (an acid rain and
smog precursor and a greenhouse gas) decreased 17%; (5) ozone (a component
of smog) decreased 14%; and (6) lead decreased 93%. See COUNCIL ON
QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: THE TWENTIETH
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1990)
[hereinafter 1990 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REPORT]. This trend has continued
for the period from 1985 through 1994. Reductions in national ambient levels
during this period were as follows: (1) sulfur dioxide decreased25%; (2) carbon
ENVIRONMENTAL

monoxide decreased 28%; (3) particulates decreased 20%; (4) nitrogen dioxide
decreased 9%; (5) ozone decreased 12%; and (6) lead decreased 86%. See U.S.
QUALITY PLANNING
AND STANDARDS, AIR QUALITY TRENDS 5-10 (1995) [hereinafterEPA, 1995 AIR
QUALITY TRENDS].
4' For each pollutant, the decreases in ambient concentrations were
accompanied by emissions decreases: (1) sulfur dioxide emissions decreased
from over 30 million tons in 1970 to approximately 20 million tons in 1990; (2)
carbon monoxide emissions decreased from over 120 million tons in 1970 to
approximately 60 million tons in 1990; (3) particulates decreasedfrom almost 25
million tons in 1970 to approximately 7 million tons in 1990; (4) oxides of
nitrogen ("NOx") emissions levels increased from over 20 million tons in 1970
to almost 25 million tons in 1980, and then dropped to just under 20 million tons
in 1990; (5) emissions of volatile organic compounds ("VOCs"), which are ozone
precursors, decreased from over 30 million tons in 1970 to under 20 million tons
in 1990; and (6) lead emissions decreased from over 200 thousand tons in 1970
to several thousand tons in 1990). See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PROGRAMS, NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR
QUALITY EMISSION AND TRENDS REPORT (1995); ENVIRONMENTAL ALMANAC,
supra note 30, at 108-10; see also U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARDS, NATIONAL AIR POLLUTANT ESTIMATES 2 (1990) [hereinafter EPA, NATIONAL Am POLLUTANT
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF Am

ESTIMATES].

46 See EPA, NATIONAL Am POLLUTANT ESTIMATES, supra note 45; see also
CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, supra note 30, at 152-53 (indicating that air
emissions from transportation sources have been reduced from 122.6 million
metric tons in 1975 to 3.5 million in 1986).
47 EPA, 1995 Am QUALITY TRENDS, supra note 44, at 4.
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Amendments48 and new federal reporting requirements under the
Environmental Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 1986
("EPCRA"). 4 9 These improvements are all the more remarkable because
from 1970 to 1994 the population of the United States increased twentyseven percent and the gross domestic product increased ninety percent."
Similarly, human and environmental exposures to many pesticides
and toxics have been reduced. For example, the extinction of the bald
eagle from exposure to DDT and other threats no longer appears
imminent." Blood lead levels in children have declined markedly. 2
The treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes have improved
since the enactment of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA") 53 in 1976 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Cleanup, and Liability Act ("CERCLA" or "Superfund")5 4 in 1980.
Notwithstanding criticisms about the slow pace and high cost of
remediating existing Superfund sites, prompt removal actions have
occurred at thousands of sites and long-term contamination problems have
been mitigated at several hundred sites. 55
Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2468 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1994)). According to a November 1995 EPA report, the number
of cities failing to meet ozone standards decreased 50% from 1990 to 1995, and
decreased 63% for carbon monoxide during the same period. EPA, 1995 AIR
QUALITY TRENDS, supra note 44, at 5, 8.
49 Pub. L. No. 99-499, tit. I, 100 Stat. 1728 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 11001-11050 (1994)); seeENviRONMENTAL ALMANAC, supranote 30, at 11216.
50 See EPA, 1995 AIR QUALITY TRENDS, supra note 44, at 4.
51 See, e.g., U.S. ENvIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF
POLICY, PLANNING AND EVALUATION, ENvIRONMENTAL FUTURES (1995); see
also Reclassify the Bald Eagle from Endangered to Threatened in Most of the
Lower 48 States, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,584, 35,585 (1994).
52 See Jerry L. Anderson, The EnvironmentalRevolutionat Twenty-Five, 26
RUTGERS L.J. 395, 403 (1995). This was achieved both through reductions in
airborne (e.g., leaded gasoline) and non-airborne (e.g., leaded paint) toxics.
" Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2796 (1976) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 6907-6987 (1994)).
54 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994)).
" As of October 1996, more than 3800 removal actions had been completed,
and more than 400 sites had reached the "construction complete" stage (out
of approximately 1300 sites on the National Priorities List). U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, SuperfundAdministrativeReforms AnnualReportFiscalYear
1996 (visited Mar. 27, 1997) <http://www.epa.gov/superfund/oerr/admin/
48
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2. Second GenerationProblems
Despite the successes in addressing first generation problems,
numerous studies suggest that the remaining problems are particularly
difficult to address. 6 One recent study, after interviewing environmental
experts and reviewing several rankings of remaining environmental
problems, identified the following as the most important (in no particular
order):
" runoff of polluted water from farmlands, developed urban areas,
construction sites, and other scattered "non-point" locations;
* high levels of ground-level ozone and other air pollutants in
many American cities;
" the potential long-term alteration of the global climate and the
depletion of stratospheric ozone;
" the wide-scale destruction of critical habitats and the resulting
threats to biodiversity;
" degradation of America's coastal zones and estuaries caused by
the combination of habitat destruction, non-point water pollution,
erosion and siltation, and overfishing;
indoor air pollution and lead paint;
* the exposure of workers to pesticides and other chemical hazards;
" the accidental introduction of non-native species into ecosystems,
such as the zebra mussel into the Great Lakes; and
" the contamination of drinking water supplies by organisms such
as cryptosporidiumY
This list is not definitive, but it includes many of the remaining
second generation threats to the environment. These second generation
problems have at least two distinguishing characteristics: (1) they arise
from multiple, diffuse sources or increased activity levels (as opposed to
traditional point sources); and (2) they often involve long-term impacts
that are broadly dispersed across regions or the globe (as opposed to
short-term, largely localized events). As discussed in Part II, these
characteristics make second generation problems more difficult to address
exocsum.htm#superfundtoday>.
56

See, e.g., ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOP-

MENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REVIEWS: UNITED STATES 78-79 (1996)
[hereinafter OECD, UNITED STATES PERFORMANCE REvIEW].
57
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, SETTING PRIORITIES,

GETTING RESULTS: A NEW DIRECTION FOR EPA 12-13 (1995) (Summary

Report) [hereinafter NAPA REPORT].
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through traditional command and control regulations than many of the
first generation problems.
"a. Diffuse Sources and IncreasedActivity
Levels
Many of the remaining air and water problems arise from numerous,
diffuse sources, such as farm and urban runoff, and from increased
individual activity levels, such as increased vehicle miles travelled per
automobile and increased solidwaste production per household. Examples
of multiple, diffuse sources abound in the water and air pollution areas.
Studies conducted by the United States Geological Survey indicate
that although water pollutant loadings from point sources decreased
between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s, increases were recorded for
nitrogen, chloride, and dissolved solids, all of which are predominately
emitted by non-point sources.58 According to the CEQ, approximately
165,000 miles of rivers and 8.1 million acres of lakes have some level of
non-point pollution.59 In 1992, the CEQ identified runoff as a leading
source of emissions to water bodies. 6' The CEQ also concluded that the
primary remaining threat to drinking water in the United States is from
non-point source contaminants, including lead and certain parasites,61
such as the cryptosporidium that contaminated drinking water in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, in 1993.62 A 1995 EPA report identified
agricultural and urban run-off as two key sources of water quality
impairment.63
Similarly, a substantial percentage of the remaining air pollution
problems are caused primarily by multiple, diffuse sources. For example,
problems from low-level ozone, better known as smog, are caused in part
See 1992 ENvIRONmENTAL QUALITY REPORT, supra note 31, at 187
(nitrogen and dissolved solids are common products of runoff from farm
fertilizers and erosion, and chloride is a common constituent of runoff from
streets that have been salted to prevent icing).
59 See id. at 188-89.
60 See id.
61 See id. at 190.
62 See NAPA REPORT, supra note 57, at 13.
58

63 See

U.S.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY,

WATER QUALITY

(1995) (indicating that 1994 data demonstrate that 40% of assessed
water bodies do not meet the "swimmable and fishable" criteria, and that
agricultural runoff accounts for 60% of impaired rivers and 50% of impaired
lakes).
INVENTORY
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by the emissions of volatile organic compounds ("VOCs"). ' Ozone is
thought to contribute to asthma,65 and since 1970 the hospitalization
rate for asthma has tripled in the United States.6 6 Although emitted
from large factories, these VOCs also are emitted by numerous, diffuse
sources, ranging from gasoline stations to dry cleaners, motor vehicles,
air fresheners, hairsprays, and home cleaning products.6 7 Indoor air
pollution also arises from numerous sources in the home or workplace.
A number of problems arise because the amount of environmentally
significant activity per person and the total number of people are
offsetting the efforts to reduce the activity's impact on the environment.
Perhaps the best example of these activity level problems is the impact
of increased automobile vehicle miles travelled on air pollution. In the
past twenty-five years, enormous emission reductions per mile travelled
have been achieved for automobiles.68 Yet the total number of automobiles has increased, as has the number of miles travelled per automobile.
The total number of vehicles in the United States increased from 89.2
million in 1970 to 139 million in 1989, a 56% increase.69 The total
vehicle miles travelled in the United States increased 111% between 1970
and 1994, from 1.11 trillion miles in 1970 to 2.35 trillion miles in
1994.70 The combination of more vehicles and more miles travelled per
vehicle has undercut part of the gains from increasingly stringent
pollution controls on new motor vehicles.7
The impact of these multiple, diffuse source and activity level
problems is significant. Although diffuse sources and increased activity
levels do not account for all emissions, they account for a substantial
percentage, in many cases fifty to eighty percent or more of the
64See EPA, 1995 AIR QUALITY TRENDs, supra note 44, at 7-8 (noting that
the other key component of ozone is NOX).
65 See id. at 8.
66 See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 33, at 777.
67 See, e.g., UpcomingProposalHas VOC Content Limits for 24 Types of

U.S.-Manufactured Products,Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) AA-1 (Oct. 27, 1995).
68 Estimates of total emission reductions per vehicle are hotly disputed, but
range from 75% to 96% per mile travelled. See, e.g., Jayne O'Donnell, EPA:
Tests Undercount Auto Pollution, USA TODAY, Dec. 11, 1995, at Al.
69 See 1990 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REPORT, supra note 44, at 9.
70 See EPA, 1995 Am QUALITY TRENDS, supra note 44, at 4.
71 This phenomenon is not limited to the United States. According to one

estimate, the number of automobiles in the world is expected to double to one
billion by the year 2030. See ENViRONMENTAL ALMANAC, supra note 30, at 110.
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remaining problems.72 As a result, major air emissions problems
remain. 73 As of 1991, at least eighty-six million people still lived in an
area in which at least one NAAQS standard was not met. Areas in
violation, or "nonattainment," included twenty-nine cities that did not
meet carbon monoxide standards, and fifty-six cities that did not meet
ozone standards.' Improvements in these areas are occurring because
of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990."5
The solid waste generation and disposal picture also is affected by the
diffuse source and activity level problems.76 Solid waste generation
increased on a per-person basis from 2.7 pounds per day in 1960, to 4
pounds in 1988, to 4.3 pounds in 1990. 7 Combined with population

A 1984 EPA report indicated that non-point sources contributed well
over half of the nitrogen, biochemical oxygen demand, phosphorous, oil, and
lead pollution in water. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
72

OFFICE OF WATER PROGRAM OPERATIONS, REPORT TO CONGRESS: NoNpoINT
SOURCE POLLUTION IN THE UNITED STATES 1-14 (1984). Similarly, a 1990

report concluded that major point sources contributed only 20% of hazardous air
pollutants. See H.R. REP. No. 101-490, at 318 (1990). But see Oliver A. Houck,
The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act, 21 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,528, 10,543 (Sept. 1991) [hereinafter Houck, The
Regulation of Toxic Pollutants].
' For example, major sources in the 12 northeastern states contributed only
16% of the ozone precursors in that area in 1990. See Richard E. Ayers,
Developing a Market in Emissions Credits Incrementally: An "Open Market"
Paradigmfor Market-Based Pollution Control, 25 Env't. Rep. (BNA) 1522,
1528-29 (Dec. 2, 1994).
74
See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF AIR
QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARDS, NATIONAL AIR QUALITY EMIsSIONs &
TRENDS REPORT 1993 (1994); see also CONSERVATION FOUNDATION, supranote
30, at 152-53 (indicating that air emissions from transportation sources have been
reduced from 122.6 million metric tons in 1975 to 3.5 million in 1986).
'7 See,

e.g., EPA, 1995 AIR QUALITY TRENDS, supra note 44, at 5-10

(indicating that ambient levels of carbon monoxide, ozone, and sulfur dioxide
decreased in 1993-1994).
76 In recent years, significant concern has developed over the concentration
of solid and hazardous waste disposal sites and toxics emissions in low income
and minority areas. Issues concerning the distribution of risks, both within the
United States and between nations, have grown in importance. See infra note
185.
77 See 1992 ENVIRONMENTAL QuALITY REPORT, supra note 31, at 335; see
also OECD, UNITED STATES PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 56, at 241
(noting that the United States has the highest per capita generation of solid waste
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increases, these increased waste generation rates have contributed to
national waste generation totals that have risen from under 100 million
tons in 1960, to 150 million tons in 1980, to a figure approaching 200
million tons in 1990.78
Diffuse source and activity levels also have increased the volume of
farm chemicals used. According to the CEQ, fertilizer use in the United
States has tripled since 1960 to twenty million tons per year.79 Herbicide
and pesticide use has increased by almost sixty-four percent since 1964,
to a total of 239,000 tons in 1991.80 The impact of this usage on the
environment is hotly debated. In 1988, the EPA reported that twenty-six
states had detectable amounts of forty-six different agricultural chemicals
in their ground water. Similarly, tests of many food supplies have
detected pesticide residues at low levels. 1
In addition, the contaminants in one medium often affect other media,
even at considerable distances. For example, air emissions are thought to
contribute close to one-third of the total oceanic pollution. 2 A substantial proportion of the nutrient and toxic pollutant loading of the Great
Lakes and the Chesapeake Bay occurs from air deposition of nitrogen
oxides ("NO,") and other substances.83
in the OECD). In addition, more than 306 million tons of regulated hazardous
waste were generated in 1991. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
BIENNIAL RCRA HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT (1993).
78 See ENVIRONMENTAL ALMANAC, supra note 30, at 90 (citing U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, CHARACTERIZATION OF MUNICIPAL
SOLID WASTES IN THE UNITED STATES: 1990 UPDATE, tbl. 1, at 10 (1990)).
79 See 1992 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REPORT, supra note 31, at 297.

so See id. at 187; see also John W. Mill, AgriculturalChemical Contamination of Groundwater:An EconomicAnalysis ofAlternative LiabilityRules, 1991
U. ILL. L. REV. 1135, 1136 (noting that between 1964 and 1987 the number of
acres treated with pesticides tripled).
8' See 1992 ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REPORT, supra note 31, at 187.
Substantial disagreement exists over the environmental and human health effects
of the chemicals at the levels detected in the environment. In the last several
years, studies have been initiated to evaluate the potential estrogenic effects of
certain compounds at low levels. See, e.g., Food Quality Protection Act of 1996
§ 405(p)(1), Pub. L. No. 104-170 (establishing endocrine disrupter substances
screening program).
82 See ENVIRONMENTAL ALMANAC, supra note 30, at 321 (citing United
Nations EnvironmentProgramme,Reports andStudies No. 39: The State of the
MarineEnvironment 88 (1990)).
83 See EPA, 1995 AiR QUALITY TRENDS, supra note 44, at 7; see also
Environmental Groups Sue EPA to EnforceAir Act ProvisionsProtectingGreat
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b. Long-Term, Global Impacts
The additional category of second generation problems arises from
the increased emissions and use of resources by expanding populations.
These problems - such as resource depletion, ozone depletion due to
chlorofluorocarbons, and climate changes due to carbon dioxide and
related air emissions - are often regional or global in scope, affecting
local or regional ecosystems such as the Chesapeake Bay, or even larger
global systems such as the stratospheric ozone layer. These complex
problems often involve uncertain and evolving scientific understanding.
For example, the concern surrounding ozone depletion and global climate
change derives from scientific information developed only during the last
few decades.
Also causing long-term, global impacts are the wide range of resource
depletion problems, such as soil erosion, "mining" of ground water, and
deforestation. For example, the Ogallala aquifer in 'the Midwest is
experiencing substantial declines in water levels.84 Many major fisheries
are at historic lows and a number have been closed.85 The depletion of
remaining tropical forest resources also is a focus of concern.
3.

Summary

Without question, a number of indicators demonstrate substantial
environmental progress during the past twenty-five years. These
improvements have occurred despite growth in population and gross
domestic product. Assessing the extent of the remaining first generation
and the emerging second generation problems is much more difficult. Are
the remaining problems short-term concerns that are likely to be solved
through the current regulatory system, technological innovation, or
cultural evolution? Or are they fundamental threats to sustaining a
vibrant, modem society that are not addressed by the current regulatory
system?

Waters, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) A-4, A-5 (July 19, 1996) (noting assertions that
air pollution may be responsible for large percentages of certain Great Lakes
contaminants); Todd Shields, ScientistTracks Bay PollutionBackto Stacks in the
Midwest, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 1996, at B1 (concluding that 20% to 35% of the
total nitrogen in the Chesapeake Bay may arise from air pollution).
14 See ENVIRONMENTAL ALMANAC, supra note 30, at 170-73.
85 See id.
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Neither the CEQ nor any other federal or state agency is responsible
for assessing these issues in depth on a national or global level. As a
result, except for anecdotal analyses and limited data on trends in certain
media, the environmental debate in the United States is conducted, and
the environmental regulatory system functions, in the absence of
systematic, comprehensive analyses of the long-term capacity of the
environment to sustain human life and environmental quality.
I.

THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM

Just as the most pressing environmental problems have evolved over
time, so has the environmental regulatory system designed to address
them. Not surprisingly, the evolution of the environmental regulatory
system has been neither methodical nor rational, nor has it always
reflected the changes in the underlying problems it seeks to address. The
early events that shaped the environmental regulatory system are
particularly important to any evaluation of environmental law reform
because those events have imparted a legacy of conventional wisdom that
has shaped the current debate. This conventional wisdom appears in the
form of prevailing, if not always accurate, views about the lessons to be
learned from the early experiences with environmental regulation and the
choices faced by reform efforts.
A. Development of the Command and ControlSystem
1. The Early Experience
A logical approach to environmental protection in the United States
might have been to identify a desired state of the environment, identify
the ambient conditions that comprise that state, and then craft strategies
to achieve those ambient conditions. On the surface, much of environmental law appears to have developed in that way. NEPA, the first
modem environmental statute, articulated a high-minded goal 6 that

Section 101(a) of NEPA makes it the policy of the United States to "use
all practicable means and measures ... in a manner calculated to foster and
promote the general welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man
and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic and
other requirements of present and future generations of Americans." NEPA
§ 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1994). Section 101(b) then sets forth objectives
(the "practicable means") for environmental policy:
86
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remains remarkably current when compared to the goal of "sustainable
development" that is now in fashion internationally. 7 Within a decade

In order to carry out the policy set forth in this Chapter, it is the
continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national
policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs,
and resources to the end that the Nation may (1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of
the environment for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and
esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment
without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable
and unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of
our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity, and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use
which will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of
life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach
the maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources.
Id. § 433 1(b). Section 101(c) provides as follows: "The Congress recognizes that
each person should enjoy a healthful environment and that each person has a
responsibility to contribute to the preservation and enhancement of the
environment."
Id. § 4331(c).
87See, e.g., U.N.
GAOR PREPARATORY CoMM. FOR U.N. CONFERENCE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OVERVIEW OF AGENDA 21 AND IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFER-

ENCE, 4th Plen. Sess., U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 151/PC/100/Add.1 (1992)
AGENDA 21]. Compare NEPA's directive to "use all practicable

[hereinafter
means and
measures... in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare,
to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in
productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of
present and future generations of Americans," NEPA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 4331(a) (1994), with the articulation of sustainable development in Our
Common Future,the final report of the World Commission on Environment and
Development: "development that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."
UNITED NATIONS, WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT,

OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987) [hereinafter UNITED NATIONS, OUR COMMON
FUTURE]. For a discussion of sustainable development on an international
level, see, for example, Edith Brown Weiss, Environmentally Sustainable
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after NEPA, Congress enacted a plethora of statutes presumably designed
to implement the NEPA goal.88
The reality of the development of environmental law is much less
satisfying.89 The strong public demand for environmental protection
coupled with concern by industry and local governments about the
economic costs of pollution control have been the subject of substantial
legal scholarship and remain important today.9" In seeking to address

Competitiveness: A Comment, 102 YALE L.J. 2123 (1993); see also Jeffrey L.
Dunoff, From Green to Global: Toward the Transformation of International
Environmental Law, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 241 (1995).
8 See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amendedat 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994)); Clean
Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1705 (1970) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1994)); Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692
(1994)); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, Pub. L. No. 92512, 86 Stat. 973 (1972) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 13 6 -13 6 y (1994));
Resource Conservation & Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat.
2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1994)); Comprehensive
Environmental Response Compensation & Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94
Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994)); Safe
Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300g-1 to 300j-26 (1994)); Oil Pollution Act of 1990,
33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1994); National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16
U.S.C. § 1604(c) (1994); Federal Land Policy & Management Act of 1976, 30
U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1994); Endangered SpeciesAct, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544
(1994); Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1421h
(1994); Emergency Planning & Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42
U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (1994).
89 NEPA was designed to induce the federal government to "approach
environmental management in a comprehensive way," yet through its implementation by the executive and interpretation by the courts it has become a
procedural requirement to ensure that environmental and other values are
included in specific federal agency decisions. For a discussion of the implementation of NEPA, see, for example, Philip Michael Ferrester, Revitalizing the
National EnvironmentalPolicyAct: SubstantiveLaw Adaptationsfrom NEPA 's
Progeny, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 207 (1992).
90 The public support for environmental protection in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, and the importance of environmental issues to then-presidential
candidates Nixon and Muskie, have been widely discussed. See, e.g., FREDERICK
R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY at xxiv
(1984) (noting that "environmental quality suddenly became a popular political
issue in the late 1960s"); PERCIVAL ET AL., supranote 33, at 764 (discussing the
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those conflicting pressures, policymakers in the 1960s lacked experience
with the available regulatory and policy options. The attempts to develop
a comprehensive environmental regulatory system in the United States
were among the first of any nation, thus experiences from abroad were
of little use. Few models existed for negotiated rulemakings or noncommand and control options such as market trading and voluntary
incentive programs.
The available experiences were based on an adversarial model. The
civil rights movement, which served as a launching pad for much of the
early environmental movement, 9 and the experience with New Deal
regulatory systems,92 offered a history of broad delegations to executive
agencies combined with reliance on federal court litigation to provide
accountability. Citizen suit provisions and challenges to notice and
comment rulemaking became common features of environmental
statutes.93 Federal financial and agency resources devoted to establishing

"politician's dilemma" that faced Nixon and Muskie). Industry and local
government opposition to the costs of pollution control, including the fact that
President Nixon vetoed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act on fiscal
grounds, also have been widely discussed. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott et al.,
Toward a Theory ofStatutory Evolution: The FederalizationofEnvironmental
Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985); see also PERCIVAL Er AL., supranote 33,
at 764. Many authors have noted that Congress had strong incentives to enact
statutes with ambitious goals to satisfy strong citizen support for environmental
protection, but, in the face of industry concerns about costs, had little incentive
to make many of the hard trade-offs required to achieve the goals. See, e.g.,
Schoenbrod, supra note 17, at 744-47; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous
Preferences,Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STuD. 217 (1993) [hereinafter
Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences].
91See SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 31, § 1.2; see also
ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 90, at 6 (noting that "a major catalyst for the birth
of the environmental movement was the transfer of political energy from the
bitterly controversial and often violent civil rights and anti-Vietnam War
movements"); Stewart, Madison'sNightmare,supra note 19, at 339 (noting that

"the successes of the civil rights movement were emulated by advocates for the
poor and for consumer and environmental interests").
92 For discussions of the impact of New Deal thinking on the development
of command and control regulatory systems, see, for example, ACKERMAN &
HASSLER, supra note 11, at 8-9; Christopher Edley, Jr., The Governance Crisis,
Legal Theory, and PoliticalIdeology, 1991 DuKE L.J. 561, 579-86; Sunstein,

DemocratizingAmerica, supra note 26, at 951-54.
93See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (1994) (Clean Air Act citizen suit provision);
see also Plater, supra note 8, at 1007 (noting that "[c]itizen litigation shaped
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an agenda for environmental protection also were limited. In fact, the
EPA was not created until 1970 and has never been given a statutory
94
mission.
Most importantly, two components of the experience in the 1960s and
early 1970s have produced a legacy that has blocked environmental law
reform in recent years: (1) scientific uncertainty about the relationship
between emissions and ambient environmental and human health
problems that existed during that period; and (2) concerns about the failed
attempts of states in the 1960s to adopt and enforce ambient environmental standards.
a. The FirstLesson:
Scientific UncertaintyAbout Natural
Systems and Ambient Conditions
In the 1960s and early 1970s, ecology was an extremely young field.
Scientific understanding of the complex interactions of the natural
environment and of the human health impacts of toxic substances was
poor." Furthermore, modelling of the movement and effect of contaminants was in its infancy.96 Since scientific understanding was limited, the
broad aspirations of NEPA were never translated on a statutory level into
more precisely defined ambient conditions or other characteristics of
human health and the environment.97 The first modem environmental

most of the modern administrative structure of environmental law every step of
the way").
" The EPA was established through an Executive Order assembling the
environmental components of numerous federal departments. See Reorganization
Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623, 84 Stat. 2086 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994)).
95

See, e.g., U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL

QUALITY 1975, 497 (1975) (noting that "it is usually impossible to prove beyond
doubt that a particular pollutant... causes health damage, much less how the

damage may vary with exposure").
96 See, e.g., Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1043 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (describing the state of knowledge about water pollution problems in the
early 1970s as "scientific ignorance").
17 For a discussion of the absence of meaningful national goals, see
Pedersen, "Protectingthe Environment,"supra note 26, at 969, 979 (noting that
"the architectsof our environmentalprotection system shrank from any definition
of goals that might provoke conflict with powerful established social groups or
values"); see also NAPA REPORT, supra note 57, at 15 (noting that "[a]s NAPA
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statutes articulated sweeping, ambitious goals, 98 but, with the exception
of several broad delegations of authority to the EPA, the statutes made
only limited attempts to identify desired ambient environmental conditions or to link particular statutory requirements to these environmental
conditions.9 9 The statutes made no attempt to assemble these conditions
into an integrated set of indicators that might signal achievement of the
overall NEPA goals for the environment.' 0
began analyzing EPA's budget, priorities, and management systems, it became
obvious that making judgments about EPA's performance was difficult because
the agency lacked a clear set of benchmarks, a coherent mission describing what
the agency was supposed to be doing").
98 See, e.g., Federal WaterPollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(1),
1288, 1312, 1313 (1994); see also PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 33, at 879
(describing the scope of the Clean Water Act goals as "breathtakingly ambitious"); Anderson, supra note 52, at 399 (describing the Clean Water Act goals
as "utopian"); Schoenbrod, supranote 17, at 803 n.358 (describing the Clean Air
Act regulatory system as "ambient standards, planning on a grand scale, and
utopian goals").
" See infra text atnotes 116-18. See, e.g., 95th Cong., 2d Sess., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1977: A CONTINUATION OF THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT,
REPORT ON RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF CONFERENCE

REPORT ON H.R. 3199, 459 (Comm. Print 1978) (describing the "general
concept" of the Clean Water Act as "that ecological protection will more likely
be achieved through the elimination of discharge of all pollutants rather than
requiring that Government bear the burden of establishing a precise relationship
between each pollutant in each effluent stream to a particular receiving water

quality impact"). Several individual environmental statutes include mediaspecific goals and provide for the establishment of certain media-specific
environmental standards. For example, the Clean WaterAct established goals of

fishable, swimmable rivers and zero discharge of pollutants. Federal Water
Pollution Control Act § 101(a)(1) & (2), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) & (2). Clean
Air Act § 110(a) required the attainment of NAAQS for criteria pollutants "as
expeditiously as practicable but... in no case later than three years from the
date of the approval of [a State Implementation Plan]." 42 U.S.C. § 7106(c)(iv).
The Endangered Species Act also articulated a general goal to preserve species.
See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994). These statutes delegated ambient standardsetting to the EPA and did not set a mechanism for integrating or prioritizing
among the ambient standards.
100 This outcome might not have been a foregone conclusion. See, e.g.,
Ferrester, supra note 89. The six objectives of § 101(b) could have been given
a substantive, as opposed to purely aspirational, reading. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs
Coord. Comm., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir.
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The lesson that ambient conditions were difficult to identify from a
scientific and technical perspective became part of the conventional
wisdom of lawmakers, courts, and other environmental policymakers.1''
Moreover, when combined with the public pressures for environmental
protection and against the costs of achieving it, the scientific and
technical difficulties encouraged Congress to delegate identification of
desired ambient environmental conditions and other similar environmental
objectives (e.g., acceptable human health risks) to executive branch
agencies. °2
b. The Second Lesson:
The Failureof State Enforcement of
Ambient Standards in the 1950s and 1960s
In addition to the scientific uncertainty about natural systems, the
experience of the 1950s and 1960s counselled against relying on a system
that directed the states to adopt and enforce non-prescriptive ambient
standards." 3 As demonstrated in Table l,' Congress did not embrace a strong, intrusive command and control regulatory system until
after more than two decades of less intrusive attempts to induce state
action failed. °5 Two elements of this pre-1970 experience are closely

1971) (holding that NEPA dictates only that agencies need only consider
environmental outcomes; they do not have to act on them). This more substantive
approach was advocated by several scholars in the early 1970s, but was rejected
by the courts. See generally DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAws AND
LITIGATION §§ 2-9 to 2-10, §§ 10-19 to 10-29 (1994).
101 See, e.g., Marcia R Gelpe & A. Dan Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific
Information in EnvironmentalDecisionmaking,48 S. CAL. L. REV. 371 (1974);
Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of
Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning"Regulatoy Reform, 37 STAN. L. REV.
1267, 1273-74 (1985) (noting in 1985 that "ecology is a relatively new science,
and society generally lacks adequate data on long-term environmental conditions
and changes").
102 See, e.g., Schoenbrod, supra note 17, at 748.
103 See, e.g., Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1062 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (upholding pulp and paper guidelines exclusion of consideration of
assimilative capacity of receiving waters in part because of failure of pre-1972
ambient standards' enforceability and states' incentivesto relax local limitations).
'04 See TABLE 1 infra p. 833.
105 See, e.g., Robert V. Percival, EnvironmentalFederalism:HistoricalRoots
and ContemporaryModels, 54 MD.L. REV. 1141, 1147 (1995).
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intertwined: the use of ambient standards as a regulatory approach and
the reliance on states to implement that regulatory approach. The failure
of this combination became a central lesson of the early history of
environniental law and greatly influenced the development of federal
environmental laws enacted in the 1970s and 1980s. The early federal
efforts to induce states to address air and water pollution problems best
demonstrate this point.
i. FederalClean Water Laws
The federal clean water efforts began with statutes directed at
research and grants in 1948106 and 1956.117 These efforts were followed in 1965 by a requirement that states set ambient water quality standards."l 8 But states were slow to develop ambient standards." 9 Perhaps more importantly, the difficulty of demonstrating the impact of
emissions from a particular source on the ambient conditions of the
receiving water discouraged state enforcement of those few standards that
were developed."1 0 In the face of mounting environmental concerns,
"oSee Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Ch. 758, 62 Stat.
1155.
107 See Federal Water Quality Standards Act of 1956, Pub. L. 84-660, 70
Stat. 498.
108 See Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903. The
standards were intended to function as a measure of performance of allowable
pollution levels and an avenue for enforcement. See S. REP. No. 92-414, at 4
(1971). This ambient standards approach led to the complex mix of ambient
standards to be achieved through permits and technology standards of the 1972
Federal Water Pollution Control Act.
109 By 1972, only half of the states had adopted the water quality standards
required by the 1965 Water Quality Act. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 33,
at 874.
10 See, e.g., ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 90, at 364-65 ("states dragged
their feet in submitting standards and enforcement was nil"); Frank J. Barry, The
Evolution ofthe Enforcement Provisionsofthe FederalWaterPollution Control
Act: A Study of the Difficulty in DevelopingEffective Legislation, 68 MICH. L.
REv. 1103, 1105-07 (1970) (Prior to 1971, the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act requirements that allowed states to set ambient water standards based on the
intended use of the water proved unenforceable because the government had to
demonstrate that a particular effluent caused the violation of the ambient
standards.); see also S. REP. No. 92-414, at 18 (1971) (noting the imprecision
of models for water quality and the effects of effluents in most waters). The
difficulty of demonstrating a nexus between a particular emission and ambient
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state inaction reinforced the need for easily enforceable, prescriptive
federal requirements. Thus, only after these early non-prescriptive,
ambient standards-based approaches failed to produce significant
improvements in water quality did Congress enact the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act of 1972 (commonly referred to as the Clean Water
Act).I'
ii. Federal Clean Air Laws
Federal clean air efforts progressed on a similar track. 2 As with
the early clean water statutes, the federal clean air statutes began in
19551" and 19601" with laws directed only at research and technical
assistance. The federal clean air efforts then evolved into the establishment of federal ambient standards in 196315 In 1967, Congress
required states to adopt ambient standards.' 6 Only after these attempts
failed to produce significant improvements in air quality did Congress
establish a federally enforceable command and control regulatory system
through the 1970 Clean Air Act. Thus, like the 1972 Clean Water Act,
the 1970 Clean Air Act was enacted only after the earlier
non-prescrip7
tive, ambient standards-based approaches had failed.'
conditions also impeded earlier attempts to use federal common law to prevent
water pollution. See Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 248 (1901) (declining to
restrict emissions of sewage from Chicago to address water quality problems in
Missouri); see also New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296,309 (1921) (refusing
to enjoin discharges of New Jersey sewage into New York harbor).
..Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1994)).
12 See Schoenbrod, supra note 17, at 744-45.
"3 See Air Pollution Control Act of 1955, ch. 360, 69 Stat.
322.
"4 See Motor Vehicle Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 162.
"5 See Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963).
16 See Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485. This led
to the complex combination of ambient standards to be achieved through state
implementation plans and technology standards in the 1970 Clean Air Act. The
principal exception to this pattern is the regulation of automobile emissions
through the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79
Stat. 992, which required the federal government to promulgate emissions
standards for new motor vehicles.
17 A substantial turnaround has occurred in many states since the 1960s,
although a number of commentators have maintained that the turnaround in
attitudes from the early 1970s has been uneven. As late as the mid-1980s, for
example, fewer than 20 states had adopted numerical standards (as opposed to
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TABLE 1
Development of the Command and Control Regulatory System
Period

Action

1940s to
1963

research
support and/
or technical
assistance

Air Legislation
Air Pollution Control
Act (1955)
Motor Vehicle Act
(1960)

Water Legislation
Water Quality
Standards Act
(1948)

Clean Air Act (1963)

Federal Water
Pollution Control Act
(1956)

1964 to
1969

ambient
standards
with limited
federal
enforceability

Air Quality Act
(1965)1'

Water Quality Act
(1965)

Early
1970s

ambient
standards with
full federal
enforceability
and technology
requirements

Clean Air Act
(1970).

Federal Water
Pollution Control Act
(1972)

A two-part lesson was derived from the experience of the early clean
air and clean water efforts. First, it became commonly accepted that
ambient standards were both technically and scientifically hard to

narrative standards) for toxics under § 303 of the Clean Water Act. See, e.g.,
James Banks, DumpingInto Surface Waters: The Making and Demise of Toxic
Discharge.Regulations,in BEYOND DUMPING 47 (Bruce Piasecki ed., 1984). One
commentator has noted that "the states vary, in capability, funding, authority, and
commitment to meet the minimum national standards set by Congress." John
Pendergrass, You Say You Want a Devolution, ENVTL. F., Nov./Dec. 1995, at 8.
11 As discussed supra at note 116 and accompanying text, the principal
exception to this pattern is the Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Act of 1965, which
set federally-enforceable technology standards for automobiles.
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identify," 9 and were almost impossible to use as a basis for enforcement.'20 Second, it also became commonly accepted that states on the
whole could not be relied upon to enforce these non-prescriptive,
ambient-based environmental standards. 2'
c. The Third Lesson:
Command and ControlDecisionmaking,
1969 to 1979
For Congress, the answer to the early environmental lessons was the
development of the command and control regulatory system. Emission
reductions were to be made through the development of a comprehensive
federal regulatory system with a limited state role. Enforcement was to
be largely a federal responsibility, and was to be predicated largely on
assessing compliance with command and control technology requirements, not on the relationship between emissions levels and ambient
environmental conditions.
The principal implementing mechanism of this command and control
system was selection of best available technology ("BAT') requirements.
Command and control strategies set emissions performance standards
based on the BAT requirements for a particular source.' 22 The BAT
performance standards typically were based on assessments of available
or foreseeable technologies and, in certain cases, cost considerations.
Estimates of the aggregate impact of the adoption of such standards on
total emissions of particular pollutants or ambient environmental

"' See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, AIR POLLUTION: FEDERAL LAW AND

ANALYSIS § 709, at 7-26 (1981); Latin, supra note 101, at 1273-84.
120 See U.S. EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd.,
426 U.S. 200, 204 (1976) (noting that technology standards "facilitate enforcement by making it unnecessary to work backward from an overpolluted body of
water to determine which point sources are responsible"); see also CURRIE, supra
note 119, at § 709, 7-26; Barry, supra note 110, at 1103.
121 See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, 93D CONG., lST SEss., 2 A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS

1972, at 1424-26 (Comm. Print 1973) [hereinafter CLEAN WATER ACT
93D CONG. 2D SESS., 1 A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970, at 40203 (Comm. Print 1974).
122 See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1994) (providing for
uniform national standards); Appalachian Power Co. v. U.S. EPA, 671 F.2d 801,
803-04 (4th Cir. 1982) (describing Clean Water Act effluent limitations).
OF

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]; CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE,
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conditions played only a limited role in developing BAT standards and
in some cases consideration of environmental conditions was prohibited. 23 The impact of the total emission reductions on desired environmental conditions for particular pollutants and particular media was rarely
articulated in rulemakings or included in facility-specific requirements,
and was certainly not integrated
into strategies for achievement of the
4
national goals set by NEPA.1
Once the complexity of the BAT process became clear, a third lesson
became commonly accepted: the great majority of environmental
regulations require complex, technical decisions that are beyond either the
capacity or the interest of Congress." 5 Moreover, although public
support for environmental protection was high, the costs were never
popular. As a result, Congress had tremendous incentives to articulate
sweeping aspirational goals in the initial command and control statutes
while providing broad delegations of authority to the EPA (and to a lesser
extent, the states) to make many of the hard choices about emission
reduction requirements.'26
123

See, e.g., AppalachianPower Co., 671 F.2d at 808; CLEAN WATER ACT

supra note 121, at 170, 309 (noting that establishment
of best practicable control technology requirements did not include "any
requirement to consider the location of sources within a category or to ascertain
water quality impact of effluent controls"); Heinzerling, supra note 13, at 302
(noting that "[i]n a command and control system, the government dictates the
technology that must be installed to control pollution; it need not make a precise
decision about the total amount of pollution that it will allow").
124 See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, qupra
note 11, at 1335 n.4 (noting that although regulation of industrial sources is
based in theory on achieving uniform national standards, "[i]n practice, however,
the controls imposed on sources in regions that do not comply with the federal
air quality standards are based on 'reasonably available control measures' - a
form of BAT").
12' See Sunstein, DemocratizingAmerica,supra note 26, at 954-57.
126 See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(1),
1288, 1312, 1313 (1994); see also PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 33, at 879
(describing the scope of the Clean Water Act goals as "breathtakingly ambitious"); Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming EnvironmentalLaw, supra note 11, at
1362 (noting that "legislators have been able to indulge in apparently absolute
statutory prohibitions of all harmful pollutants"); Anderson, supranote 52, at 399
(describing the Clean Water Act goals as "utopian"); John P. Dwyer, The
Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 235 (1990);
Schoenbrod, supra note 17, at n.358 (describing the Clean Air Act regulatory
system as "ambient standards, planning on a grand scale, and utopian goals").
LEGISLATIvE HISTORY,
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For example, the Clean Air Act of 1970 included sweeping goals of
protecting public health with an "adequate' ' 127 or "ample 1 28 margin
29
of safety. With the possible exception of mobile source requirements,
the statute did not provide clear guidance on how to implement the
sweeping goals.130 The New Source Performance Standards ("NSPS")
for new air emissions sources applied "best available control technology"
requirements to categories of stationary sources that "may contribute
significantly" to air emissions. The standard was intended to impose
source controls for each category to reduce emissions to levels as low as
possible, taking into account costs and technological feasibility.' The
EPA, not Congress, was to make these determinations by specifying the
pounds of pollutant that could be emitted on a per-unit of input or output
basis. The broad discretion provided to the EPA Administrator in the
Clean Air Act has been described by one commentator as "comparable
to the discretion that would be given under the tax laws if the Internal
Revenue Commissioner were told to raise a sum of money 'sufficient to
meet federal needs with an adequate margin of safety' without prescribing
the rates and categories of taxation."'3 Consequently, the implementation of these provisions was slow, controversial, and fraught with
13
litigation. 3
The Clean Water Act followed a similar approach. The Act sought to
achieve the broad goals of "fishable and swimmable" waters by 1983,
with a total elimination of discharges by 1985.13 Section 301 required
the EPA to promulgate "effluent limitations" for point sources in order
to achieve BAT standards, including "best practicable control technology
currently available" by 1977 and "best available technology economically

127
128
129

42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1994).
Id. § 7412(b)(1)(B).
See, e.g., id. §§ 7521-7590.

The Clean Air Act goal enumerated in § 101 did form the basis of an
early Sierra Club suit to require the EPA to develop a "prevention of significant
deterioration" program, however. See Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp.
253 (D.D.C.), ajfd per curiam without opinion (D.C. Cir. 1972), affid by an
equally divided Court, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
13 See 42 U.S.C. § 741 l(a)(b) (1994).
132 Schoenbrod, supra note 17, at 821.
...
More than a decade after Congress required the EPA to establish NSPS,
standards were established for only a fraction of industries. See id. at 792; see,
e.g., Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
134 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 101(a)(1)-(2), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(1)-(2) (1994).
130
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achievable" by 1983.' Similarly, section 306 imposed a BAT requirement on new sources. 3 6 Under section 307, Congress required the EPA
to establish technology-based limitations for toxic substances that would
protect public
health and water quality with an "ample margin of
137
safety."
In both the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act, Congress
attempted to link emissions requirements to ambient environmental
conditions. These provisions - the NAAQS and state implementation
plan ("SIP") provisions of the Clean Air Act, and the water quality
standards and National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") provisions of the Clean Water Act - are a more complex
component of the command and control system developed in the early
1970s. 138 In both statutes, Congress delegated authority to both the EPA
and the states to develop ambient standards. The NAAQS provisions of
the Clean Air Act require the EPA to establish uniform national standards
for air quality, with primary responsibility to achieve the standards
delegated to states through SIP requirements and facility-specific
permits. 139 If the various BAT standards do not achieve the NAAQS,
states are required to use SIPs and facility-specific permits to impose
additional requirements.
Similarly, in sections 303 and 304 of the Clean Water Act, Congress
required the states to establish water quality standards based on criteria
published by the EPA.' 4' The Clean Water Act standards are to be
achieved through imposition of conditions in NPDES permits. Congress
recognized that the sum of the BAT controls in certain watersheds might
be insufficient to achieve water quality standards.' 4 ' As a result,

SeeFederal WaterPollution Control Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1994).
The Water Quality Act of 1987 extended the 1983 deadline to 1989. The EPA
has issued effluent guidelines for more than 50 categories of industrial sources.
See 40 C.F.R. pts. 405-471 (1995).
136 See Federal WaterPollution Control Act § 306,33 U.S.C. § 1316 (1994).
13' Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 307, 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1994).
138 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7410 (1994) (Clean Air Act provisions); 33
U.S.C. § 1313 (1994) (Clean Water Act provisions).
139 Clean Air Act § 109 required the EPA to establish federally uniform
ambient air standards in the form of the NAAQS. See 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1994).
'40See Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 303(c)(2), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313(c)(2) (1994). The Senate version of the 1972 Clean Water Act would
have deleted water quality standards completely. See S. REP. No. 92-414, at 18
(1971).
141 See CLEAN WATER AcT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 121, at 246
131
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sections 301 and 302 authorized the imposition of more stringent
requirements than the applicable BAT standards if necessary to achieve
the water quality standards. 4 2 In both the SIP and NPDES permit
requirements the relationship between the BAT requirements found
elsewhere in the statutes and the achievement of ambient conditions was
a secondary consideration and was difficult to implement.'43
Scholars have criticized the NAAQS for failing to make difficult,
implicit policy choices regarding emission reductions and for failing to
provide clear, precise, action-forcing direction to the EPA and the
states.'" They also have maintained that the NAAQS demonstrate the
failure of approaches that identify ends without identifying means.145
Similar criticisms have been levelled against the Clean Water Act's water
quality standards.'4 6 The use of ambient standards in the Clean Air Act
and the Clean Water Act may have been more successful than commonly
believed, however. The role of ambient standards in the command and
(remarks of Mr. Harsha).
142 See Federal Water Pollution Control Act §§ 301(b)(1)(C) & 302(a), 33
U.S.C. §§ 131 l(b)(1)(C) & 1312(a) (1994); see alsoMississippi Comm'n on Nat.
Res. v. Costle, 625 F.2d 1269 (5th Cir. 1980). In addition, Clean Water Act
§ 303(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1994), requires states to identify areas where the
cumulative impact of pollution sources will exceed applicable water quality
criteria, and to calculate the total maximum daily load ("TMDL") that a segment
of water can receive of a particular pollutant without exceeding ambient
standards. See, e.g., Alaska Center for the Env't v. Reilly, 762 F. Supp. 1422
(W.D. Wash. 1991) (applying the TMDL process). States allocate the total loads
among the sources along a body of water, often based on historical discharge
levels. The TMI)L program has been difficult to implement. See Administrative
Efforts to Improve TMDL ProgramUnder Way, EPA Official Says, Daily Env't
Rep. (BNA) A-5 (July 16, 1996) (noting that approximately 15 lawsuits have
been filed to require the EPA or states to implement the TMDL program); Final
303(d) CWA List Released; Next Step Is Development of TMDLs, Daily Env't
Rep. (BNA) A-5, A-6 (July 18, 1996) (noting that at its current pace it will take
Oregon 400 years to complete TMDLs).
"' See, e.g., Latin, supra note 101, at 1305, 1308 (noting that although the
Clean Water Act "authorizes more stringent water quality-related pollutant
limitations to supersede technology based standards ... the promulgation of
more stringent water quality standards apparently has not been prevalent").
'44See Anderson, supra note 52, at 402; Schoenbrod, supra note 17, at 74851.
14s See Heinzerling, supra note 13, at 338-39.
146 See ANDERSON Er AL., supra note 90, at 399-400; Houck, The Regulation
of Toxic Pollutants,supra note 72, at 10,543.
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control system and their implications for addressing the second generation
environmental problems are addressed in Part V.
2. Tightening the Command
and Control Response: 1980 to 1990
By the early 1980s, the congressional response to environmental
problems was more complex. The magnitude of pollution control costs to
industry and local governments had become increasingly clear by the
mid-i 970s, as had public resistance to a number of intrusive environmental requirements such as transportation controls in Southern California. 47 Even so, overall public support for environmental protection
remained strong. 4 8 In addition, distrust between the legislative and
executive branches was high.
This combination of factors contributed to enactment of new
environmental laws with far more prescriptive statutory deadlines and
requirements imposed on the EPA in order to address public support for
strong environmental measures. At the same time, Congress continued to
delegate authority to the EPA to impose technology-based requirements
in many cases and to make many of the most difficult and politically
sensitive decisions. The length and prescriptive nature of environmental
statutes during this period increased substantially. 149 Among the statutes
enacted were the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments ("HSWA") to
5
the RCRA,'50 with numerous "soft hammers" and "hard hammers' '
in the event of EPA inaction; the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments

141 See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 33, at 795 (noting a "firestorm of
protest" against proposed SIP gas rationing regulations); Schoenbrod, supra note
17, at 770-71.
"' See, e.g., Schoenbrod, supranote 17, at 433 (citing BNA report); Richard
Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 154 (1988) [hereinafter Stewart, Controlling
EnvironmentalRisks] (noting that in the late 1970s and early 1980s "the public
remained strongly committed to environmental goals").
"' Compare Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and
Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994)) (approximately 50 pages long) with Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401 to 7621 (1994)) (approximately 700 pages long).
"0 Pub. L. No. 98-616,98 Stat. 3221 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C., §§ 69016992 (1994)) (amending Pub. L. No. 94-550, 90 Stat. 2796 (1976)).
'-' See RCRA § 3004, 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1994).
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of 1986, with a requirement (removed in 1996) that the EPA promulgate twenty-five new maximum contaminant levels for drinking water
every three years;"' and the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments,
with numerous statutory deadlines for air toxics and other air emissions.
Although remarkably prescriptive in requiring the EPA to make
difficult decisions on specified timetables, these statutes did not deviate from the lessons learned from the pre-command and control era, and
only slightly increased the congressional resolution of the most difficult environmental, economic, and political issues. 54 Examples of the
continued broad delegations include the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments' requirement that the EPA establish "reasonably achievable
control technology" ('RACT") for certain existing sources of emissions
in non-attainment areas'5 5 or "maximum achievable control technology"
("MACT") for certain sources of hazardous air pollutants.'5 6 Under
the new, more prescriptive approach of this period, Congress again
could articulate its general support for the environment while leaving
the EPA and the states to face criticisms about the high costs and
inefficient application of environmental requirements to any particular chemical substance, region, or industry.'5 7 The linkage between
BAT standards and ambient environmental conditions remained tenuous
at best.
Pub. L. No. 99-339, 100 Stat. 642 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 201
(1994)). The 25 MCL per year requirement was rescinded by the 1996 Safe
Drinking Water Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 104-182, 110 Stat. 1613.
"I Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1994)).
154 See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, supra
note 11, at 1354 (noting that the BAT system enables Congress to "content
itself with mouthing pieties about the need to achieve 'reasonable further
progress").
1--42 U.S.C. § 7503 (1994).
156 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 301,42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1994).
117 A number of commentators have proposed revisions to the broad goalsnarrow technology approach. For example, as early as 1980 Ackerman and
Hassler proposed that Congress define ends-based outcomes, such as achieving
"ambient air quality improvements that promise to add at least 25,000 years to
the life expectancies of the American people by 1984." Bruce A. Ackerman &
William T. Hassler, Beyond theNew Deal: Coaland the CleanAirAct, 89 YALE
L.J. 1466, 1568-69 (1980).
152
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3. The MissingLink: Statutory
Requirements andEnvironmental Conditions
Although environmental outcomes on occasion have been incorporated into statutory requirements, each of the principal lessons of the early
development of environmental law counseled against the use of ambient
standards: (1) ecology, generally, and ambient conditions, in particular,
were only poorly understood; (2) ambient standards were hard to enforce,
particularly by the states; and (3) decisionmaking for BAT standards
required complex, technical decisions that necessitated congressional
delegation to the EPA. Consequently, environmental regulatory and
judicial activity during the last two decades have centered on the
promulgation and implementation of BAT requirements by the EPA.
At least three results have occurred. First, substantial environmental
gains have been achieved, but with high costs that have led to a backlash
against regulation. Second, the linkage between BAT standards and the
desired state of the environment, whether specific ambient conditions or
the general goals announced in NEPA, has rarely been litigated or
discussed. Third, as discussed above, the EPA has been forced to make
many difficult economic and political trade-offs inherent in implementing
and enforcing the BAT statutes.' 8
The absence of a linkage between BAT standards and the state of the
environment produced wide-ranging consequences during the first two
decades after enactment of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act in the
early 1970s. Little momentum developed for the study or enactment of
desired national environmental conditions. The relative threat of second
generation sources, while not ignored, did not become the subject of
widespread debate or action. In fact, congressional debates over the
environmental goals in NEPA, or environmental conditions generally,
have been almost non-existent. 9 Many modem environmental casebooks have given little attention to the existence of the NEPA goals. 6
Most importantly, neither the NEPA goals nor, with very limited
See Schoenbrod, supra note 17, at 813-14. Schoenbrod notes that in a
non-zero sum situation, leniency in enforcement can be used to avoid explicit
trade-offs among sources. Id.
,59 See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 13, at 318-25. A recent computer
database search revealed an occasional genuflection toward the importance of the
NEPA goals, but no discussion or debate about the goals.
160 See, e.g., ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 90, at 683-84; WLLIAM H.
RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER POLLUTION 130-31
(1986); SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra note 31, at 1217-21.
158
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exceptions, any other environmental goals or outcomes have created
legally enforceable rights in the command and control regulatory system.
I would hazard a guess that the majority of environmental lawyers do not
know that the NEPA goals exist and can be reasonably comfortable that
they do not risk malpractice in their ignorance.
B.

Criticismsof the Command and ControlSystem
1. Economic and Legal Criticisms

Although the limited link between the BAT-driven command and
control requirements and environmental conditions was a rational
response to the information base and policy debate in the 1970s and
1980s, the resulting environmental regulatory system is under remarkable
pressure in the 1990s. Despite the environmental gains discussed in Part
I, the weaknesses attributed to the command and control system, and
BAT in particular, have become much-plowed ground in academic
scholarship and the popular press. 6 ' Commentators have identified its
high costs and inefficiencies, 6 2 intrusiveness,' 6 3 susceptibility to cap161

See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 11; CASS R. SUNSTEIN,

AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 81

(1994) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION]; Ackerman &
Stewart, Reforming EnvironmentalLaw, supra note 11, at 1334-40; Regulating
Regulation,supra note 28, at A18 (maintaining that some regulations "have gone
way too far or are monuments to illogic").
62

' See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 161
("[B]etween 1972 and 1985 the United States spent no less than $632 billion for
pollution control."); Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs andBenefits of
Regulation: Review and Synthesis, .8YALE J. ON REG. 233, 271-72 (1991)
(estimating that expenditures equalling over $90 billion, or 2.5% of gross
domestic product, are spent on environmental regulation eachyear); see also U.S.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF POLICY, PLANNING, AND
EVALUATION, ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTMENTS; THE COST OF A CLEAN

ENVIRONMENT at v (1990) (estimating that total annualized costs for all pollution
control activities in the United States will rise from 0.9% of GNP in 1972 to
2.8% in 2000); Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The
Democratic Case, supra note 13, at 177 (asserting that "[n]o serious student
denies that the existing system achieves its cleanup goals at an extra-ordinarily
high cost").
163 See infra notes 193-200 and accompanying text. See also DEWITT JOHN,
CIVIC ENVIRONMENTALISM: ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATION IN STATES AND

COMMUNITIES 10 (1994) (quoting an Iowan as stating that "[iut may take an
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ture by special interests,'
tendency to freeze technology,'
and
tendency to generate litigation.' 6 6 The relationship between federal and
state responsibilities also has been called into question, with critics
maintaining that the federal command and control system leaves an
inadequate role for the states.' 67
Moreover, the symptoms of dysfunction abound. At any given
time, the EPA is a litigant in more than six hundred lawsuits'68 and
has several hundred rulemakings underway, including numerous
"major" rulemakings 6 9 which on average take four years to comoccupying army to regulate the 100,000 farmers in our state."). The difficulties
of addressing diffuse sources are not limited to the United States. See Farm
Pollution Row Brings Down Flanders Government, ENV'T WATCH WESTERN
EUROPE, Apr. 7, 1995, at 14 (discussing the fall of a provincial government in
Belgium arising from attempts to limit the amount of manure used as fertilizer
by farmers). In addition, an environmental issue brought down the Dutch
government in 1989. See JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 49.
16 See infra notes 201-08 and accompanying text. See, e.g., ACKERMAN &

supranote 11, at 44-48; Stewart, Madison 's
Nightmare,supranote 19,
at 335.
165 See, e.g., Sunstein, Administrative Substance, supra note 38, at 627-29
(describing BAT strategies as a "defining characteristic of the regulation of the
air, water and workplace conditions"). Professor Sunstein has identified a number
of key problems with BAT: (1) BAT strategies discourage citizen and representative debate about environmental ends; (2) BAT requirements produce "wildly
inefficient" results because BAT requirements do not account for differences
among plants, industries and geographical areas; (3) some BAT requirements
penalize new products or technologies by imposing BAT on new facilities rather
than existing facilities; and (4) BAT requirements focus on "superficial
symptoms rather than underlying causes of pollution." Id. at 628, 630.
HASSLER,

166 See, e.g., PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 33, at 883 (noting that by 1977

over 200 lawsuits had been filed against the EPA's Clean Water Act effluent
guidelines); Ackerman& Stewart,ReformingEnvironmentalLaw,supranote 11,
at 1337 (noting that BAT standards "provide a fertile ground for complex
litigation in the form of massive adversary rulemaking proceedings and
protracted judicial review").
167 See infra notes 210-16 and accompanying text.
168 See, e.g., Leslie Kaufman, CabinetFever,GOV'T ExEC., July 1993, at 32,
35. See generallyRosemary O'Leary, The Impact ofFederalCourt Decisions on
the PoliciesandAdministrationofthe U.S. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency, 41
ADMIN. L. REV. 549 (1989).

169 See, e.g., Regulatory Agenda, 60 Fed. Reg. 23,928 (1995). The initial
Reagan Administration executive order on regulatory review defined a "major"
rulemaking as one that is likely to produce an impact on the economy of $100
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plete. 7 ° Environmental regulations often must be interpreted by plant
managers and others under emergency conditions, yet the regulations have
been described as "stupefyingly complex"' and fill at least sixteen
volumes of the Code of Federal Regulations. Furthermore, the
system based on installation and operation of BAT provides only limited
opportunities for innovation by the regulated community and government.
The command and control regulatory system also has been criticized
for its erratic agenda. Critics maintain that although the command and
control system has achieved substantial environmental gains, the
correspondence between its agenda and the most critical remaining
environmental problems is limited."7 The absence of overall objectives
has enabled critics to claim both that major environmental problems
remain unaddressed 74 and that the system has regulated many of the
most apparent or most substantial risks, with current actions focusing on
expensive efforts to eliminate "the remaining one percent."'7"

million or more, or a substantial increase in costs or prices. Executive Order No.
12,291, 3 C.F.R. § 127 (1981). The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 alone
required the EPA to promulgate more than 200 rulemakings in two years. See
PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 33, at 766.
170

See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 168, at 35.

Anderson, supra note 52, at 411, 413 (noting that the EPA published
almost 3500 pages of proposed and final regulations in the Federal Register in
the first half of 1994).
172 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1-1517 (1996). The difficulty of understanding these
regulations has been noted recently by several federal courts that have rejected
environmental enforcement actions on the grounds that the agency interpretations
of complex environmental regulations did not provide fair notice regarding the
regulatory requirements. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. U.S. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324,
1331 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that a "person 'of good faith' would not
reasonably expect" the EPA's interpretation of a PCB rule); Massachusetts v.
Blackstone Valley Elec. Co., 67 F.3d 981, 991 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that a
"complicated regulatory regime like CERCLA or the CWA cannot function
effectively unless citizens are given fair notice of their obligations"). The
environmental regulatory framework includes more than twenty federal statutes
and six federal agencies. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 90, at xxvii.
173 See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, supra
note 11, at 1337 (noting that "[a] BAT strategy is inconsistent with intelligent priority setting").
174 See, e.g., Houck, The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants,supra note 72, at
10,540-41.
17'

"t Bud Ward, Playingthe Few Cards Left, 12 ENVTL. F. 4 (1996) (quoting

Norman Ornstein); see Farber, supra note 8, at 1294 (getting the "last five
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Regardless of which, if any, of these views is correct, the current
environmental regulatory system is unable to defend its allocation of
resources. Congressional enactment of new environmental laws tracks
environmental disasters more closely than a strategic attack on the most
important environmental problems. 176 Each of these statutes may have
been a necessary and appropriate response to environmental problems, but
none of them was the product of a broad strategic decision about which
environmental problems should be addressed first.
The EPA's attempts to prioritize problems have suffered a similar
fate. In particular, the EPA's attempts to prioritize problems based
primarily on risk, such as the EPA Science Advisory Board's 1990
Regulating Risk report 177 and the 1987 EPA report Unfinished Business,178 have triggered debate about the use of risk assessment and the
need for priorities. 179 But controversies over the appropriate use of risk
assessment abound, and the EPA has only limited control over its
allocation of human and financial resources, particularly after the last

percent"canprevent effective decisionmaking) (citing DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE

516 (1986)). The actual extent to which we are in a last one percent
situation is highly debatable. The perception that we are is so widespread,
however, that the idea is having a significant effect on the public debate. See,
e.g., Stewart, EnvironmentalRegulation, supra note 14, at 2085. Attempts to
define a risk-oriented agenda have been controversial. Public perceptions of risk
diverge widely from experts' perceptions. See STEVEN BREYER, BREAKING THE
Vicious CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 21, 34 (1993); Farber,
supra note 8, at 1283-85. The narrow focus of the risk debate undercuts its ue
as an agenda-setting tool, and scholars have noted the heavy administrative
burdens that may be imposed by risk analyses. See Oliver A. Houck, Risk
RECKONING

Management Gone Too Far?, ENVTL. F., Mar./Apr. 1994, at 8, 8-10 (book
review) (reviewing BREYER, supra) [hereinafter Houck, Risk Management].
176 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 52, at 414 (noting that environmental
statutes developed as Congress reacted to "the environmental crisis of each
particular year"). Examples that are commonly cited are CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675 (1994) (enacted after public concem over Love Canal), the
Toxic Release Inventory provisions of the 1986 Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act ("SARA"), 42 U.S.C. § 11022 (1994) (enacted after the
Bhopal disaster), and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761
(1994) (enacted after the Exxon Valdez oil spill).
177U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SCIENCE ADVISORYBOARD,

REGULATING RISK (1990).
178 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, UNFINISHED BusINEss

(1987).
179

See, e.g., Farber, supra note 8, at 1281-85.
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decade of statutory deadlines enforced through court orders.' Consequently, although the EPA's attempts to identify the most substantial risks
have placed an important new emphasis on the need for priority-setting,
they have had a limited impact on the overall direction of the EPA's
resources and regulatory efforts.' 8 '
2. Environmental Criticisms
The ability of the command and control system to achieve long-term
human health and environmental objectives (albeit largely undefined) also
has been called into question.8 2 Significant improvements in environ183
mental quality have occurred during the past twenty-five years,
despite large increases in population and economic activity, and many of
these gains are the product of BAT requirements.'84 Nevertheless,
critical problems persist, and the long-term health of the environment is
far from assured.'85 In particular, the command and control system is
See Ackerman & Stewart, ReformingEnvironmentalLaw,supranote 11,
at 1360 n.61 (noting that priority-setting through litigation provides no assurance
of "a sensible allocation of limited administrative and compliance resources");
Dwyer, supra note 126, at 236 (noting that "U]udicial intervention denied the
Agency the opportunity to create a functional regulatory program and advanced
few, if any, of Congress' substantive goals"). In addition, numerous studies
suggest that public reaction to risks is not rational: highly visible risks are
overestimated, while less dramatic risks are underestimated. See, e.g., Sunstein,
DemocratizingAmerica, supra note 26, at 974.
181 See NAPA REPORT, supra note 57, at 17-18. The EPA has made several
recent attempts to establish relative priorities among environmental objectives,
such as the EPA Goals Project, the New Generation of Environmental Protection
(EPA's Strategic Plan), and, for enforcement policy, the creation of the Office
of Compliance Assurance in the new EPA Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance. No formal mechanism exists to translate priorities, whether
based on risk or any other criterion, into the legal and budgetary responsibilities
of the EPA and the other affected federal agencies.
180

182

See, e.g., NAPA REPORT, supra note 57, at 1-5.

See supra notes 36-55 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, OfBats, Birds, and B-A-T The Convergent
Evolution of EnvironmentalLaw, 63 MIss. L.J. 403 (1994) [hereinafter Houck,
Of Bats, Birds, and B-A-TJ; Latin, supra note 101, at 1267; Sidney A. Shapiro
& Thomas 0. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical:The Rationalefor TechnologyBased Regulation, 1991 DuKE L.J. 729.
185 Defenders of a strong federal regulatory role have maintained that the
effectiveness of the command and control system has been hampered by an
183

184
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not well suited to address the multiple, diffuse, non-point sources that
characterize6 many of the emerging second generation environmental
problems.1
Furthermore, although the attempts to address the first generation
problems garnered broad popular support early on, attempts to address
second generation problems face greater difficulties. Efforts to address
first generation sources often attacked visible emissions from large
polluters. The "enemy" was clear: large, industrial polluters. The
imposition of costs through command and control regulations on these
large point sources required little sacrifice from the general public. With
some notable exceptions, the costs of command and control regulations
for the general public were so diffuse that resistance to them typically
was limited to the specific industry, employees, or local government
affected.
Similarly, the large point source emissions that characterize the first
generation problems may have been the most amenable to regulation
through command and control requirements. These sources often are
sufficiently homogeneous to enable BAT standards to be identified for
source categories. The large size and comparatively small total number
of sources also facilitated vigorous enforcement of the BAT requirements.
The second generation problems may pose no less threat to the
environment, but they are less susceptible to regulation by currently

unintegrated approach, ranging from the tendency to move contaminants from
one medium to another, to a focus on end-of-the pipe controls rather than
pollution prevention and non-point sources. See, e.g., Lakshman Guruswamy,
IntegratingThoughtways: Re-Opening of the EnvironmentalMind?, 1989 WIs.
L. REv. 463,472-76. They have pointed to an inability to integrate environmental concerns into areas of economic and other incentives (e.g., tax, resources, and
transportation planning). See, e.g., SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, supra
note 31, at 182-84. Concerns also have been raised about the disproportionate
burden of risks on low income and minority populations. See, e.g., Jon C. Dubin,
From Junkyards to Gentrification:Explicatinga Right to ProtectiveZoning in
Low Income Communities of Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739 (1993); Richard J.
Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice" The DistributionalEffects of
Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787 (1993); Peter L. Reich,
Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of EnvironmentalRace Discrimination,41 U.
KAN. L. REV. 271 (1992); see also Executive Order No. 12,898, reprintedas
amended in 3 C.F.R. § 321 (1996).
186 Attempts to address these problems in the 1970s included mandatory gas
rationing and other measures. These were extremely unpopular. See Schoenbrod,
supra note 17, at 770-71; PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 33, at 795.
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available command and control mechanisms, and they are less likely to
generate public support.'87 The large number and variability of the
sources of the second generation problems may make them less amenable
to BAT regulations. In addition, for many of these second generation
problems, such as urban and agricultural run-off, the enemy is not an
easily identified industrial polluter but a broad pattern of activities, often
involving small businesses and the general public itself. Finally,
numerous studies have suggested that the public overreacts to visible,
dramatic risks and does not respond to equally important but less
dramatic risks.8'8 Because they originate in multiple, diffuse sources
and because their impacts often are long-term or occur on a global level,
the second generation problems are particularly difficult for the public to
understand and to respond to.
Perhaps as a result, attempts to use command and control requirements to address the second generation problems have fueled resistance
to government intrusion. As early as the mid-1970s, EPA attempts to use
command and control approaches other than BAT standards, such as
restricting commuting to achieve Clean Air Act requirements in Southern
California, met with stiff opposition.' 9 Recent history also provides
numerous examples of adverse reactions to the command and control
system's attempts to regulate diffuse, multiple non-point sources. In
particular, EPA regulations aimed at restricting the emissions of smog
precursors from a wide variety of sources, ranging from dry cleaners to
mobile sources to a variety of consumer products, have been unpopular. 9 ' Despite the importance of second generation sources, the constant

See, e.g., ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 90, at 356 (describing the
solution to non-point source water pollution as "a complicated mix of institutional and technical factors"). The problems with regulating behavior to address
second generation sources have been apparent for some time. See, e.g., Eli
Chernow, Implementing the Clean Air Act in Los Angeles: The Duty to Achieve
the Impossible, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 537 (1975) (noting that achieving air quality
standards in the California South Coast Air Basin would have required motor
vehicle miles travelled to be reduced by 80%).
l88 See, e.g., Sunstein, DemocratizingAmerica, supra note 26, at 974.
89 See, e.g., PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 33, at 795.
90 See, e.g., Carolyn Whetzer, Air Pollution: Southern CaliforniaDumps
RideshareRule, Adopts MeasureRelying on Menu of Options, Daily Env't Rep.
(BNA) A-9, A-10 (Dec. 13, 1995); see also Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847 (1996). The best
recent examples arise from the EPA's attempt to implement the 1990 Clean Air
Act Amendments provisions that address second generationproblems, such as the
187
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theme of many critics is that federal intrusion into consumer and small
business activity is unwarranted and unacceptable. The animus toward
these types of restrictions is deep.
Urban and agricultural non-point water pollution is a case in point.
Although the CEQ and the EPA have identified agricultural runoff as the
principal remaining water quality problem, federal attempts to limit nonpoint source emissions directly, or to prompt states to control non-point
sources, for example, through mandated state or regional watershed
planning, have met with limited success. 9' The difficulty of applying
command and control regulations to non-point water pollution problems
was highlighted recently by one commentator, who quoted an Iowa
farmer as saying that "[i]t may take an occupying army to regulate the
100,000 farmers in our state."' 92 To the extent many of the remaining
environmental problems arise from second generation sources such as
small air emitters and urban and agricultural runoff, the traditional
command and control approaches are unlikely to succeed.
3.

Democracy Criticisms:The Democracy Deficit

In recent years, a number of scholars, including Professors Bruce
Ackerman, Richard Stewart, and Cass Sunstein, have identified a more
carpooling incentives of the Employee Commute Option System ("ECOS"), see,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(d) (1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 42,056, 42,056-57 (1994)
(discussing the ECOS as implemented in Indiana); automobile inspection and
maintenance systems, see, e.g., Inspection/lMaintenanceFlexibility Amendments,
60 Fed. Reg. 20,934 (1995) (to be recodified at 40 C.F.R pt. 517 (proposed Apr.
28, 1995) (recent automobile inspection and maintenance rules); and regulation
of air emissions from a variety of sources ranging from dry cleaners to
outboard motors and charcoal grilling. These actions are directed at important
second generation sources, but have met with criticism and resistance from
businesses, states, Congress, and the general public. See Ackerman & Stewart,
Reforming Environmental Law, supra note 11, at 1349 (noting that under a
command and control approach "regulators must consistently undertake new,
difficult, and unpopular initiatives to impose ever more stringent BAT controls
on existing sources in order to accommodate economic growth without increased
pollution").
1'1 See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 208, 33 U.S.C. § 1288 (1994) (mandated
planning process). Section 208 requires states to develop watershed plans for
waters affected by point and non-point sources. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra
note 90, at 363 (noting that "a number of implementation problems weakened the
§ 208 planning effort").
192 JOHN, supra note 163, at 10.
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fundamental problem with the BAT-driven command and control system:
the process of selecting the specific technologies or emissions rates that
are at the core of the command and control system is not amenable to
meaningful public participation.' 93 Overall, these scholars have noted
that the command and control system has focused the public debate on
the means of environmental protection, such as the appropriate BAT
control technology for a particular source, and away from the ultimate
ends of environmental protection, such as the acceptable level of a
particular type of pollution.'9 4 These scholars have identified at least
two major concerns with this focus on environmental means: (1) the
general public is for all intents and purposes excluded from participating
in the most important decisionmaking within the environmental regulatory
system; and (2) the centralization of decisionmaking in the federal
environmental regulatory system has made it vulnerable to control by
interested factions and has diminished the role of states and localities.
According to Professor Stewart, these concerns comprise a "democracy
deficit" in the command and control system.' 95
As to the first concern, Professors Stewart and Ackerman have
maintained that the BAT system discourages a "serious political
encounter" with questions about how clean the environment should be
and how much money should be spent on it: "BAT focuses Congressional
debate, as well as administrative and judicial proceedings, upon arcane
technological questions which rapidly exhaust the time and energy that

See Sunstein, Democratizing America, supra note 26, at 957-59. See
generallyAckerman & Stewart, Reforming EnvironmentalLaw, supra note 11;
Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case,
supra note 13; Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks, supra note 148;
Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, supra note 19; Sunstein, Administrative
Substance, supra note 38, at 607.
194 See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law:
The
Democratic Case, supra note 13, at 171 (describing the current regulatory
choices as "a flood of technocratic mumbo-jumbo").
195 Stewart, Antidotes, supra note 12, at 85. This view about
the failure of
government actions to reflect democratic ideals extends to both the legislative
and executive branches. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The State ofMadison 's Vision
of the State:A Public ChoicePerspective,107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1335 (1995)
[hereinafter Easterbrook, Madison's Vision] ("All participants in this discourse
agree that Madison's vision of a national legislature in which most members,
most of the time, look to the public good, rather than to the clamor of private
interests, has not been realized.").
193
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most politicians, let alone the larger public, are willing to spend on
environmental matters.', 196 Instead, they argue that
[r]ather than debating the difference between the 'best available control
technology' and 'lowest achievable emission rate,' [in a system based
on environmental ends] citizens may focus upon a different question
when the environmental acts come up for revision: During the next n
years, should we instruct the EPA gradually to decrease (or increase)
the number of pollution rights by x percent?'97
Similarly, Professor Sunstein has noted that the need to select particular
technologies in many environmental statutes focuses the debate on "the
largely incidental and nearly impenetrable question of what technologies
are now available."'9 8 This focus distracts the debate from the more
important questions of "the appropriate degree and nature of regulatory
protection."' 99 Overall, these scholars maintain that the product of BAT
standards is an absence of transparency in decisionmaking, lack of public
accountability among elected representatives, and ultimately a loss of
democratic control over environmental decisions. 0 0
'96Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming EnvironmentalLaw: The Democratic
Case, supra note 13, at 189.
197 Id. Several commentators have asserted that broad public participation and
reasoned deliberation about complex issues may simply be incompatible. See
Edley, supra note 92, at 602; see also Note, Civic Republican Administrative
Theory:BureaucratsasDeliberativeDemocrats,107 HARv. L. REv. 1401, 140305 (1994).
198 Sunstein, DemocratizingAmerica, supra note 26, at 958.
199
Sunstein, Administrative Substance, supra note 38, at 629.
20 See id. at 629; Cass R. Sunstein, Well-Being and the State, 107 HARv. L.
REV. 1303, 1304 (1994). Professor Sunstein's work has also drawn on the
renewed interest in civic republicanism. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups
in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985) [hereinafter Sunstein,
Interest Groups]; CassR. Sunstein, Beyondthe RepublicanRevival, 97 YALE L.J.
1539 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Beyond]; MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE
AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTION LAW (1988) (proposing the
opposition of "liberal" and "republican" traditions); Frank I. Michelman, The
Supreme Court, 1985 Term -Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARv.
L. REv. 4 (1986); Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493
(1988) (contrasting the dominant "pluralist" views with "liberal republicanism"
or "Madisonian Republicanism"); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What Is Republicanism?, 102 HARV. L. REv. 1695, 1697 (1989) (identifying "core tenets" including
"that human beings are essentially political animals, that they can fulfill their
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The second concern is that BAT standards facilitate factional control
over the regulatory process. This view has been expressed most clearly
in Professor Stewart's essay entitled Madison's Nightmare2"' and in
several recent articles by Professor Sunstein. °2 According to this view,
James Madison's principal fear was the control of the democratic process
by economic and ideological factions. In Federalist No. 10, Madison
asserted that the national government, by virtue of its large size and
diverse composition, would provide more distance from these factions
than state or local governments, thus better enabling the federal government to debate and determine the public good. 203 Madison's prescriptions for the avoidance of factions thus were an attempt to stimulate
rational democratic discourse regarding the public good.2 4
Professors Stewart and Sunstein have maintained that despite the
design of the national government, factions exert significant influence
over the regulatory system, reproducing on a national level the problems
that Madison feared would occur on a local level.2 °5 The complex,
technological focus of the environmental command and control system

natures only by participating in self-government, and that the most important
aims of the political community should be to promote virtue among the citizenry
and to advance the common good" (footnotes omitted)).
201 Stewart, Madison s Nightmare, supra note 19.
202 See, e.g., Sunstein, Administrative Substance, supra note 38, at 625-31;
see also Gary Lawson, The Rise andRise ofthe AdministrativeState, 107 HARV.
L. REv. 1231 (1994).
203 SeeTHE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77-78 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961); Stewart, Madison'sNightmare,supra note 19, at 335; see also Cass
R. Sunstein, Factions, Self-Interest and the APA: Four Lessons Since 1946, 72
VA. L. REv. 271, 272 (1986). Of course, even the existence of the "public good"
is problematic. See Easterbrook, Madison's Vision, supra note 195, at 1339
(describing the Madisonian concept of the public good to be "empty"); Steven
G. Gey, The UnfortunateRevival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REv.
801, 854-94 (1993) (noting the substantive and procedural problems associated
with the public good).
204 See Sunstein, InterestGroups, supranote 200, at 38-48; Sunstein, Beyond,
supra note 200, at 1547-58; see also Easterbrook, Madison s Vision, supra note
195, at 1331-33 (stating that the prescriptions envisioned by Madison included
the design of institutions to provide decisionmakers with "agency slack" or
distance from the direct political fray, such as the use of the electoral college in
presidential elections, the election of senators by state legislatures, and the
diversity of the states in the federal structure).
20' See, e.g., Stewart, Madison's Nightmare,supra note 19, at 335; Sunstein,
DemocratizingAmerica, supra note 26, at 958.
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contributes to this modem factionalism by excluding non-specialists from
the public debate over the development of BAT standards. 0 6 These
scholars also note that command and control regulatory systems shift
power from the President and Congress to the unelected federal bureaucracies and courts because of the tendency of the command and control
systems to require far more decisions than can be overseen by the
President or Congress.
As a result of the exclusion of non-specialists and the flood of
technical decisionmaking, congressional subcommittees, executive
agencies, and courts make most of the significant decisions, all under the
influence of interested constituencies (both industry and environmentalists) and in the absence of broader accountability.0 7 The organized
economic and ideological interest groups crowd out more disinterested or
general notions of the public good. In essence, the public good Madison
envisioned being generated by a broad, national perspective is inverted
by the "micro-politics" of the federal agency-congressional subcommitteeinterest group arrangement. °8 Professor Stewart has described this
tripartite arrangement as the "iron triangle."2 9
In addition to interest group control, Professor Sunstein has noted that
the centralizing effect of federal command and control strategies leads to
a diminished role for states and localities, thus further excluding citizen
participation in environmental decisionmakingY ° Sunstein has noted
that some worker safety and environmental issues can best be resolved by
workers and local community participants in order "to promote more
engagement with governmental affairs."' He has suggested setting
national performance standards as a "floor" while permitting states

See, e.g., Sunstein, Administrative Substance, supra note 38, at 607.
See Stewart, Madison'sNightmare, supra note 19, at 341-42.
208 According to Professor Stewart, the structural protections of the
constitutional design have been superseded by this "new political system." Id. at
340, 342. This modem form of regulatory factionalism is not limited to
environmental law, but extends to a wide range of fields that involve complex
command
and control regulation. Id.
209
Id. at 341-42; Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming EnvironmentalLaw: The
DemocraticCase, supranote 13, at 191; see alsoEasterbrook, Madison's Vision,
supra note 195, at 1335 (maintaining that the extended rulemaking proceedings
of the Administrative Procedure Act combined with congressional oversight
hearings "reduce agency space and therefore augment the relative power of
faction").
210 See Sunstein, DemocratizingAmerica, supra note 26, at 971.
211 Id.
206

207
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flexibility to take differing regulatory approaches, so long as the floor is
met.
For the most part, however, the solutions posed by the democracy
theorists have been market trading systems.2 12 In their view, the process
of identifying acceptable levels of pollution on which to base rights to
pollute, the starting point of a market trading system, will be much more
amenable to democratic discourse and to decentralized decisionmaking
'than the debates over technology standards that have dominated enactment and implementation of the command and control statutes.21 3 As
discussed in Part VI, however, the suggestion of market trading mechanisms as the logical cure for the democracy deficit may be selling the
concept of ends-based approaches short.1 4
C. The FadingParadigm
Regardless of whether one accepts the myriad economic, environmental, and democracy criticisms just outlined, it is clear that although
the command and control system is the principal implementing mechanism of environmental law, it is no longer the dominant paradigm for
environmental law reform efforts. A number of commentators have
pointed out that command and control measures have achieved greater
environmental gains than other approaches,2" 5 but the command and
control approach has not provided the intellectual framework for
recent reform proposals.21 6 As Part Im will demonstrate, despite a

212 See, e.g., id. at 949; see also Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, supra note 11.
213 This scholarship has suggested that market mechanisms, in addition to
addressing the economic inefficiencies of the command and control system,
provide an opportunity to address the democracy deficit by forcing decisionmaking away from technology standards and toward the more accessible issues
of emission reductions or rates of emission reductions.
214 In addition, as Professor Heinzerling has noted in a recent analysis of
the
debate over the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, it is not at all clear that a
full debate over environmental ends will occur when Congress enacts legislation
to authorize market trading. Heinzerling, supra note 13, at 303.
215 See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Gaba, FederalSupervision of State Water Quality
Standards Under the Clean Water Act, 36 VAND. L. REv. 1167 (1983); Houck,
OfBats, Birds and B-A-T, supra note 184, at 403; Shapiro & McGarity, supra
note 184; Latin, supra note 101, at 1304-09.
216 See, e.g., Farber, supra note 8, at 1296 (stating that "it is time to explore
new approaches to regulation").
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recent outpouring of reform proposals, articles in the academic literature, and bills before Congress, few propose to increase the use of
command and control measures to address the emerging second generation environmental problems. Much more common are suggestions to
replace or restrict the reach of the existing command and control
system.
II.
A.

THE REFORM PROPOSALS

Market Approaches

In response to the high costs and other failings of the command and
control system, support for market approaches has grown in the past two
decades. Advocates have proposed to reduce government regulation by
using tradeable pollution rights, green taxes, and other means of enabling
the market to serve as the mechanism for reaching desired environmental
outcomes." 7 The advocates of market approaches have touted the
economic efficiencies to be gained by application of market mechanisms
to environmental problems.
Market approaches have been used by the EPA for more than a
decade. These approaches have produced cost savings in several Clean
Air Act programs, including bubbling and trade-off approaches,2 18 as
well as the phase-down of leaded gasoline. 9 More recently, Congress

mechanisms have been advocated by a number of authors and
policymakers. See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law:
The Democratic Case, supra note 13, at 171; Elliott et al., supra note 90.
See generallyRobert H. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Where DidAll the Markets
Go? An Analysis ofEPA 'sEmissions TradingProgram,6 YALE J. ON REG. 109
(1989) (discussing the need to analyze the multiple impacts of emissions
trading); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Market Models for Water Pollution Control:
Their Strengths and Weaknesses, 25 PUB. POL'Y 383 (1977) [hereinafter RoseAckerman, Market Models] (contrasting the market approaches of effluent
charges and pollution rights).
218 See, e.g., Richard Stewart, Economics, Environment, and the Limits of
Legal Control, 9 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 12-14 (1985); see also Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Emissions Trading Policy Statement, 51
Fed. Reg. 43,814 (1986).
219 See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, supra
217 Market
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expanded the use of market approaches by adopting a scheme for
marketable sulfur dioxide allowances in the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments.22 In California, the South Coast Air Quality Management
District recently developed a regional air emissions trading scheme called
the RECLAIM program.22' The Clinton Administration also has advocated extending market systems to additional air and water pollution
control programs. 222
The growth of market approaches has been somewhat limited,
however, and the prospects for expanding market approaches are
uncertain, at least in part because of the criticisms they have generated.223 Market mechanisms have been criticized on a number of
fronts224 and have been viewed skeptically by many environmental

note 11, at 1348-49 (estimating the savings of the lead phase-down to be in the
hundreds of millions of dollars) (citing U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING AND EVALUATION, COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF REDUCING LEAD IN GASOLINE: FINAL REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS

(1985)).
220 See subchapter IV-A of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L.
101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651(o)
(1994)). The flexibility provided by the acid rain allowance trading program
reduced initial acid rain emissions control costs by $200 million, according to
one study. See Regulatory Reform of Title IV Responsiblefor Lowering Cost of
S0 2 Emission Control, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) A-9 (Oct. 5, 1995).
221 See Alexandra Teitz, Assessing Point Source Discharge in Permit
Trading: ControllingSelenium Dischargesto the San FranciscoBay Estuary, 21
ECOLOGY L.Q. 79, 86-87 (1994).
222 See Clinton Plan Sets Program to Lift Rules Burdening Those Who
Exceed Standards,Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) D-3 (Mar. 17, 1995); Alec Zacaroli,
GreaterRole Sought for Emissions Trading in EnvironmentalRegulation, 26
Env't Rep. (BNA) 331 (June 9, 1995).
223 See, e.g., Hahn & Hester, supra note 217, at 6-9; Sunstein, Democratizing
America, supra note 26, at 968 (describing the use of one Clean Air Act market
program as "quite limited").
224 See, e.g., Latin, supra note 101, at 1270-71; Sunstein, Administrative
Substance, supra note 38, at 636-37; see also STEVEN BREYER, REGULATION
AND ITS REFORM 171-74 (1982); Jerry Mashaw, Imaginingthe Past; Remembering the Future, 1991 DUKE L.J. 711, 721-23; Joel A. Mintz, Economic Reform
ofEnvironmental Protection:A Brief Comment on a Recent Debate, 15 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 149, 152-54 (1991). See generally Shapiro & McGarity, supra
note 184 (critiquing Sunstein's market-based approach in favor of BAT
regulation).
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groups.225 Critics have maintained that few empirical studies
22 6
support the efficacy of market mechanisms in the environmental area,
that market mechanisms will sacrifice environmental protection,22
and that widespread application of market mechanisms is not feasible.

2 28

The strongest criticism may be that creating tradeable rights to pollute
"commodifies" interests that some argue should not be commodified.229
In a related view, creation of tradeable rights to pollute would sanction the emission of pollutants, which some consider to be an improper
or immoral act.23° Similarly, several commentators have maintained
that the rhetoric of the market model legitimizes rights to pollute
and therefore undercuts environmental values.'
Although market

The principal exception is the Environmental Defense Fund. See, e.g.,
Robert W. Hahn, UnitedStates EnvironmentalPolicy:Past,PresentandFuture,
225

34 NAT. RESOURCES J. 305, 332 (1994).

See Farber, supra note 8, at 1278, 1290 ("Until these studies [of the
efficacy of market approaches] have been done, we should proceed cautiously in
replacing conventional regulation with incentive schemes.").
227 See, e.g., Latin, supra note 101, at 1271.
228 See Houck, Risk Management, supra note 175, at 8-10.
229 See generally Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L.
REv.2301849 (1987) (discussing justifications for market inalienability).
226

See generallyMARK

SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSO-

PHY, LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1988); Mark Sagoff, Economic Theory and
Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1393 (1981). The largely undiscussed
distinction between normative and utilitarian approaches to environmental
protection has a tremendous impact on the implementation and reform of
environmental law. See, e.g., William H. Ruckelshaus, Stopping the Pendulum,
ENVTL. F., Nov./Dec. 1995, at 25 (describing the normative approach as "quasireligion").
231 For a discussion of the concern about the rhetoric of rights to pollute, see
MargaretJ. Radin, Compensation andCommensurability,1993 DuKE L.J. 56, 58;
Radin, supranote 229, at 1849 (examining "commodification"ofpersonhood and
the impact of market rhetoric). See generally Frances E. Olsen, The Family and
the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1497
(1983). But see Carol Rose, EnvironmentalFaustSuccumbs to the Temptations
of Economic Mephistopheles, or, Value by Any Other Name is Preference, 87
MICH. L. REv. 1631 (1989) (book review) (reviewing MARK SAGOFF, THE

ECONOMY OF THE EARTH (1988)). For a review of the commonality of views

about the expressive function of law among environmental ethicists, civic
republicans, and commodification theorists, see generally Jane B. Barron &
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mechanisms ultimately may prove successful, these critics have asserted
that the market approach does not provide a basis for environmental
aspirations.
Perhaps because of these criticisms, the movement toward market
mechanisms in environmental law has been slow. After more than two
decades of proposals and vigorous debate, the acid rain provisions of the
1990 Clean Air Act Amendments are the only express statutory market
provisions in the command and control system. Agency use of trading
mechanisms through administrative measures has been more widespread,
but has not extended beyond the programs discussed above.232 At the
same time, many market incentives are largely unexplored by policymakers or have not been attempted broadly, such as a comprehensive
national air emissions trading program, global C02 trading, and various
tax incentives and deposit schemes.2 33
The most important barrier to the expansion of market mechanisms
may be that creating tradeable rights to pollute requires the establishment of property rights in emissions. Establishment of property rights
in emissions requires quantification of acceptable levels of emissions.
In turn, this requires an understanding of the impact of emissions on
ambient conditions. By relying on BAT, the current environmental
regulatory system has not created incentives to generate comprehensive inventories of emissions levels for many pollutants or for many
media, or comprehensive studies of the impacts of these emissions on
ambient environmental conditions. Moreover, by not creating a clear
relationship between allowable emissions levels and desired ambient
conditions or other environmental outcomes, the environmental regulatory system has left itself open to skepticism about whether market
mechanisms will lead to a cleaner environment, or only to cost savings.
Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques of Economic
Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARDOzO L. REv. 431 (1996).
232 The EPA has expressed its intention to allow trading of NO. and VOC
air emissions under the Clean Air Act and of water emissions under the Clean
Water Act, although some of these trading schemes may require statutory
changes. See Bill Clinton & Al Gore, Reinventing Environmental Regulation,
INSIDE

EPA, Mar. 17, 1995, at 1.

See Sunstein, Administrative Substance, supra note 38, at 637-39
(discussing emissions trading of carbon dioxide on a global level).
233
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B. Additional Reform Proposals
1. The EPA Reforms
In recent years, reforms to the command and control system have
been proposed by the EPA,24 the states,235 numerous blue ribbon
commissions,1 6 and scholars. 237 In addition to its efforts to expand
market trading, the EPA has launched a number of non-market efforts to
reform the environmental regulatory system. These efforts have covered
a wide range of issues, including attempts to gain control of the
regulatory agenda, whether through the 1987 and 1990 re-examinations
of the environmental agenda based on risk, as discussed above,238 or
through more recent attempts to develop a comprehensive strategic plan

" For example, on the federal level, a number of voluntary programs have
been developed, such as the "33/50 Program," see U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, SPECIAL PROJECTS OFFICE, THE 33/50 PROGRAM:
FORGING AN ALLIANCE FOR POLLUTION PREVENTION (1992); the "Common
Sense Initiative," see CAROL M. BROWNER, THE COMMON SENSE INITIATIVE: A
NEW GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1994) (remarks at Center
for National Policy NewsmakerLuncheon, Washington, D.C.); "Project XL," see
Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282 (May 23,
1995); and the "Design for the Environment Program," see U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE DESIGN FOR THE ENVIRONMENT PROGRAM:
CLEANER TECHNOLOGIES FOR A SAFER FUTURE (1993). Other programs that do
not rely on traditional command and control or market trading schemes include
the information disclosure required by the Toxic Release Inventory ("TRI"), see
42 U.S.C. § 11022, and disclosure requirements for environmental liabilities
under the securities laws, see, e.g., E. Donald Elliott et al., A PracticalGuide to
Writing Environmental Disclosures,25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,237
(May 1995).
235 For examples of state innovations, see State Roundup - Texas, Daily
Env't Rep. (BNA) B-3 (Aug. 29, 1995) (Texas pollution prevention program).
See alsoRobert F. Blomquist, Government'sRoleRegardinglndustrialPollution
Prevention in the UnitedStates, 29 GA. L. REV. 349, 414 (1995) (discussing the
Massachusetts
"Blackstone" project).
236
See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: A
NEW CONSENSUS FOR PROSPERITY, OPPORTUNITY AND A HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT (1996). See generally NAPA REPORT, supra note 57.

Proposals to date include "civic environmentalism," see JOHN, supra note
163, at 10, and "integrated thoughtways," see Guruswamy, supra note 185, at
492-514.
238 See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
2
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for the EPA.239 The reform efforts also have included structural changes, such as adding an EPA international office, and restructuring
enforcement elements to increase emphasis on compliance assurance and
economic sector-based enforcement.24 °
The EPA efforts also have included attempts to supplement the
statutory command and control requirements with new, voluntary
compliance tracks. These programs have included numerous voluntary
emission reduction programs,241 as well as efforts to re-examine regulatory requirements on a sector-by-sector or facility-specific basis.242
Despite these efforts, the statutory imperatives of the command and
control system continue to drive the great majority of the EPA's
resources and programs.243
2. PrivateInitiatives and Academia
The reform proposals advanced by blue ribbon commissions and
in the academic literature also have ranged widely. Market trading
approaches were advocated in the academic literature more than a
decade before the 1990 Clean Air Amendments established the first
statutory trading scheme. 2 " More recently, private initiatives
and academic proposals have included developing alternative environ2 46
mental performance tracks,2 4' returning decisionmaking to the states
or local communities,247 increasing reliance on public information to stimulate compliance, 24' and returning to common law reme-

See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, A NEW GENERATION
OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: A SUMMARY OF EPA's FIVE-YEAR
STRATEGIC
PLAN (1994) (Executive Summary).
240
See, e.g., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ENFORCEMENT
REORGANIZATION PLAN (1993); see also Stahl, supra note 35.
241 See supra note 234.
242 See, e.g., U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Common Sense
Initiative, 59 Fed. Reg. 55,117 (Nov. 3, 1994).
243 See NAPA REPORT, supra note 57, at 11-12.
24 See generally Rose-Ackerman, Market Models, supra note 217.
239

245

See, e.g., HAMMOND ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS, supra note

14, at 11-16.
246 For a review of efforts to return environmental decisionmaking to the
states, see Pendergrass, supra note 117, at 8.
247 See generallyJOHN, supranote 163 (advocating an increasedrole for local
communities).
248 See, e.g., Christopher L. Bell, ISO 14001: Application of International
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dies. 4 9 These proposals often have included recommendations to
replace the multitude of environmental laws with a single comprehensive
statute.250
Several recent proposals have emphasized the potential importance of
2
environmental outcomes or performance indicatorsY.
' These proposals
have emphasized the importance of developing environmental criteria to
evaluate the state of the environment and the performance of the
environmental regulatory system.
C. EnvironmentalGridlock: Prospectsfor Reform
Despite the flurry of reform activity, environmental law reform
remains in gridlock. The environmental debate is extremely polarized.2" 2 No major environmental legislation was enacted during the five
year period from 1991 to 1995.253 Although amendments to food safety
and drinking water laws passed in 1996, more fundamental legislative
changes did not move. Moreover, the regulatory reform initiatives

Environmental Management Systems Standards in the UnitedStates, 25 Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,678, 10,683 (Dec. 1995) (reviewing environmental
compliance strategies based on the ISO 14000 environmental management
standards).
249 Many commentators have noted that early cases demonstrated that the
common law was inadequate to protect the environment. Cases commonly cited
for this proposition include Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 6 A. 453, 459
(Pa. 1886), limited by Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 319 A.2d 871
(Pa. 1974).
250 See, e.g., Ruckelshaus, supra note 230, at 28-29; William Reilly, The
Future of EnvironmentalLaw, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 351, 353 (1989) (proposing
a single o'rganic statute); Guruswamy, supra note 185, at 516-35; CONSERVATION
FOUNDATION, supra note 30; see also EPA Convenes Talks in Congress on
Integration of EnvironmentalStatutes, INSIDE EPA, July 5, 1996, at 12.
25' See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra
note 236; NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSTITUTE, REINVENTING THE

VEHICLE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (First Phase Report) (1995); see
also Yale Launches Effort to Redefine Future of EnvironmentalPolicy, INSIDE
EPA, Apr. 19, 1996, at 18 (noting that a half dozen reform efforts were
underway in 1996).
252 See infra Part Ill.C. 1 (notes 257-61 and accompanying text).
253 The most significant new environmental laws enacted after 1990 are the
Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-182, 110 Stat.
1613, and the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110
Stat. 1489.
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proposed in recent years are remarkably similar to proposals made more
than a decade before.2 54 As opposed to linear development, commentators have noted a swinging pendulum of legislative and regulatory activity
extending back to the late 1960s.255
To date, the proposed environmental law reforms have resulted in
several new EPA programs and an increased emphasis on emissions
trading and state delegation, but they have had a limited impact on the
overall regulatory system. Although many of the proposed reforms and
new programs include promising approaches to certain environmental
problems, none has y&t emerged with the broad applicability or support
necessary to replace the command and control approach.256
1. The EnvironmentalReform Debate
Why have reforms bogged down? One reason is that the environmental reform debate is dysfunctional. Commentaries about the public
discourse on the environment routinely note that it is polarized and that
symbolic issues dominate.257 The public is generally disengaged.
Although public support for a clean environment is high, there is a great
deal of public dislike of government intrusion and antipathy toward the
costs of environmental protection activities.25 8 -A broad public aspiration
Compare the legislation cited supra note 2 with Schoenbrod, supra note
17, at 823.
" See, e.g., Ruckelshaus, supra note 230, at 25-29. This pendulum in fact
can be traced back even further, perhaps even to the late nineteenth century, in
the natural resource preservation area. See, e.g., SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW, supra note 31, at 18-19. This phenomenon also has been described as a
"policy seesaw." See Stewart, ControllingEnvironmentalRisks,supra note 148,
at 154.
256 New initiatives have been criticized for not achieving sufficient
reductions, for difficulties in monitoring compliance, and for an absence of
transparency. See generally Susan Rose-Ackerman, American Administrative
Law Under Siege: Is Germany a Model?, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1279 (1994)
[hereinafter Rose-Ackerman, American Administrative Law].
257 See, e.g., Pedersen, "Protectingthe Environment,"s'pra note 26, at 978
(noting that "[t]he complexity of environmental issues and the short attention
span of the media allow fake claims of victory and disaster to be taken - all too
often - at face value"). The dysfunctional aspects of the debate are not new. See
Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, supra note 11, at 1352
(noting in 1985 the need for "a more democratic, and more enlightened, dialogue
on the nature of America's evolving environmental objectives").
258 See, e.g., Paul Taylor, ImpasseMirrorsCountry's
Ambivalenceon Modern
254
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for the environment that incorporates these disparate lines of thought has
not developed.
In the current environmental reform debate, each participant has
incentives to extract narrow benefits without accounting for the impact of
its position on the desired state of the environment, not to mention the
corresponding economic or social impacts. Environmentalists have
incentives to gain media attention, raise funds, and increase membership
with warnings of disaster. They are not forced to identify the inherent
environmental, social, or economic trade-offs in their positions, or to
focus public attention on second generation sources. Industry has
incentives to overstate the costs and other burdens of additional emission
reductions in an effort to avoid costs altogether, and has incentives to
shift costs to other economic sectors if the costs cannot be avoided
entirely. Industry also is not forced to identify the environmental,
economic, and social trade-offs that arise from avoiding or shifting
compliance costs.
In the debate, the media and the general public have little basis from
which to evaluate the environmental claims of environmentalists and
industry, or to weigh them against other economic or social impacts." 9
Consequently, environmental news typically is characterized in terms of
polarized controversies involving the environment and the economy. As
a substitute for an independent analysis of the issues, perspectives from
environmental activists are set in opposition to business interests. In these
stories, decisions are either pro-environment or pro-business. The
positions of the decisionmakers are framed by the polar opponents on
both sides.
The executive and legislative branches at the federal and state levels
also have mixed incentives in the environmental debate. These incentives
include the temptation to make unrealistic promises that may never be
implemented in practice.26 ° Both branches face difficulties resisting
pressure from environmentalists and business interests.26' The product
Role of Government,WASH. PosT, Nov. 19, 1995, at A9 (noting that "Americans
are of two minds about the role of their government. They want its protections
but not its intrusions, its benefits but not its costs.").
259 See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, supra
note 11, at 1353 (noting that "the BAT system focuses congressional debate...
upon arcane and technological and definitional questions which rapidly outstrip
the time and energy that most politicians and citizens are willing to spend on
environmental matters").
260 See, e.g., Sunstein, Paradoxes,supra note 7, at 407.
26' This problem is exacerbatedby differences in perceptions of risk. To take
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of this tension is the shifting, crisis-based environmental agenda discussed
in Part II. Regardless of its causes, the shifting agenda prevents government from focusing on the most important long-term environmental
problems, as well as creating uncertainty for the regulated community.
2. EnvironmentalLaw Reform:
Early Lessons and False Choices
A second reason for the slow pace of reform is that the participants
in the environmental law reform efforts learned several false lessons from
the experience of the 1960s and 1970s. These lessons, in turn, create
several false choices that block efforts to reconceptualize the regulatory
framework.
a. Implementing Mechanisms:
Technology Standardsor Ambient Standards
The first such lesson presumes that one of two implementing
mechanisms for environmental law must be selected: technology standards
or ambient standards. The lesson of the early development of environmental laws, and the received wisdom of the academic literature, suggests
that if technology requirements are selected, certainty and national
uniformity regarding emission controls will be achieved, but high costs,
inflexibility, and intrusiveness will result.262 At the same time, the
experience of state adoption and enforcement of ambient standards prior
to 1970 and the limited success of non-BAT provisions in post-1970
environmental statutes suggest that if ambient standards are selected, the

only one example, numerous studies suggest that public and expert perceptions
of the environmental and human health risks from toxic waste sites differ greatly.
Toxic waste sites rank far higher on lists of public concern than on experts' lists.
See, e.g., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, UNFINISHED BUSINESS:
A COMPARABLE ASSESSMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS (1987). In this
situation, if the environmental regulatory system is responsive to local public
concerns, it will generate environmental actions that are misdirected in the view
of environmental experts. See Farber, supra note 8, at 1285. Rather than an
additional means of assessing and prioritizing among national objectives, risk
techniques often become a mechanism in the environmental debate for meeting
public demand for action while delegating difficult choices to, and criticizing,
both the implementing agencies and the command and control regulatory system.
262 See, e.g., Ackerman& Stewart,ReformingEnvironmentalLaw,supranote
11, at 1333.
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standards will be difficult to administer and enforce. 263 Consequently,
the lessons of the early evolution of environmental law pose a difficult
choice: choose ambient standards and sacrifice the environment or choose
technology standards and sacrifice economic efficiency.
The environmental law reform debate rarely focuses on whether this
is in fact now a false choice: whether it is in fact necessary to choose
between technology standards and ambient standards. The debate rarely
addresses whether ambient conditions can be identified and used not as
an implementing mechanism, but as a means of encouraging the development of more effective implementing mechanisms. Nor does the debate
address whether technology standards, at least in the short-term, can
provide an effective floor in such a system without perpetuating undue
economic inefficiencies.
b. Decisionmaking:
Congress or the EPA
The second false lesson from the 1960s and 1970s concerns whether
Congress or the EPA should make implementation decisions. Complex
decisions are inherent in any environmental regulatory system, ranging
from what environmental conditions are desirable, to what emissions
control technologies are available, to what costs are acceptable, to who
should bear those costs. The BAT-driven command and control approach
requires decisions about the most technically narrow and impenetrable of
those decisions: which control technologies are appropriate for which
specific industries. The environmental law reform efforts to date have
largely assumed that resolution of these difficult policy judgments
requires Congress to delegate authority to the EPA to develop the specific
implementing mechanisms for environmental protection, such as the BAT
requirements of the command and control approach.264 At the same
time, the experience of the 1970s and 1980s demonstrates that the
See Houck, OfBats, Birds, and B-A-T, supra note 184, at 403; see also
Weyerhauser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1042 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (noting
Congress's concern about "administrative flexibility" in the Clean Water Act);
Latin, supra note 101, at 1267.
264 See, e.g., Latin, supra note 101, at 1267. Moreover, even if it were
feasible for Congress to set specific statutory BAT standards, selecting
technologies in a statute, rather than delegating the selection of technologies to
the EPA, could freeze the technologies in law and thus exacerbate the cost,
inefficiency, and inflexibility problems of BAT statutes.
263
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delegation to the EPA of difficult BAT implementation decisions leads
to delays, litigation, and limited citizen participation.
Thus, the lessons from the development of environmental law have
produced a second difficult choice. The environmental reform debate
rarely addresses whether this, too, is a false choice: whether, on the one
hand, Congress must delegate difficult decisions to the EPA and in so
doing not only fail to resolve many important issues but also create the
administrative delays and other problems that arise from broad delegation,
or, on the other hand, select only broad ambient goals and sacrifice the
environmental improvements that have arisen from the BAT approach.
D. A New Choice
Is there a method of ensuring enforceable environmental requirements
without prescribing the environmental implementing mechanism? If
technology standards are not the only possible implementing mechanism,
the choice may not be only whether Congress or the EPA is better suited
to picking technologies. Instead, the choice may include whether
Congress is able to set desired ambient conditions and to resolve a
number of the drawbacks of ambient standards by also identifying and
allocating the corresponding emission reduction responsibilities. This
choice may enable the EPA and the states to avoid the nearly impossible
task of both establishing desired environmental conditions and implicitly
allocating the corresponding emission reduction responsibilities through
rulemakings and permits. Instead, this choice would involve creating a
process in which Congress establishes desired environmental conditions
and allocates the corresponding responsibilities, thus enabling the EPA
and the states to administer and enforce these statutory emission reduction
responsibilities.2 65
The hurdle of feasibility, among other potential objections, is
obviously extremely large. Yet the Netherlands appears to have developed
such a new approach by taking two fundamental steps: (1) addressing the
environmental debate problem with a re-examination of the state of the
environment and of the broad national goal; and (2) addressing the
Market trading schemes may provide insight on these questions and may
permit a somewhat more reasoned role for Congress in determining emissions
allowances; but as discussed in Part H (notes 86-216 and accompanying text),
these approaches have encountered substantial criticisms, and few major new
statutory trading schemes are on the horizon. See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart,
Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case, supra note 13, at 171;
Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming EnvironmentalLaw, supra note 11, at 1333.
265
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implementation problem not by just prescribing particular emissions
technologies (or specific allowance trading mechanisms), but by identifying desired ambient environmental conditions and the emission reductions necessary to achieve them, as well as by allocating the emission
reductions among all major economic sectors and geographic regions.
IV.

THE EXPERIENCE ABROAD

Several countries, including the Netherlands, New Zealand, and
others,"' in recent years have turned the command and control approach on its head. Without abandoning the use of BAT requirements in
many circumstances, these countries have used BAT not as the determinant of environmental conditions, but as one tool for achieving environmental conditions that are identified and apportioned through a broad reexamination of the nation's environmental goals. Although the distinction
may appear to be a fine one, its implications for the environmental law
reform debate and for the prospects of achieving environmental ends are
substantial.
A.

The Netherlands

The Dutch process is the most comprehensive and innovative example
of the new ends-based approaches, and it provides an example of the
266 See New Zealand Ministry for the Environment, Environment 2010

Strategy: A Statement of the Government's Strategy on the Environment (Oct.
1994). Additional countries that have developed or are developing systems
similar to those of the Netherlands and New Zealand include Austria, Canada,
and Singapore. See, e.g., Austria ProposesAmbitious National Environmental
Plan, ENVIRONMENT WATCH WESTERN EUROPE 1, 1-2 (Sept. 6, 1996).
Commentators writing about these systems have sometimes described them as
"Green Plans." See, e.g., JOHNSON, supra note 14. This description may not fully
characterize the overall impact of these systems, however. First, although they
are "green" in the sense that they have environmental protection as an underlying
objective, they typically incorporate or acknowledge economic and other social
objectives as well. Second, although they involve "plans" as discussed in the
review of the Dutch planning process in this Article, they need not involve
invasive, comprehensive social planning along European lines. Indeed, although
comprehensive thinking is required at the outset, a principal long-term benefit of
these systems may be their ability to create incentives for self-implementing or
voluntary compliance systems and, thus, to reduce the government's role in
directing the private sector.
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strengths and weaknesses of these systems. As discussed later in this
Part,267 differences between the Dutch and American legal systems,
culture, economy, and physical landscape suggest that adoption of the
Dutch approach may not be possible or even advisable in the United
States. Nonetheless, the underlying concepts of the Dutch approach are
valuable for examining the environmental regulatory system and reform
efforts in the United States.
1. Background
The initial development of Dutch environmental law followed the
course of the United States and many other western democracies. Inthe
1970s, a number of media-specific laws and regulations were put in
place. 268 The national environmental agency (the current Directorate
General for Environmental Management of the Ministry of Housing,
Spatial Planning, and the Environment or "Ministry of VROM" 26 9) also
was structured along media-specific lines.
In the 1980s, two new approaches emerged. In addition to traditional
media-based laws with a focus on air, water, and land, and substancebased laws with a focus on toxics, these new approaches cut across
traditional lines and set the stage for the later efforts. The first new
approach was based on "themes," eight significant problem areas that the
Dutch attempted to attack through multi-media strategies. The environmental themes are climate change, acidification, eutrophication, dispersion
of hazardous substances, waste disposal, local nuisance, water depletion,
and resource management. 2 0
The second new approach focused on "target groups," economic
sectors that were identified as major sources of environmental degradation. 271 The target groups are agriculture, industry, refineries, retail
See infra Part IV.B (notes 318-22 and accompanying text).
See generallyVan Zijst, supra note 14, at 13.
269 The VROM acronym derives from the Dutch title for the ministry:
Ministerie van Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening en Milieubeheer.
270 See Ministry of VROM, Towards a SustainableNetherlands, Environmental Policy In Action No. 6: Achieving Integration 4 (1994) [hereinafter Towards
a Sustainable Netherlands, Environmental Policy in Action No. 6].
271 The target group approach was adopted in the Indicative Multi-year
Environmental Management Programme 1986-1990, a five-year environmental
program that adopted a source-reduction strategy for target groups. See Ministry
of VROM, Second National Environmental Policy Plan 103 (1994) [hereinafter
NEPP2]. This five-year program identified the defining characteristics of target
267
268
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trade, transport, consumers, the construction industry, the waste disposal
industry, the drinking water supply industry, sewage and waste water
treatment, and research institutions."' 2 Although a focus on potential
sources is common to all environmental regimes, the new Dutch approach
was unusual in its attempt to achieve compliance by apportioning
responsibility to entire economic sectors, and by broadening the effort
beyond industry Similar attempts to circumvent the unintended effects of
media-specific approaches were developed in the United States and
elsewhere, but in the Netherlands these strategies laid the foundation for
a much more novel approach that began in the late 1980s.
2. New Approach
Beginning in the late 1980s, environmental law reform efforts in the
Netherlands focused on developing and implementing a comprehensive
environmental strategy around the themes and target groups. The effort
has proceeded in several steps: (1) evaluation of the state of the
environment; (2) selection of an environmental goal; (3) allocation of
emission reductions; (4) development of implementing mechanisms; and
(5) periodic review
a. Evaluationof the State of the Environment
At the request of the Minister of VROM, in 1987 and 1988 an
independent national environmental research institute, the National
Institute of Public Health and Environmental Protection (the
'"RV" 27 3 ), surveyed trends in the state of the Dutch environment and
the likely state of the environment in one generation (twenty to twentyfive years). The RIVM selected 1985 as the base year, and 2010 as the
target year for the survey274

groups: (1) those groups that were a "major source of pollution"; (2) those
groups that were "a major contributor to the national or international economy,
larger and national m scope (than other sectors)"; or (3) those groups for which
the "central government is the authorized permitting authority." Id. at 103.
272 See Id.
273 The R1VM acronym derives from the Dutch name for the institute:
Riksmstituut
Voor Volksgezondheid En Milieuhygiene.
274
SeeEviRONMTAL FORECASTING BUREAU, CONCERN FOR TOMORROW:

A NATIONAL ENViRONMENTAL SURVEY 1985-2010 (Rob Maas ed., 1989)
[hereinafter CONCERN FOR TOMORROW].
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To organize the study, the RIVM examined emissions levels affecting
the eight key environmental indicators - the "themes" discussed above.
The RIVM also focused on five levels or "scales of occurrence": global,
continental, fluvial (river systems), regional, and local. The study
examined a variety of future scenarios for the eight theme areas at the
five scales of occurrence, based on different projected levels of economic
growth, energy consumption, population growth, vehicle kilometers
travelled, and other factors.275 The study focused on particular theme
area problems that were most likely to occur at certain scales of
occurrence (e.g., acidification was examined on the continental scale of

occurrence).
The study was published in the 1988 report Concern for Tomorrow.276 It concluded that despite substantial progress since the early 1970s, the then-current environmental regulatory approaches would
not achieve sustainability within one generation, by 2010, and in some
cases would not prevent significant deterioration. For example, on a
continental level, the study identified acidification and low-level
ozone as two of the most significant theme problems. To achieve
sustainability, or avoid "the most serious damage" to the environment
from acidification, the study projected that reductions of 90% for SO 2
and 70% for NO, would be required from 1980 levels. Similarly, to
address damage from ozone, reductions in NO, and volatile organic
compounds of 70% to 90% from 1980 levels would be required.277 In
both cases, the study indicated the percentage reductions that
appeared feasible with then-current technologies and regulatory approaches (e.g., 80% for SO 2, 55% to 60% for NOx, 65% to 75% for NO3, and
50% for VOCs), and noted that a gap existed between the currently
feasible reductions and the levels necessary to address the environmen278
tal harms.
For waterbodies (the "fluvial" scale analysis), the study
examined eutrophication, dispersion of hazardous substances, and
several other theme areas. It concluded that discharges of nitrogen
and phosphorous would need to be reduced by 75% to avoid

Id. at xvii.
The principal conclusion of the study was that despite progress, "a further
deterioration of [Dutch environmental] quality will certainly occur if present
trends persist." Postponing action will result in environmental and economic risk.
Id. at preface.
277 See id. at xvii.
278 See id.
275
276
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eutrophication in several key areas. Similar conclusions were drawn
for dispersion of five substances of greatest concern in water and sediment cadmium, copper, lindane, benzo(a)pyrene, and certain phthalates.
In some cases, the study concluded that existing measures appeared to be
sufficient. For example, the controls on chlorofluorocarbons appeared to
address its global-level contribution to stratospheric ozone depletion. On a
regional level, planned controls on phosphorous were thought to be adequate
to prevent a build up in soils and groundwater, although not to avoid
deposition in waterways, as discussed above. The study examined the
susceptibility of each distinct geographic area in the Netherlands to the eight
theme problems, and reviewed the sources of emissions and costs of control
2 79
to major economic sectors.
The study also examined human health impacts. 280 It made use of risk
assessment techniques, but with an explicit recognition of the limits of risk
assessment methodology and the need to consider other factors. 28' The
study also examined the impacts of environmental measures on gross national
product ("GNP"'). It concluded that planned measures would hold environmental spending at approximately 2% of GNP. Measures to achieve
sustainability were projected to increase the figure to between 3% and 3.5%
of GNP by 2010. The study also noted that economic benefits would accrue
from achieving the sustainability targets but that those benefits could not be
quantified.
b. Selection of an EnvironmentalGoal
The Concernfor Tomorrow report implicitly assumed that the national
government would select sustainable development as the premise for

27' See id. ch. 10.

See id. at 314-15.
See id. at 287. The study attempted to make comparisons of environmental risks to other risks, such as lifestyle risks. "In this way, within the limits of
uncertainty, some statements can be made about which environmental problems
are the most important threat to public health and which kind of regulatory
measures can possibly lead to 'health profit."' Id. The specific conclusions
included findings that it is difficult to make quantitative targets for health effects,
and that environmental exposures present relatively low risk for death, but higher
risk for chronic effects. The study also generated a list of the most important
types of actions identified (e.g., reduction of indoor and outdoor air pollution,
radon exposure reduction, UV light exposure, cadmium emissions, noise
pollution). See id. at 314-15.
280

281
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environmental management efforts. The concept of environmentally
sustainable development within a generation as an international goal was
proposed in 1987 by the World Commission on Environment and
Development, known as the Brundtland Commission.2"' This sustainable
development concept has received substantial support internationally,
including adoption at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro.28 3 The concept has received
less attention in the United States.284
The adoption of national environmental goals in the Netherlands
appears not to have been undertaken lightly. The Dutch conducted a
vigorous debate in various public fora and in Parliament over the
national goals for the environment.28 5 A National Environmental Policy
Plan ('NEPP") was prepared by the Ministry of VROM in 1989 2" and
was submitted for debate in Parliament.287 In the NEPP, an initial
national goal of achieving sustainable development was expressed as
producing "development that attends to the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own

NATIONS, OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 87.
See Overview of Agenda 21 and Implementation Mechanisms: Report of
the Secretary-Generalof the Conference, U.N. GAOR Preparatory Comm. for the
U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, 4th Plen. Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 151/PC/100/Add. 1 (1992). For a discussion of sustainable development
on an international level, see, for example, Edith Brown Weiss, Environmentally
Sustainable Competitiveness:A Comment, 102 YALE L.J. 2123 (1993).
284 The principal exception is the President's Council on Sustainable
Development. See generally PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 236.
28 The adoption of a national goal in the Netherlands occurred after
substantial national debate. Immediately preceding the release of the Concernfor
Tomorrow report, Holland's Queen Beatrix delivered a state of the nation speech
in which she articulated the government's position that environmental improvements were adequate. Shortly thereafter, with the release of the Concernfor
Tomorrow report, the more uncertain long-term status of the environment became
clear. As a result, the Queen's holiday message of 1988 expressed substantially
more concern for the environment. See JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 48-49.
286 Ministry of VROM, National Environmental Policy Plan (1989)
[hereinafterNEPP 1]. The National Environmental Policy Plans ("NEPPs") (1989,
1990, 1994) are submitted to the Dutch parliament. Provincial, local, water
management boards participate in the development of the plans, which are
reviewed and updated every four years.
287 See id.
282

283

See UNITED
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needs." 28 The NEPP identified broad emission reduction objectives by
geographical area 8 9 and by theme area.290 The debate over the NEPP
was vigorous. In fact, the debate over one environmental provision in the
NEPP concerning parking subsidies contributed to the fall of the Dutch
government in 1989.291 After a new election, the NEPP was resubmitted
and approved by Parliament.
c. Allocation of Emission Reductions
The identification of quantified emission reduction objectives for
themes and geographic areas provided the basis for a third, more radical
step. In the NEPP the government established emission reduction targets
for major economic sectors (e.g., industry, agriculture, transportation and
Id. at 7. The NEPP states that "[t]he main objective of environmental
management is to preserve the environment's carrying capacity for the sake of
sustainable development." Id. at 15. The sustainable development goal was
further defined to focus less on the vague notion of "needs" and more on the
concept that each generation should solve the environmental problems that it
creates. The NEPP states that "existing problems must be solved within the span
of a generation (20 to 25 years) and at the same time the creation of new
problems must be prevented." Id. at 75.
289 Geographicalareaproblems (e.g., global and regional scale) were assigned
broad percentage reductions of emissions necessary to achieve sustainability for
the themes of most concern. For example, a regional level may require 80% to
90% reductions in many emissions, and 70% to 80% reductions in wastes. See
id. at 15. For geographic levels, quantitative and qualitative objectives were set
for the year 2010. Id. ch. 4.
290 Quantitative objectives were set for eight themes: (1) climate change
(ozone depletion and global warming); (2) acidification (annual emissions
ceilings for year 2000 for SO2, NO., ammonia, and VOCs); see id. at 132-34; (3)
eutrophication (targeted reductions in phosphorus and nitrogen emissions, plus
ambient standards); (4) diffusion of substances (toxics and pesticides); (5) waste
disposal (hazardous and solid waste); (6) disturbance (noise, odor, and accidents);
(7) dehydration (ground water depletion); (8) squandering (resource depletion,
e.g., soils and ground water); see id. at 23-28.
291 The NEPP was submitted to Parliamentby the Lubbers government. After
Parliament defeated a provision in the plan that would have ended subsidies for
automobile commuters, the Lubbers government resigned. This has been called
the first time a government has fallen over an environmental issue. See JOHNSON,
supra note 14, at 49. The controversial provision was included in the NEPP draft
that was eventually approved by Parliament. See NEPP1, supra note 286.
288
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The NEPP objectives were based on the "desired quality of
the environment." 293 The national government then apportioned, or
"disaggregated," these emission reductions among the target groups, and,
through the NEPP and later actions, further apportioned the emission
reductions among subsectors (called "branches," e.g., the chemical industry,
the printing industry).
For example, the NEPP assigned an industry target group the goal of
reducing phosphorus emission levels from a 1985 baseline of 15 kilotons to
8 kilotons in 1994, and to 4 kilotons in 2000.294 Similarly, SO 2 emission
reduction responsibilities were defined for two industry subsectors as set forth
in Table

2:295

TABLE

2

Total Allowable SO2 Emissions (in kilotons)
Year

Refineries

Chemical and
Other Industries

1985

95

69

1994

56

45

2000

36

15

The NEPP also set quantitative industry objectives for VOCs and nitrogen
discharges, as well as a combination of qualitative and quantitative objectives
The target groups are as follows: (1) agriculture; (2) traffic and transport;
(3) industry; (4) electricity and gas companies; (5) building trade; (6) consumers;
(7) environmental trade; (8) research and educational institutions; (9) societal
organizations/environmental organizations. See NEPP1, supra note 286. The
emission reduction objectives have been updated in a revised version of NEPP 1,
known as the NEPP Plus, see Ministry of VROM, National Environmental Policy
Plan Plus (1990), and in a second plan, the NEPP2, see NEPP2, supra note 271.
The NEPP2 also reiterated the eight environmental themes, identified based on'
the "greatest (known) risks presented to human health, animals, plants, goods and
land use potential." Towards a SustainableNetherlands, Environmental Policy In
Action No. 6, supra note 270, at 4.
293 Ministry of VROM, Memorandum on Implementation of Target Group,
Environmental Policy of Industry 33 (1990) [hereinafter Memorandum on
Implementation of Target Group].
292

294 See
295 See

NEPPI, supra note 286, at 207.
id. at 206.
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for a number of other emissions (e.g., percentage reductions for certain
"priority substances" or toxics), 29 6 and environmental problems (e.g.,
"isolate, manage and control" contaminated soils).2 97
The process by which these emission reduction responsibilities were
apportioned among sectors has little parallel to the Administrative Procedure
Act notice and comment rulemaking processes familiar in the United States.
Emissions objectives for the year 2000 and the year 2010 for industry
branches, and in some cases for individual companies, were set through three
principal steps. 298 The first step involved an emissions inventory at the
branch and sub-branch, but not company, level by the Industry Division of
the Directorate General for the Environment ("DGE"). 299 The second step
involved the creation of a matrix identifying emissions from various sectors,
based on an evaluation of the branch's contribution to the environmental
theme problems identified in the NEPP, and the selection of "priority
branches" to be targeted."' The Industry Division then created a database
by evaluating the sectoral data against the emission reduction targets
established by the NEPP. 0 1 After consultations with the affected sectors,
the DGE then prepared and received comments on sector-by-sector emission
reduction objectives. 0 2 The allocation was done "with a carpenter's eye,"
a Dutch expression meaning with some degree of precision, but not with
See id. at 140-41, 208.
297 Id. at 207.
296

See id. at 119 (stating that emission reduction objectives for industry are
set forth in an August 1992 document entitled Reduction Objectivesfor the
Industry Target Group); see also Ministry of VROM, Towards a Sustainable
Netherlands, Environmental Policy In Action No. 1: Working with Industry
(1994) [hereinafter Towards a Sustainable Netherlands, Environmental Policy In
Action No. 1]; Towards a Sustainable Netherlands, Environmental Policy In
Action No. 6, supra note 270; seegenerallyMemorandum on Implementation of
Target Group, supra note 293, at 30-31 ("The integrated environmental
objectives for a particular industrial sector will indicate the extent to which
pressure on the environment from that sector as a whole is to be abated.").
299 See Ministry of VROM, Note on Target Group Management for Industry
Appendix I and p. 8 (1990) (overview of relative emissions contribution by
branches
of business) [hereinafter Note on Target Group Management].
3
1 See id. at 8; see also Towards a Sustainable Netherlands, Environmental Policy
In Action No. 1,supra note 298, at 2. Emissions data were available from a national
emission registration. Note on Target Group Management, supranote 299, at 8.
301 See Note on Target Group Management, supra note 299, at 6-7.
302 The regional application of emission was also considered. Although the
preference was for a "blanket approach," where "demonstrable additional benefits"
could be achieved, the VROM reserved the right to require more stringent objectives.
Memorandum on Implementation of Target Group, supra note 293, at 35-36.
298
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complete exactitude.303 Although admittedly imperfect at the outset, the
level of precision of these objectives was expected to increase over
time.
d

Development of Implementing Mechanisms

After the allocation of emission reduction responsibilities, the national,
provincial, and local governments then began negotiating with representatives
of'the sectors, subsectors, and individual companies to reach agreements to
meet the apportioned emissions targets. The implementing mechanisms
included a combination of compliance with existing BAT and other
regulatory requirements, imposition of new government requirements, and
voluntary actions by the target groups.
The apportionment of emission reductions on a sectoral and geographic
level promoted the development of a number of innovative new environmental compliance mechanisms, most notably covenants. Covenants are voluntary
agreements used to assist the target group strategy. °4 The key features of
the Dutch covenants are as follows: (1) the government reserves its sovereign
powers, but expresses a preference for achievement of environmental
objectives through voluntary measures; (2) industry commits to meet targets,
but reserves its right to raise economic and technical impracticability
concerns; and (3) provisions are made for modifications,305 monitoring, and
harmonization with international standards.

See Note on Target Group Management, supra note 299, at 9.
0 Covenants generally are legally enforceable under Dutch civil law. See
Lucas Bergkamp, Dutch Environmental Law: An Overview of Recent Trends,
Int'l305
Env't Daily (BNA) 148 (Nov. 19, 1993); Van Zijst, supra note 14, at 14.
In the NEPP2, the Ministry indicated its view of reopening covenants and
other agreements:
Agreements already made (covenants, environmental plans, etc.) remain fully
in force and binding on all the actors involved, and their progress will be
monitored. Where the desired results are not being achieved, corrective
303

action will have to be taken by the target group or within the region, in the

first place in the form of phased measures within the term set Only if this
proves unfeasible may consideration be given to achieving the desired
reduction elsewhere, on the basis ofreciprocity. This will only be considered
in the current period if it looks as though the target cannot be reached by a

particular target group or region.
NEPP2, supra note 271, at 48. At the same time, the NEPP2 indicates that the
government will provide greater flexibility to target groups and provincial and local
authorities in setting priorities for target groups, subject to three conditions: "choices
made should be made visible in plans; choices should be open to public discussion
and verification; [and] the realisation of the theme objectives within the term set in
the NEPP 1 should remain the key concern." Id.
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The objective of the covenant approach is a "shift from the imposition of regulations from above to self-regulation within a framework,"
allowing the government to limit its role in the longer term to the
establishment of the framework and facilitation. 0 6 In some cases, the.
covenants may obviate the need for regulations." 7 By the end of 1995,
covenants were expected to have been signed with fifteen sectors,
comprising 12,000 companies and ninety percent of priority emissions.308
Covenants vary in form and have evolved over the last several
years.30 9 In general, covenants fall into two types: (1) general ("legislative covenants") at the national level; and (2) specific ("compliance
covenants") at the provincial and municipal level. 10 For less complex,
more homogeneous industrial sectors (e.g., sectors with a limited number
of industrial processes, such as the printing industry) a covenant is
negotiated at the branch level. 31 1 The covenant includes the steps

" By the publication of the NEPP2 in 1993, 18 covenants had been signed
regarding the environmental properties of products, eight regarding process
emissions and 26 regarding energy conservation. Covenants with the printing,
primary metals, and chemical industries account for 60% of industrial emissions.
The Ministry expected to conclude "declarations of intent" with 15 industry
sectors by the end of 1995. See NEPP2, supra note 271, at 18. These 15 sectors
include 12,000 companies and account for 90% of Dutch industrial emissions.
See Towards a Sustainable Netherlands, Environmental Policy In Action No. 1,
supra note 298, at 10.
307 The NEPP states that "[i]f good results are reached by this method it may
be a good enough reason not to impose regulations." NEPPI, supranote 286, at
30-32.
308 See id. at 31. Covenants have been developed where legislation is too
slow. Interim measures can be obtained by voluntary industry action while a
problem is being explored, and legislation can be anticipated by voluntary
agreements, with parallel legislation to follow, or where legislation can be
"supplemented or tightened" in a covenant.
309 The process begins with preliminary talks aimed at identifying environmental objectives for 1995, 2000, and 2010. These talks are held between
representatives of the national, provincial, and municipal governments along with
industry sector representatives, including trade associations and labor. See
Towards a Sustainable Netherlands, Environmental Policy in Action No. 1,supra
note 298, at 3.
310 See Bergkamp, supra note 304, at 147-48.
3" See Towards a Sustainable Netherlands, Environmental Policy In Action
No. 1, supra note 298, at 8-10. The process used for the printing industry
involved an environmental agreement that provided the structure for an IETP.
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necessary to achieve the sector's Integrated Environmental Target Plan
("IETP"). 1 2 The IETP sets forth negotiated emission reduction targets
as well as objectives for achieving other environmental themes (e.g.,
noise abatement and energy efficiency measures).
For complex, heterogeneous industrial sectors (e.g., the chemical
industry) a Declaration of Intent is negotiated with the industry sector to
establish the sector's IETP." 3 The Declaration of Intent is then signed
by individual companies, committing them to establish more specific
Company Environmental Plans to achieve the IETP targets. 31 4 To
The IETP for the printing sector consisted of a more detailed implementation
plan, including specific measures to be taken to meet environmental targets,
reporting requirements, timetables, and organizational structures for managing
ongoing activities.
312 See Ministry of VROM, Declaration of Intent on the Implementation
of
Environmental Policy for the Chemical Industry (1993) [hereinafter Declaration
of Intent, Chemical Industry]; Ministry of VROM, Declaration of Intent on the
Implementation of Environmental Policy for the Primary Metals Industry (1992)
[hereinafter Declaration of Intent, Primary Metals Industry].
313 See, e.g., Declaration of Intent, Chemical Industry, supra
note 312;
Ministry of VROM, Environmental Policy Agreement with the Printing Industry
(1993); Declaration of Intent, Primary Metals Industry, supranote 312; Ministry
of VROM, Packaging Covenant (1991). The Declaration of Intent also may
address processes for further consultation, the role of the parties in overseeing
implementation, monitoring and reporting obligations, and other steps. See, e.g.,
Declaration of Intent, Primary Metals Industry, supra note 312.
314 The Company Environmental Plans include specific steps to be taken
along with deadlines. The Base Metals Industry covenant, for example, did not
translate specific target reductions to a per-company level, but allowed the
signatory companies to determine the type and timing of steps to be taken. See,
e.g., Declaration of Intent, Primary Metals Industry, supra note 312; see also
Towards a SustainableNetherlands, Environmental Policy In Action No. 1, supra
note 298, at 7. The Company Environmental Plans must extend for a period of
at least four years and will serve as the basis for the company's permit, but they
do not supersede existing permits. See id. at 6-7. The Netherlands has instituted
a single, multimedia permitting approach. The Environmental Management Act
provides for integrated permitting, with the exception of activities regulated by
the Surface Waters Protection Act. See Towards a Sustainable Netherlands,
Environmental Policy In Action No. 6, supra note 270, at 5. Common elements
of company environmental plans include identification of emission reductions to
be achieved, identification of additional measures to be taken, assessments of
possible problems with implementation, inventory of base-year emissions and
energy consumption, and use of best available technology as a "starting point."
Towards a Sustainable Netherlands, Environmental Policy In Action No. 1,supra
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provide an enforceable requirement, the emission reduction objectives for
a particular company are then included in the company's permits.3 1
Recently, multi-media permitting has been made part of a comprehensive
environmental statute, the Environmental Management Act of March 1,
1993.316
e. PeriodicReview
As a final step in the Comprehensive Policy Planning Process, every
four years the Minister of VROM reviews environmental progress and
updates the emission reduction targets in a new NEPP. The requirement
for the national government and the provinces to produce an environmental policy plan every four years was incorporated into the new Environmental Management Act.3 17 These four-year plans update the emission
reduction targets for the eight theme areas and for the economic sectors.
B.

Implications of the Dutch System

The differences between the Netherlands and the United States
suggest that the process leading to the NEPP and the NEPP itself are
unlikely to be replicated in the United States.3 18 The Netherlands is
smaller, more densely populated and more industrialized than the United
States. The Netherlands also has a strong tradition of government
planning and public consensus-building. 3 9 In addition, sixty percent of

note 298, at 7. The reporting requirements for signatory companies are
standardized, allowing for company-specific evaluations as well as an integrated
assessment of the performance of the sector as a whole.
315 See Note on Target Group Management, supra note 299, at 11.
316 See Towards a Sustainable Netherlands, Environmental Policy in Action
No. 6, supra note 270, at 5.
317 See NEPP2, supra note 271, at 35.
318 One recent source analogized the Netherlands to New Jersey in size and
industrialization. However, this source argues that comprehensive planning
approaches can work in the United States because such planning has not only
succeeded in a nation comparable to New Jersey, but also in New Zealand, which
resembles a more agrarian, less densely populated state such as Oregon. See
JOHNSON, supra note 14.
31 See Towards a Sustainable Netherlands, Environmental Policy In Action
No. 1, supra note 298, at 11 (stating that "Dutch society has a strong tradition
of proceeding through consensus building and government/industry relations are
no exception").
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the Dutch live below sea level, leading to a substantial interest in
environmental issues generally and climate change, which could raise sea
levels, in particular.32 Moreover, various aspects of Dutch environmental law differ significantly from the legal framework in the United
States.32'
Nevertheless, a number of aspects of the Dutch system are both
remarkable and potentially relevant to environmental law reform in the
United States. The Dutch system takes a methodical, comprehensive,
multi-media approach to environmental problems, rather than looking at
problems on an ad hoc or media-specific basis. The Dutch system also
provides flexibility for covenants and other voluntary means of implementing emission reduction targets.
Although these developments are important, the most fundamental
aspect of the new Dutch approach is often overlooked: the country has
developed a system based on re-establishing the context for decisionmaking and action at three levels. First, a national goal was selected for
the state of the environment - sustainable development, as identified in
the NEPP1 and NEPP2. The debate over national goals appears to have
been vigorous and widely followed in the Netherlands. The NEPP and the
debate over the NEPP included an explicit, clearly articulated goal of
achieving sustainability within one generation. The goal suggested not
just an unattainable aspiration for perfection, but also the need for
difficult environmental, economic, and social choices. The high costs of
achieving sustainability were articulated, as were the implications of not
achieving sustainability.
Second, an attempt was made to understand the environmental
conditions necessary to achieve that goal (in the form of the Concernfor
Tomorrow3 2 2 report and subsequent updates). Because the NEPP relied
heavily on the Concernfor Tomorrow report, decisions underlying the
NEPP were placed in a scientific and policy context for the public and
the decisionmakers. These documents also translated the national goal
into quantitative objectives for the desired state of the environment and
the emission reductions necessary to achieve that state.
Third, an allocation was made of the emission reductions and other
actions necessary to achieve environmental characteristics as provided in

320

See generally ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND

DEVELOPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REvIEWS: NETHERLANDS 19-21

(1995); The Netherlands,Int'l Env't Rep. (BNA) 207, 210-11 (Sept. 1993).
321 See Bergkamp, supra note 304, at 147-48.
322 CONCERN FOR TOMORROW, supra note 274.
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the NEPP1, NEPP2, and other documents. As Part V will discuss, the
explicit allocation of emission reduction targets among economic and
geographic sectors is a critical, although rarely discussed, element of the
new Dutch environmental regulatory system.
V. THE FRAMEWORK APPROACH IN THE UNITED STATES
The Dutch experience suggests that many of the weaknesses ascribed
to the American environmental regulatory system may arise less from the
particular implementing mechanisms of environmental law, whether the
command and control system or its market-based alternatives, than from
the absence of established environmental ends at three levels: (1) the
desired state of the environment (Level 1); (2) the environmental
conditions that characterize that state of the environment, as well as the
corresponding emission reductions and other actions necessary to achieve
those conditions (Level II); and (3) an explicit allocation of the emission
reductions and other actions among economic and geographic sectors
(Level I). I have called the identification of goals at these three levels
the Framework Approach.
This Part first outlines the core principles of the Framework
Approach (Part V.A) and then distinguishes the Framework Approach
from the existing statutory goals and regulatory structure in the United
States (Part V.B). The discussion in Part V does not address whether the
adoption and implementation of the Framework Approach is feasible or advisable - in the United States. Instead, the discussion compares the
Framework Approach to the existing command and control system to
bring the key distinctions between the two clearly into focus. The
discussion in Part VI then uses the Framework Approach concepts to
expose the underlying weaknesses of the current environmental debate
and the environmental regulatory system in the United States, and
examines the implications of the Framework Approach for environmental
law reform in this country.
A.

Principlesof the FrameworkApproach
1. The Meta-Goal:
A National Goalfor the Environment
(Level I Goal)

The identification of a national goal for the environment is the Level
I goal and the first component of the Framework Approach. By a national
goal, I mean a succinct summary of the nation's aspiration for the
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environment. The Framework Approach does not require the selection of
any one particular national goal as the Level I goal.
The sustainable development approach appears to have had some
success in the Netherlands and elsewhere for several reasons that may
suggest the common characteristics necessary for the Level I goal. First,
it is easily articulated and understood. The Dutch articulation of
"sustainable development in one generation" arises from a commonly
understood and accepted concept: responsibility to the next generation.
Second, by not being entirely utopian, it is capable of stimulating a
debate over the difficult choices involved in environmental protection.
The implications of adopting a sweeping goal that does not acknowledge
the trade-offs necessary to achieve it are discussed in Part V.B below.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, it provides an easily understood rule
of thumb against which to judge more specific actions. The goal is
sufficiently cogent to provide guidance in the conduct of the environmental reform debate and the determination of the emission reductions and
other objectives of the environmental regulatory system. The existing
goals and objectives of NEPA section 101323 are very similar to the
sustainable development concept and could provide a starting point for
deliberations in the United States.
The Level I goal could be expressed in a wide variety of formulations, but its environmental impact would take one of three underlying
forms: (1) preservation of the status quo, with no improvement sought or
regression permitted (the "Status Quo Option"); (2) regression from the
status quo (the "Status Quo-Minus Option"); or (3) improvement from the
status quo (the "Status Quo-Plus Option"). The sustainable development
goal adopted in the Netherlands and the NEPA goal in the United States
are variations of the Status Quo-Plus Option. To better understand the
functioning of the Framework Approach, one can assume the selection of
any one of these Level I goals.
For example, if the Status Quo Option were adopted, the goal might
be formulated as some form of: "Let's keep the environment just the way
it is." This formulation would meet the test of easy articulation and
comprehension. It also would be sufficiently provocative to stimulate a
broad debate over difficult choices. Adopting the Status Quo Option
suggests acceptance of the current state of the environment, which is
unlikely to occur without significant debate about whether the current
state of the environment is acceptable, or too costly, or insufficiently
protective for the future. It also suggests a rule of thumb to guide actions.

323

See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1994).
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Furthermore, it is not necessarily a "no action" alternative: if population
or human activity levels increase, additional steps would have to be taken
to maintain the current state of the environment, whether through new
technologies, changes in resource utilization, or additional regulatory
controls. 24 If population or other activity levels decrease, presumably
a relaxation of environmental restrictions could occur, with the possible
exception of the extraction of non-renewable resources. A similar analysis
is possible for the Status Quo-Minus and Status Quo-Plus Options. The
Level I goal, regardless of the option selected, would provide a starting
point for the debate over the desired state of the environment and a
guiding principle for the development of the Level II and III goals.
2. Environmental Conditions
and Emission Reductions
(Level H1 Goals)
The Level II goals include two components: (1) the identification of
the ambient environmental conditions necessary to achieve the Level I
goal; and (2) the identification of the emission reductions and other
actions necessary to achieve the desired environmental conditions.3 25 In
the Netherlands, the development of Level II goals involved a study that
culminated in the Concern for Tomorrow report.326 The Dutch simplified the analysis by organizing it around the eight "theme ' areas (climate
change, acidification, eutrophication, dispersion of hazardous substances,
waste disposal, local nuisance, water depletion, and resource manage-

For example, the United States population increased 27% from 1970 to
1994. See EPA, 1995 AIR QUALITY TRENDS, supra note 44, at 4.
325 Although the term "emission reductions" connotes quantified reductions
of chemical pollutants, the concept could be broadened to include a wide range
of environmental actions, such as responsibilities regarding pesticides, wetlands,
natural resources, or endangered species. In the long run, to encompass the broad
range of environmental issues and to facilitate allocation among economic
sectors, the effort may require a quantification and allocation, if possible, of
these environmental actions. At the outset, however, it could begin with emission
reductions.
326 The RIVM, which is a governmental research body independent of
VROM, the Dutch environmental agency, has no direct parallel in the United
States. However, the National Academy of Sciences in the United States has
comparable independence to the RIVM and a variety of similar government
research organizations exist in this country, including the National Institutes of
Health and the National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences.
324
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ment) and five geographic "scales of occurrence" (global, continental,
fluvial, regional, and local).
Although the Framework Approach need not rely on a particular
approach to the Level II goals, the Dutch experience suggests that several
elements may be important. First, the Level II goal identification process
at the outset may require a credible, scientific study of the trends and
anticipated state of the environment.327 Three components of the study
may be essential for the debate and decisionmaking to follow: (1) a
snapshot of the expected environmental conditions at a date in the future,
based on current trends; (2) identification of the ambient environmental
conditions that will characterize the various states of the environment for
the different Level II goals under consideration (e.g., the key ambient air
and water conditions that characterize a sustainable environment); and
(3) identification of the estimated emission reductions and other actions
necessary to achieve the Level I goal.328 The study could be organized
based on the "theme" and "scales of occurrence" approach adopted in the
Netherlands, or an analogous process could be tailored to the heterogeneous environment of the United States.329
Second, the determination of environmental conditions could be
performed with enough specificity to further define the Level I goal and
to provide the basis for determining emission reduction requirements, but
The report prepared for the Netherlands by RIVM included a recommendation on emission levels necessary to achieve the desired state of the environment by the year 2010.
328 Despite the obvious limitations in data gathering and analysis currently
available to support this effort, as discussedsupra notes 29-35 and accompanying
text, the amount of information that is available to assist with the identification
of emission reductions is substantial and growing. See, e.g., U.S. ENVIRONMEN327

TAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PROPOSED ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS FOR AMERICA

wrrH BENCHMARKS FOR THE YEAR 2005

(1995) (draft) (proposing "benchmarks"
for climate change, stratospheric ozone restoration, terrestrial ecosystems, food,
workplaces, and waste management); HAMMOND Er AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
INDICATORS, supra note 14, at 11-20. In addition, because of the increased
reliance on measuring and tracking emissions and environmental conditions,
further study of monitoring mechanisms and environmental indicators may be
necessary.
329 To stimulate public debate, the report may have to limit its evaluation to
a relatively small number of key areas. A number of data-gathering efforts have
demonstrated that such an effort, although difficult, is probably not beyond the
capability of current science. See, e.g., U.S. ENViRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
PROGRAM (1995).

Toxic RELEASE INVENTORY REPORTING
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enough generality to avoid endless debate over small differences in
conclusions about environmental conditions and emission reduction
requirements.3 3 As the Dutch have recognized in applying the "carpenter's eye" approach to decisionmaking, the issue of precision is critical
to the Framework Approach. Given the potential scope of the Level II
goals, exactitude would not be possible across all environmental problems
and for all geographic levels or areas.
To better understand the Level II goals of the Framework Approach,
assume again the selection of the Status Quo Option as the Level I goal.
One can select any particular environmental problem to examine the
Level II goals that might follow from the Level I goal. Low-level ozone
a NAAQS
air pollution is one example of a complex problem for which
331
exist.
already
research
of
amount
standard and a substantial
To determine the Level II goals, the Status Quo Option could be
translated into quantitative national and regional objectives for ambient
ozone concentrations that would "keep the environment just the way it
is."33 The ozone standard could be expressed as it is in the current
NAAQS, in a specific concentration for a specific duration (e.g., Xparts
per million measured over Yperiod), or an alternative measurement could
be used.
For a discussion of the adverse impact on the environmental regulatory
system of judicial and executive branch attempts to obtain all information before
acting, see Farber, supra note 8, at 1293-95 (noting that "[m]istakes are rarely
irrevocable in the regulatory arena, and the agency may do better to try a 'quick
and dirty' interim solution, to be improved when additional information arrives").
See also James E. Krier & Mark Brownstein, On IntegratedPollution Control,
22 ENVTL. L. 119, 123-26 (1992).
331 The use of low-level ozone as an example in this Article is not intended
in any way to suggest the appropriate outcome of the debate over revisions to the
ozone NAAQS. For many compounds, no NAAQS or equivalent standard exists,
and establishing the Level II desired environmental conditions will be difficult.
But an ambient standard of some type exists for many of the most significant
pollutants. The EPA has described ozone as "the most complex, difficult to
control, and pervasive of the six principal pollutants." EPA, 1995 AiR QUALITY
TRENDS, supra note 44, at 8.
332 For example, in the most analogous recent exercise in the United States,
the establishment of a 10-million ton cap on sulfur dioxide emissions, the
principal underlying scientific studies by the National Academy of Sciences (12
million tons recommendation) and National Air Precipitation Assessment
Program (8 million tons recommendation) both came under criticism. See
Heinzerling, supra note 13, at 326.
330
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For low-level ozone, the more difficult task may be identif~ring
emission reduction levels sufficient to achieve the Status Quo Option
environmental conditions. The sources of low-level ozone vary widely.
The sources include large and small businesses, automobiles, consumer
products and other sources. 3
Calculation of the Level II emission reductions necessary to achieve
the desired environmental conditions presumably would require using
existing data to establish a baseline of current emissions, projecting
growth rates in the relevant economic sectors, and then calculating
changes in emissions necessary under projected growth rates to achieve
the environmental conditions that characterize the Status Quo Option. The
emission reductions from current levels could be expressed in terms of
total amounts to be reduced or as percentage reductions. A similar
exercise would be necessary for either the Status Quo-Minus Option or
the Status Quo-Plus Option.
3. Emission Reduction Allocations
(Level 111 Goals)
The third component of the Framework Approach, the Level I goal,
is the allocation of emission reduction responsibilities. Despite the
enormity of the task of establishing the Level II environmental conditions
and emission reductions, the more difficult challenge could be allocating
emission reduction responsibilities, which many scholars have characterized as largely a political, rather than technical, decision. As Professor
Heinzerling has noted, the experience of the acid rain emissions trading
debate in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments suggests that, as between
total emissions levels and allocations of rights to emit among constituents,
the latter is far more likely to be subject of congressional interest.334
333 See, e.g., FRANK DiETz ET AL., ENvIRONMENT, INCENTIVES AND THE

COMMON MARKET 62-63 (1995) (identifying 1990 VOC sources in the European
Union as originating approximately 50% from large industrial point sources, 35%
from small businesses, and 15% from households).
334 See Heinzerling, supra note 13, at 327-28. In the Netherlands, trade
groups for many economic sectors played a significant role in negotiating
allocations. A wide variety of trade organizations are active in the Netherlands,
Germany, and elsewhere in Europe. See Rose-Ackerman, American Administrative Law, supra note 256, at 1290-91 (noting the prevalence of "private
norm-setting organizations" in Germany). It may be more difficult in the United
States to identify representatives who can represent many economic sectors,
particularly largely unorganized sectors such as consumers.
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For the purposes of this Article, I have assumed that the Level III
goal would have several components. First, where possible, the emission
reduction responsibilities would be established quantitatively to assist the
allocation of responsibilities and assessment of performance.335 Second,
all economic sectors that have a significant impact on the environment
would be included in any allocation of responsibilities. This would
include not only sectors commonly viewed as sources of environmental
contamination, such as heavy industry, but also less commonly identified
but potentially significant sources of second generation environmental
problems, such as consumers. Third, similar allocations also would be
made to geographic sectors.336 Fourth, for the reasons discussed in Part
VI, the allocations would be expressed in terms of affirmative steps to
achieve the Level I and Level II goals (e.g., emission reduction responsibilities), as opposed to affirmative rights to pollute at particular lev33 7
els.
To continue the hypothetical developed earlier with the Level I and
II goals, a hypothetical Level I goal for ozone can be examined. For
example, if the Level I Status Quo Option were translated into Level If
environmental conditions and emission reduction requirements for ozone,
the emission reduction requirements could then be apportioned among
economic sectors. This Level III apportionment could include percentage
emission reduction targets by a fixed date for the ozone precursors
emitted by each substantial source sector. A baseline could be identified
for ozone precursor emissions for all sectors in a representative year. The
Level I allocations could be established for entire sectors and for
subsectors in some instances. The transportation sector could be assigned
a W% reduction from baseline figures, the industry sector X%, the small
business sector Y%, and the consumer sector Z%. Within each major
sector, the percentage reductions could be further apportioned among subsectors. For example, within the transportation sector, the percentage
Where the necessary environmental actions are not expressed as emission
reductions or are not quantifiable, other performance indicators would need to
be developed.
336 One formulation of this approach would allocate emission reductions
by state, geographic region, or ecosystem. In fact, a state-by-state or ecosystemby-ecosystem component of the allocation may be desirable both for achieving
the desired environmental outcomes and for developing an appropriate role for
states. See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, ReformingEnvironmentalLaw,supranote
11, at 1350-51 (noting the need to identify a geographic basis for emissions
allotments and the difficulty of doing so).
337 See infra notes 375-410 and accompanying text.
33-
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reductions could be further apportioned among automobiles, airplanes,
and so on. Within the industry sector, the percentage reductions could be
further apportioned among chemical producers, steel producers, and
others.
4. Process
A key component of the Framework Approach is the process of
debate and decisionmaking that could be used to establish the Level I, ]I,
and III goals. Although the specifics of this process are beyond the scope
of this Article, several procedural steps are central to understanding the
potential impact of the Framework Approach. The first step is a scientific
study and report that identifies the characteristics of the current state of
the environment (and baseline emission levels), the characteristics of one
or more potential future states of the environment, and, on at least a
general level, the types of emission reductions and other changes that
may be necessary to achieve each of the various potential future states of
the environment.
The second step is a broad public debate over the preferred state of
the environment, taking into account the wide range of factors evaluated
in the initial study, and culminating in legislation establishing a Level I
goal for the nation."' The prospect of a statutory edict establishing a
Level I national goal may be necessary to trigger such a debate. In
contrast, debate over a non-binding report or agency action may not
trigger wide public participation, and it may engage only those parties
with a particular interest in environmental regulation, replicating the "iron
' 339
triangle.
The third step is a debate in Congress over, and statutory enactment
of, the Level II environmental conditions and emission reduction
goals. 34" Following the debate and determination of the Level I and II
SeeAckerman & Stewart, ReformingEnvironmentalLaw:TheDemocratic
Case, supra note 13, at 191. Only a statute will provide the certainty necessary
to allocate emission reductions and the authority to enable development of new
implementing mechanisms. Furthermore, so long as areas of uncertainty are
identified, the debate over legislation is the appropriate place for discussing the
policy choices involved in proceeding in the face of uncertainty. See id. (noting
that as to fundamental environmental regulatory questions, "it is precisely
because they cannot be resolved technocratically that they should be framed in
a way that invites self-conscious political decisions by Congress").
33 See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
340 One approach to establishing the Level II goals could be to charter a
338
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goals, the fourth step is a similar debate and determination of the Level
III allocation of emission reduction responsibilities.3 41 The fifth and
final step could include legislation that would: (1) provide the EPA with
the flexibility to override existing statutory BAT requirements for
economic sectors that are on track to meet their emissions targets; or (2)
expressly authorize the EPA to develop flexible compliance mechanisms
to achieve the next increment of environmental gains, with no override
mechanism for existing statutory requirements. The approach followed by
the Dutch included retention of existing BAT standards to serve as a floor
coupled with new, more flexible mechanisms to achieve future reductions.
Alternatively, a phase-out period could be established for sectors or areas
demonstrating equivalent or better performance than achieved under the
BAT requirements.
The process for adoption of the Framework Approach in the United
States, and the feasibility of adoption and implementation, are admittedly
substantial hurdles. By not addressing feasibility issues at length in this
Article, I do not mean to suggest that the ability to design, implement,
and enforce the regulatory system on a day-to-day level is not critically
important. In fact, these administrative feasibility concerns were a
principal, and probably sound, basis for the decision to use a BAT
national commission on the environment that could have broad membership and
a mission to develop quantitative indicators of environmental conditions and
overall emission reduction requirements. The commission's product could be a
report to Congress and the President. Federal, state, and local agencies could
support the commission with staffing and resources. Congress could debate and
modify the recommendations of the commission report or could take a
pre-commitment strategy much like the Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission. See, e.g., Robert M. Sussman, An "IntegratingStatute, "ENVTL F.,
Mar./Apr. 1996, at 16, 18. For a discussibn of precommitment strategies, see
Donald A. Dripps, Precommitment,Prohibition,and the Problem ofDissent, 22
J. LEGAL STUD. 255 (1993).
341 A commission process also could be used for the Level HI allocations,
with corresponding strengths and weaknesses. Alternatively, the EPA could be
required to submit to Congress a proposed allocation report or proposed
legislation with allocations. The EPA's priority-setting is unlikely to succeed in
part because the courts have rejected priority-setting efforts out of concerns that
these "partial solutions" create equitable or distributional problems. See, e.g.,
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir.
1977); Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus, 602 F. Supp. 892 (N.D. Cal. 1984). These
court decisions have a strong normative undertone: if pollution is bad, why allow
it to occur, even in the name of priority setting? See Carol Rose, Environmental
Lessons, 27 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1023 (1994).
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approach in the first place. As several of the recent reform efforts have
recognized, however, major advances have occurred in the last quartercentury that bear on administrative feasibility, including improvements in
the understanding of ecosystems and human health, monitoring of
environmental conditions, modelling, and data-gathering, as well as
advances in the policy tools available to achieve environmental ends.
Perhaps most importantly, unlike the era in which the environmental
regulatory system developed, the BAT requirements now provide a floor
of environmental controls to underpin a new system, at least at its
inception.342 Moreover, the recent experience of the Netherlands
suggests at a minimum that in the right setting a Framework Approach
process is within the realm of possibility. Whether it may be advisable or,
at a minimum, whether it will refocus the reform effort on the most
important questions, is the subject of Part VI.
B.

The FrameworkApproach Distinguishedfrom Existing
Environmental Goals

Before reviewing the pros and cons of the Framework Approach, it
is important to consider whether there are meaningful differences between
the goals established in the Framework Approach and the plethora of
goals that already exist in environmental statutes in the United States. As
discussed in Part II, almost all of the major environmental statutes include
one or more meta-goals: lofty, absolute aspirations for human health and
the environment.34 3 The environmental statutes typically combine these
meta-goals with difficult implementation choices delegated to the EPA
through requirements to either: (1) establish and enforce technology
standards; 344 or (2) establish specific ambient standards for contamiOf course, even the concept of a "floor" could be subject to debate:
should it be the current floor or the current floor plus reasonably anticipated
additional regulatory requirements? See William F. Pedersen, Jr., Can Site
Specific Pollution Control Plans Furnish an Alternative to the Current
Regulatory System and a Bridge to a New One?, 25 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,486 (Sept. 1995) [hereinafter Pedersen, Can Site-Specific Pollution
Control Plans Furnish an Alternative].
13 The meta-goals in the Clean WaterAct have been described as "breathtakingly ambitious." PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 33, at 879.
341 Examples include the New Source Performance Standards of the Clean
Air Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1994); the effluent guidelines of the Clean Water
Act, see 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1994); and the Best Demonstrated Available
Control Technologies standard for hazardous waste treatment of the Resource
342
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nants, with difficult implementation choices further delegated to the EPA
or to state permit writers.145 To identify the key differences between the
Framework Approach and the existing goals, this Part first examines the
distinctions between the Framework Approach Level I goal and the
aspirational meta-goals of the current environmental statutes. It then
identifies the more difficult, and in many ways more important, distinctions between the Level II and Level mH goals of the Framework
Approach, and the technology and ambient standard-setting required by
existing statutes (see Table 3).
TABLE 3

Framework Approach Compared to Current Scheme
Framework

Current

Level I - state of the environment

NEPA, CAA, CWA, and other
meta-goals

Level II - environmental conditions

NAAQS and water quality

and emission reductions

standards

Level III - allocated emission

implicit allocations with limited

reductions for sectors and geographic
regions

exceptions (e.g., acid rain
emissions trading and the TMDL
program)

Conservation and Recovery Act, see RCRA § 3004(m), 42 U.S.C. § 6924(m)
(1994). A number of environmental statutes defer implementation decisions
through delegation to a federal agency to establish other federal requirements that
do not include technology standards (examples include the Endangered Species
Act, the Clean Water Act § 404 wetlands requirements, and the CERCLA
process for selecting site-specific cleanup standards).
345 The two most important examples are the NAAQS/SIP combination of the
Clean Air Act, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409, 7413 (1994), and the water quality
standards/National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit combination
of the Clean Water Act, see 33 U.S.C. § 1314(c) (1994).
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1. The Meta-Goal
As discussed in Part II, NEPA and most of the other federal
environmental statutes include at least one meta-goal. The NEPA
meta-goal is lengthy, but it is remarkably similar to the goal of "sustainable development in one generation" adopted by the Netherlands and
several other countries.346 In short, NEPA provides that the environmental goal of the United States is "to use all practicable means and
measures... in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general
welfare, to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature
can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and
'
other requirements of present and future generations of Americans."347
As with the goal of sustainable development, the NEPA goal is tied to a
sense of intergenerational responsibility. The NEPA goal is not absolute:
it does not ignore economic or social concerns. Instead, it attempts to
strike a balance between the environment ("conditions under which man
and nature can exist in productive harmony"348 ) and social and economic values ("fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present
and future generations of Americans"349 ).
Although the NEPA goal is remarkably similar to the goal of
sustainable development in one generation adopted in the Netherlands, it
is different in three important respects. First, in contrast to "sustainable
development in one generation," the NEPA meta-goal is not formulated
in a sufficiently simple, succinct fashion to serve as a useful rule of
thumb for the public debate. Second, as discussed in Part H, the NEPA
goal is only loosely tied to ongoing evaluations of environmental quality
and to evaluations of executive branch, congressional, and state actions
to achieve the goal. Third, the NEPA goal has not been translated into
comprehensive ambient environmental conditions or legally enforceable
rights or requirements for governmental action. As a result, it is largely
unknown and irrelevant to the participants in the environmental reform
debate, and to many environmental lawyers, judges, elected representatives, and executive branch decisionmakers.
Each of the major environmental statutes also includes one or more
meta-goals. These goals differ from the Framework Approach Level I
goal in two respects. First, unlike the NEPA goal, the meta-goals in the

346

See supra notes 282-91 and accompanying text.

347 NEPA § 101(a), 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1994).

Id.
349 Id.
348
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existing statutes typically are absolute. For example, the Clean Air Act
goals suggest that absolute protection of "human health" and "welfare"
will be achieved through the Act.3 ° Similarly, the 1972 Clean Water
Act established goals of "fishable and swimmable" waters nationally by
1983, with a total elimination of discharges by 1985.3 11 Although these
meta-goals establish admirable aspirations, their promise of absolute
protection has rendered them largely irrelevant. 2 As the failure to
achieve the Clean Water Act's goals suggests, the absolute protection
promised in these goals is unlikely to occur without a total elimination of
emissions. With some exceptions, a total elimination of emissions is
either physically impossible or unlikely to occur without extreme cost and
social dislocation. Therefore, these statutory meta-goals quickly became
irrelevant not only to the environmental reform debate, but also to the
implementation of the laws themselves. Because the goals promise an
unlikely and unenforceable outcome, their aspirational value is lost, they
generate public distrust of government, and they provide little guidance
to agency and judicial decisionmaking.3 53
Second, each of these statutory meta-goals is "hanging in air": it is
unclear what achievement of the goals will bring. Perhaps the best
illustration of this phenomenon is the "no net loss" policy developed to
administer the Clean Water Act section 404 wetlands program (although
this is actually an administrative policy, not a statutory goal).Y4 The
"no net loss" goal meets several of the criteria discussed above, and its

The Clean Air Act § 109 requirementis to set primary ambient air quality
standards that, "allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect
the public health" and secondary standards that are "requisite to protect the
public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effect." 42 U.S.C. § 7409
(1994).
35 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
352 For a review of the limits of aspirational goals in environmental law, see
James A. Henderson, Jr. & Richard N. Pearson, Implementing Federal
Environmental Policies: The Limits ofAspirational Commands, 78 COLUM. L.
REv. 1429 (1978).
311 See, e.g., Ruckelshaus, supra note 230, at 25-27; see also Adam Babich,
RegulatoryReform and the Chevron Doctrine,26 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
10,597, 10,599 (Nov. 1996) (advocating establishment of"reasonable"statutory
goals for use in judicial review of agency decisionmaking).
"" See Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994); Memorandum of
UnderstandingBetween the EnvironmentalProtectionAgency and the Department of the Army Concerning the Determination of Mitigation Under Clean
Water Act Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines (Feb. 6, 1990).
350
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approach is far preferable to the approach taken in many of the statutory
meta-goals. For example, the no net loss goal is not absolute, and it
provides an easily comprehensible standard for decisionmaking. The goal
does not provide for protection of all wetlands, just of the net acreage of
wetlands. This type of goal is easier to apply than an absolute aspirational
goal, and it is significantly more valuable for facilitating meaningful
oversight, as well as stimulating public debate and public involvement,
than the meta-goals of the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act.
Nevertheless, the no net loss goal differs from the Framework
Approach goals because it is hanging in air. It lacks a fundamental
foundation: Why no net loss? Do we have the desired net acreage of
wetlands today? Too few? Too many?355 For what purpose?356
In the absence of a conceptual context or rationale for the goal, the
"no net loss" objective is difficult to defend against criticisms either from
wetlands advocates or from property rights advocates. As a result, the
decision regarding any particular wetland is much more controversial and
difficult to defend. That situation, in turn, spawns delay, interest group
pressure, litigation, and inconsistent outcomes in agency decisionmaking.
Perhaps most importantly, there is no certainty that the wetlands necessary to meet long-term needs are being preserved or, for that matter, that
we are not expending substantial resources preserving wetlands that are
not necessary to meet long-term needs.357
Of course, the answer may simply be that there is no scientific agreement,
or no answer to be found in science generally, to these questions. Even in that
event, however, a national debate over these fundamental questions - whether
the answers are science-based or pure policy choices - is important to a broad
democratic discourse and resolution of desired outcomes regarding wetlands. The
fact that this decision was made in a memorandum of understanding between two
federal agencies only emphasizes the extent to which national policy is unlikely
to be the product of broad, deliberative debate and resolution of desired
environmental outcomes.
356 In asking this question, I do not presuppose that there must be a utilitarian
purpose, only that a decision should be made as to the purpose. For example, one
could decide that wetlands should be protected only insofar as they have a
functional utility, such as support for the human food chain, protection of
endangered species, or other needs. Alternatively, one could decide that
wetlands have intrinsic aesthetic value that requires protection of all that
remain, or even restoration of previously destroyed wetlands, regardless of their
functional utility. Neither objective is irrational, but the absence of an articulated objective arguably is.
3" Again, by long-term needs, I do not presume to answer whether those
needs are based on an aesthetic, utilitarian, or other approach.
355
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In contrast, the Framework Approach Level I goal would differ by
acknowledging trade-offs (such as sustainable development in one
generation or even the Status Quo Option) and by connecting the goal to
a comprehensive set of desired environmental conditions, as well as the
emission reductions necessary to achieve those conditions. This comprehensive, environmental outcomes-based strategy could approach the
"hanging in air" problem by providing some comfort that achieving the
desired emission reductions will, within the limits of certainty, result in
achieving the desired state of the environment. The Framework Approach
goals thus may differ from the current meta-goals by providing the public
with a basis for assessing whether particular actions are necessary to
achieve agreed-upon environmental conditions.
2.

The Meta-Goal with Delegated Technology Standards

As discussed in Part II, the mainstay of the command and control
system is the combination of lofty aspirations and delegated BAT
requirements included in the NSPS provisions of the Clean Air Act, the
effluent guidelines of the Clean Water Act, and similar statutory
provisions."' These provisions require the EPA to promulgate and, in
conjunction with the states, to enforce regulations requiring that certain
types of point sources install and maintain BAT for pollution control.
These provisions are distinct from the Framework Approach in two
principal ways.
First, the BAT provisions differ from the Level III goals of the
Framework Approach in the way they distribute regulatory burdens. In
short, the BAT provisions do not include an explicit, statutory allocation
of emission reduction responsibilities. Of course, the BAT provisions do
have significant distributional effects: they allocate emission reduction
responsibilities, but they simply do not do so explicitly. 5 9 Instead, the
BAT provisions require the EPA to make an implicit determination of
emission reduction responsibilities through notice-and-comment rulemaking on BAT standards for specific industrial sources or, with the
states, on facility-specific permits. These implicit allocations occur with

A third example is the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Best
Demonstrated Available Control Technology standards. See RCRA § 3004(m),
42 U.S.C. § 6924(m) (1994). For a discussion of the role of these BAT
requirements, see, for example, Sunstein, DemocratizingAmerica,supranote 26,
at 949.
311 See, e.g., Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, supra note 19, at 335.
358
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limited statutory guidance, but under tight statutory deadlines, and with
frequent litigation, judicial review, and congressional oversight.36
Although the product of the statutory BAT standards is an allocation of
emission reduction costs and other responsibilities, the implicit allocation
approach is extremely slow and litigious. It also is rarely transparent or
amenable to public participation, and it produces allocations that provide
little certainty.36 '
Second, the BAT provisions are only loosely linked to achievement
of ambient environmental conditions (the Level II goal). For example, in
both the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act, the relationship between
technology standards and ambient conditions theoretically could occur at
two levels: (1) in the drafting and promulgation of specific technology
requirements for particular types of sources, such as the Clean Air Act
NSPS and Clean Water Act effluent guidelines; and (2) in the imposition
of Clean Air Act SIP and facility-specific air permit requirements and
Clean Water Act facility-specific NPDES permit requirements. As
discussed in Part II, however, to avoid the early problems with ambient
approaches, the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act BAT standards
typically are not based on estimates of their impact on ambient environmental conditions, and in some statutes Congress expressly prohibited
consideration of ambient environmental conditions. 362 Furthermore, as
discussed in Part V.B.1, in practice a meaningful linkage between
technology standards and ambient standards occurs only at the facilityspecific permit
level, and even at that level it is often a secondary
3
concern.

36

In contrast, the Level II goals for emission reductions and other
actions envisioned in the Framework Approach would be based directly
360 See supraPart l.A.1.c (notes 122-46 and accompanying text). According
to a recent article, in 1992 more than 100 congressional committees and
subcommittees claimed jurisdiction over the EPA (second only to the Department
of Defense, which has a budget approximately 50 times larger than the EPA's
budget). See Kaufman, supra note 168, at 35; see also Ruckelshaus, supra note
230, at 956-57.
361 See Sunstein, DemocratizingAmerica, supra note 26, at 949.
362 See supra Part II.B. 1 (notes 122-46 and accompanying text).
363 See Oliver A. Houck, Clean Water Act and Related Programs, CA37
ALI-ABA 295 (1996) [hereinafter, Houck, Clean WaterAct]. For example, major
new effluent guidelines discuss the ability of proposed BAT standards to
achieve ambient water quality standards very little, if at all. See, e.g., 40
C.F.R. § 455.20-.22 (1996) (Pesticide Chemicals Category Effluent Guidelines).
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on ambient conditions. In the hypothetical example, the aggregate
technology-based emissions levels, and the ambient conditions created by
them, would form the initial basis for any Status Quo Option approach.
Of course, a Status Quo-Plus approach would require improvements over
those baselines, and a Status Quo-Minus approach would permit
digression from them.
3.

The Meta-Goal with DelegatedAmbient Standards

The NAAQS of the Clean Air Act and the water quality standards of
the Clean Water Act are the principal provisions in the command and
control system that link ambient standards to emission requirements, and
they are the closest approximation in the current system to the Level II
goals envisioned in the Framework Approach. The NAAQS, in particular,
are unusual among environmental provisions in that they seek to link the
overall national aspiration for clean air to specific environmental
conditions. In short, the Clean Air Act requires that the states incorporate
requirements in State Implementation Plans ("SIPs") that are sufficient to
achieve the NAAQS for the six criteria pollutants.3 64 The SIP terms
guide state decisionmaking on facility-specific controls for air emission
sources.
The states typically use modelling to determine whether the combination of uniform, statutory BAT standards and additional site-specific
permit terms imposed on air emissions sources in the air quality region
will result in achievement of the NAAQS. The SIPs are subject to EPA
review and approval.36 5 In the absence of SIP provisions that are
sufficiently stringent to attain NAAQS "as expeditiously as practicable,"
sanctions are available, ultimately including the requirement that the EPA
Administrator promulgate a federal implementation plan.366 In practice,
however, 7these types of coercive mechanisms are extremely difficult to
impose.

36

" See Clean Air Act § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1994). SIPs include
emissions limitations, as well as timetables for their imposition. See supra note
138 and accompanying text.
365 See generallySchoenbrod, supra note 17, at 763-65. In addition, Title V
of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 now provides a federal air permit
requirement for major sources. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 § 112,
42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1994).
366 SeeCleanAirAct §§ 110(a)(2)(I), 172,173; 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(1),
7572, 7573 (1994).
367 See, e.g., Schoenbrod, supra note 17, at 740; see also Farber, supra note
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Similarly, to achieve ambient water quality standards, the Clean
Water Act requires point sources to comply not only with BAT requirements, but also with any more stringent requirements imposed by state or
federal law through NPDES permits.3 68 For example, the EPA and the
states may impose a zero discharge requirement on toxics emissions if
necessary to achieve ambient water quality standards. 69 Modelling is
used to demonstrate that the combination of uniform, statutory BAT
standards, such as effluent guidelines, and additional specific permit terms
imposed on the sources in the watershed, will result in achievement of the
water quality standards.37 °
In practice, however, many NPDES permits only require sources to
use BAT controls and do not impose more stringent conditions in order
to achieve ambient water quality standards.37 ' If states fail to impose
permit conditions sufficient to achieve ambient water quality standards,
8, at 1292 (noting the difficulty of withdrawing EPA-delegated authority).
368 See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 302, 33 U.S.C. § 1312
(1994). If effluent restrictions to achieve water quality standards are more
stringent than BAT standards, the more stringent water quality-based standards
must be met. See Homestake Mining Co. v. U.S. EPA, 477 F. Supp. 1279,
1285-86 (D.S.D. 1979).
369 See, e.g., Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 302(a), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1312(a) (1994).
370 For a discussion of the difficulty of estimating or modelling water quality
impacts from emissions sources, see Houck, Clean Water Act, supra note 363,
at 10,544-45 (concluding that "the permitted levels of toxic pollution from
identical plants to identical waters are going to vary widely across the country
not only from the more visible differences in state water quality criteria, but also
from the nearly invisible calculations by which they are derived").
171 See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 33, at 924, 879-83 (maintaining
that
water quality permit requirements were "retained primarily as a backup when
effluent limitations proved insufficient to protect water quality"); see also Houck,
Clean Water Act, supra note 363. The exceptions to the overall reliance of the
Clean Water Act requirements on effluent limitations are the § 304(1) process
required by the 1987 Clean WaterAct amendments and § 303(d) TMDL process.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1994). Section 304(1) requires states to identify water
bodies that are not meeting designated uses because of degradation by toxics and
to impose "individual control strategies" on sources for those water bodies. The
TMDL process focuses on establishing total loads for entire watersheds. For a
discussion of the status of the Clean Water Act § 303(d) TMDL program, see
supra note 142. See also Water Pollution: Administrative Efforts to Improve
TMDL ProgramUnder Way, EPA Official Says, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) A-5,
A-6 (July 16, 1996).

1996-97]

TARGETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

the EPA has few options: withdrawal of the state's delegated authority,
or time-consuming, costly, and intrusive permit-by-permit oversight.372
Although the NAAQS and water quality standards are similar to the
Level II goals of the Framework Approach, they differ from the
Framework Approach in several important respects. The Framework
Approach would place the Level II air, water, and other ambient
standards in the context of the larger national goal (Level I), and would
include in the Level UI goals a much broader set of environmental
conditions than the NAAQS air standards and the water quality standards.
The Level II goals of the Framework Approach would include not only
the environmental conditions that parallel the current ambient standards,
but also the overall emission reductions necessary to produce those
environmental conditions. The Framework Approach goals therefore
differ from the NAAQS and water quality standards by providing a more
obvious linkage between the national goal, specific environmental
outcomes, and the requirements for changed behavior.
The principal difference between the Framework Approach and the
existing ambient standards, however, is that Congress stopped short of
explicitly apportioning responsibility for achieving the NAAQS and water
quality standards, whereas the Framework Approach Level III goal would
explicitly allocate emission reduction responsibilities among economic
and geographic sectors. With the exception of the acid rain allowance
trading scheme of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, this has not been
attempted on a statutory level in the United States. Instead, the apportionment of emission reduction requirements has taken place implicitly,
through agency rulemaking and facility-specific permits, causing the
delays, litigation, and other distribution-driven problems discussed in Part
Il. 3 Explicit apportionment by federal and state agencies of responsiSee Farber, supra note 8, at 1292. Clean Water Act § 301(b) authorizes
the EPA to impose additional limits on discharges if it determines that the BAT
standards in a permit will not achieve the water quality standards set for the area.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(a)-(b) (1994).
373 To some extent, EPA action currently is discouraged by the Hobson's
choice presented by the remaining excedences of ambient standards: impose
near-zero emissions requirements on existing first generation point sources at
great cost, or impose - and, at least implicitly, allocate - sweeping, intrusive,
and unpopular requirements on the multiple, non-point, second generationsources
that have never been effectively regulated. The distributional choices in the final
analysis are likely only to be resolved by Congress in any event, and in fact may
be most suitable to expressly political decisionmaking, so long as the selected
ambient conditions are met.
372
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bilities for releases of effluents to watersheds has been attempted under
the Clean Water Act Total Maximum Daily Load ("TMDL") provisions.
Under the TMDL program, the agencies, not Congress, are responsible
for emissions allocations, and progress has been slow.374 By providing
for Congress to make express allocations of emission reduction burdens,
the Level II goals of the Framework Approach thus differ from the
TMDL program.
VI.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE FRAMEWORK APPROACH

In prior Parts, this Article has examined the legacy of false lessons
from the early history of environmental law in the United States,
examined the core elements of the Framework Approach, and distinguished the Framework Approach from the current environmental
regulatory system. Given the significant differences between the
Framework Approach and the current command and control regulatory
system, the obvious question is whether the Framework Approach offers
potential benefits worthy of taking the risk of implementing a largely
untried concept.
This Part reviews the implications of the Framework Approach for
the current regulatory system. It examines the potential impact of the
Framework Approach on the environmental law reform debate, and on
the democratic, environmental, and economic consequences of environmental regulation. At this point, the Framework Approach is not well
enough defined, and the Dutch system that serves as its model is too
early in its development, to provide concrete answers to the implementation questions. It is clear, however, that many of the shortcomings of the
environmental law reform debate, and many of the criticisms about
environmental regulation, arise from the absence of the clear objectives
that are envisioned as the Level I, II, and IR goals of the Framework
Approach.
A.

The Impact of the FrameworkApproach on the Environmental
Law Reform Debate and the DemocraticProcess

The Framework Approach has implications for the functioning of the
broader democratic system in four principal areas: (1) the public debate
regarding environmental protection; (2) the impact of factions; (3) the

"4 See, e.g., supra note 142 (noting that at the current pace it will take
Oregon 400 years to fully implement the TMDL program).
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accountability of the three branches of government; and (4) the role of
the states.
1. The EnvironmentalLaw Reform Debate
a. The Level of Public Discourse
The Framework Approach demonstrates the extent to which the
environmental law reform debate in the United States is conducted in a
near vacuum of substantive context. The fact that Level I, II, and rn-type
goals are not a significant part of the current debate points out the extent
to which several of the most fundamental questions are rarely deliberated:
(1) what is the desired current state of the environment?; (2) what are the
characteristics of the desired state of the environment and the burdens of
achieving that state?; and (3) who should bear these burdens?
The absence of goals at all three levels contributes to many of the
democracy shortcomings in the debate identified by Professor Stewart and
others.375 In the absence of an attempt to make explicit, public decisions
at all three levels, the general public, Congress, and executive branch
officials only have limited opportunities to debate decisions regarding the
most important environmental questions. Instead, given the narrow issues
raised by any particular new regulation or permit in the current regulatory
system, the debate often either focuses on vague generalities and
unrealistic policy declarations, or gets lost in the details.
In the debates over the technical issues that characterize the BATdriven regulatory process, the general public and elected representatives
have little incentive to deliberate over the desired outcomes and trade-offs
of environmental law.376 In the debates over the existing ambient

...
See Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, supra note 19, at 335. For a
description of the "democracy deficit," see supra Part II.B.3 (notes 193-214 and
accompanying text).
376 See supra Part HA.l.c (notes 122-46 and accompanying text). To the
extent there are incentives to express altruism and high public aspirations in the
public context, the debate over the Framework Approach goals may provide an
opportunity to translate those aspirations into legally binding requirements.
Although a case-by-case cost-benefit analysis, even if carefully done, may create
democracy problems if the analysis only reflects "market" preferences, not
"public" preferences, a public debate on ends ensures some opportunity for the
latter to be discussed in an appropriate setting. See Sunstein, Endogenous
Preferences,supra note 90, at 217 (asserting that legislators want to be able to
express high aspirations, knowing they will not be enforced).
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standards, the absence of an operative national goal leaves the dialogue
without a substantive foundation - the "hanging in air" problem
discussed above. As a result, the debate over environmental statutes
provides little opportunity for meaningful participation by citizens and
elected representatives.
If conducted in connection with a sound scientific study of environmental conditions, the Framework Approach debate may be more
substantive than the current debate. At the outset, the debate over
establishment of the initial Level I, II, and HI goals could stimulate open
discussion about both the importance of environmental protection and the
trade-offs involved in environmental measures. Over the long-term, the
context provided by the Level H environmental conditions also could
increase the likelihood that future debates regarding the implementing
mechanisms necessary to achieve the goals will be comprehensible to the
general public, and will provide the public with some means of judging
the heated rhetoric about environmental disasters and economic costs. In
the process, the debate may yield many of the benefits enunciated by the
democracy theorists.377 As Professor Sunstein has stated, "[k]nowing
378
choices are a precondition for liberty."
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that substantial risks
could arise from the Framework Approach. In the absence of an
extremely carefully managed process, the dysfunctional aspects of the
current debate could overwhelm attempts to set Level I, II, and HI
goals. Similarly, if a credible, accessible scientific study did not
precede the debate over Level I and H goals, the public discourse would
be no more governed by substantive concerns than the current debate.
Preparing a study that is credible to experts and understandable to nonexperts will be extremely difficult given the complexity of the issues, the
scope of the study, and the lack of consensus about the calculation and
role of risk, aesthetic values, and other issues. The concept of risk
analysis for setting goals is sufficiently controversial to block the entire
process if the overall benefits of the Framework Approach do not
overwhelm concerns about its appropriate role, methodology, and
required level of precision. Determining the appropriate role for aesthetic
values could be equally difficult.

3"To succeed in the United States, the debate would need to engage
Congress, the President, state and local government, the regulated community,
public interest groups, and the general public, including not only participants
with a particular interest in the environment but non-specialists as well.
378 Sunstein, DemocratizingAmerica, supra note 26, at 960.
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In addition, even if a credible scientific study were prepared, it would
only be a starting point. The determination of Level II and ImI goals
would require many tough judgment calls. The challenge of managing the
process in a way that could produce meaningful public participation and
reasoned deliberation in Congress, as well as an end product with enough
generality to capture the public's interest and enough specificity to guide
future decisions, would be a formidable undertaking.
In the final analysis, the assessment of whether a construct such as
the Framework Approach is preferable as a substitute for, or as an
addition to, the current command and control system will depend in large
part on the quality of the debate triggered by the initial study. The
inevitable generalizations and inaccuracies of the study and debate
regarding environmental protection could overwhelm the benefits of
establishing goals on all three levels. As many critics have noted,
environmental decisionmaking based on ambient standards or on precise
estimates of risk in many cases have produced inaction. In addition, many
risk issues may be as inaccessible to public understanding as technology
standards.
On balance, however, it may be easier to express large policy choices
on the basis of risk and public value judgments (e.g., should priority be
placed on toxic sites or on certain types of air pollution?) than to express
more specific choices based on these criteria (e.g., what concentration
should be achieved of a particular constituent at a Superfund site or in the
air?). Although there is always a potential that interest groups will use the
fog of the debate to produce outcomes unintended by the public or
decisionmakers (e.g., by using environmental or economic scare tactics),
the existence of the current system provides some comfort that a fallback
is available. In addition, the benefits of public education regarding second
generation problems that may accrue from the Framework Approach
debate suggest that its impact on the level of public discourse is worth a
hard look.
b. Distributionof Burdens
The Framework Approach also demonstrates the extent to which an
absence of context in the environmental reform debate enhances the
distributional problems discussed in Parts III.C. 1 and V.B.3. Each branch
of the federal government, as well as state and local governments,
industry, public interest groups, and the general public, can seek
self-interest, espouse adherence to high standards, and blame others for
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problems. 7 9 In the absence of goals at all three levels, each participant
has incentives to use the debate to shift compliance burdens to other
parties, and no participant is encouraged or compelled to identify the
trade-offs in its position. When trade-offs are not acknowledged,
polarization increases.
The Framework Approach, in contrast, could reduce polarization by
creating a context in which trade-offs are more difficult to ignore. In
addition, it may address the distribution of burdens problem through the
establishment of Level III goals. As a result, it may generate a more
thorough public debate about the most difficult problems facing the
environmental regulatory system.
The Level I allocations also could address the frequent criticism that
prior ambient standards in many cases have not produced desired
environmental outcomes38 ° and that the EPA has been reluctant to
impose sanctions on states that do not achieve the standards.381 Although these criticisms have fueled the idea that ambient standards are
impossible to administer or enforce and have led many to believe that a
choice must be made between ambient and technology standards, a closer
look at the failures of these ambient standards, and a comparison of the
ambient standards with the Level II and H goals, suggests that the
criticisms may be misdirected. In fact, the inability of the EPA and the
states to coerce compliance with ambient standards in some cases may be
fueled by the difficulty of making decisions that are largely policy or
political choices about the distribution of environmental protection costs
among economic and geographic sectors based on regulatory and
permitting requirements that are largely technical.
Despite these potential benefits, there are significant risks in
allocating Level I environmental burdens: (1) the allocations could

...
This dysfunctional aspect of the current debate also could be viewed as
the product of a "commons" problem on a political level. The classic commons
problem, called an "n-person prisoner's dilemma" by game theorists, occurs when
multiple actors extract value from a common resource. In the classic case, such
as a fishery or common grazing area, each party has an incentive to over-extract
common resources to the point where the total amount exacted by all parties
declines, such as through overgrazing or depletion of fisheries. See, e.g., Garrett
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 168 Sci. 1243 (1968); see also PERCIVAL
Er AL., supra note 33, at 47-48.
380 See, e.g., Schoenbrod, supra note 17, at 740.
381 See, e.g., Heinzerling, supra note 13, at 300 (Clean Air Act); Oliver A.
Houck, Ending the War: A Strategy to Save America 's Coastal Zone, 47 MD. L.

REv. 358, 389-90 (1988) (Clean Water Act).
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provide an opportunity for back-door alterations to the overall Level I
goal and Level II emission reductions; (2) the deliberations could be too
narrowly technical and therefore resistant to public participation; and
(3) the technical or political difficulty of the task could overwhelm the
decisionmaking capacity of Congress and the executive branch. If the
Level I and Level II decisions remain intact, however, the Level I
debate may not produce a sub-rosa attack on the agreed-upon meta-goal
for the state of the environment, or on the desired environmental
conditions and aggregate emission reductions.
The problem of narrow technical issues precluding public involvement and encouraging capture is a more difficult problem. Nevertheless,
on balance, a debate concerning relative risk, aesthetic values, and other
factors arguably may be more comprehensible and less subject to capture
than the debate about which technologies are necessary under BAT
standards. Even if Level II allocation issues are no more comprehensible
than technology issues, an additional factor weighs in favor of the Level
H allocation process. If the Level IH debate is conducted after the
completion of the initial Level I and Level II decisions, the overall level
of emission reduction responsibilities will have been established, and a
zero-sum situation will have been created. Participants in the debate will
have clear incentives to police the debate over the allocation of emission
reductions because any reduction in one sector's allocation may produce
an increase for other sectors. Thus, even if the issues are not intrinsically
more comprehensible, the debate may be less opaque than under the
current system, thereby yielding greater public understanding and
increased participation.
Perhaps the most substantial risk arising from the Level II allocations
is that technical or political difficulties will overwhelm the decisionmaking capacity of Congress and the executive branch. Despite the
evolution of scientific understanding and the enormous quantities of data
collected over the past twenty-five years, a sound allocation of emission
reduction burdens may be difficult, although it may no longer be
impossible.3 82 The political hurdles would be no less formidable.
Professor Heinzerling's review of the congressional debate over the acid
emission allocations in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments demonstrates

See, e.g., WaterPollution: GuidancePlannedon WaterAct Programsas
EPA Seeks Rapid Implementation, Flexibility, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 4 (Sept.
1987) (quoting RebeecaHamnerfor the proposition that by 1987 the monitoring,
emissions database, permitting, and enforcement were better able to support
water quality standards than in 1972).
382
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that Congress is likely to show great interest in the allocation process.
The greater problem may be to design a process that establishes emission
reduction requirements at a sufficiently detailed level to provide direction
to economic and geographic sectors without leading to decisions that are
so technical that the "iron triangle" is replicated. Despite these hurdles,
at a minimum the Framework Approach decisionmaking may be able to
produce an explicit debate over who should bear the burdens of achieving
the desired state of the environment.
c.

The EnvironmentalAgenda

Perhaps the greatest adverse impact of the current dysfunctional
debate is its impact on the strategic environmental agenda. The debate
participants have little basis on which to make long-term priority-setting
decisions and little opportunity to do so. The pivotal decisions that remain
unaddressed range from which environmental problems deserve the
greatest responses to which types of information should be collected.
Most important, the absence of goals at all three levels also leaves the
press and the general public without the context necessary to understand
and evaluate environmental crises or challenge the claims of each
participant in the debate. This absence of information contributes to the
wide pendulum swings of the environmental agenda." 3 The absence of
context also hinders prompt responses to important new information, and
limits the ability of policymakers to fend off calls for action regarding
problems that are urgent but not important. Although many second
generation problems are critically important, they often are not urgent and
thus get lower priority in the current debate.
In addition to the negative impact on the strategic agenda, the
absence of clear goals encourages litigation and can make management
of the day-to-day environmental agenda extremely difficult. Litigation
See Ruckelshaus, supra note 230, at 25-28; Pedersen, "Protectingthe
Environment, "supra note 26, at 975. Pedersen has noted that:
As the often ineffectual efforts of the past twenty-five years have
shown, in the short run public opinion alone is both easily titillated and
easily appeased. Without a deep understanding of the political and
institutional changes required to accomplish results, the public will not
know what to demand and its representatives will not know what to
supply.
Id.; see also Sunstein, DemocratizingAmerica,supra note 26, at 959 (noting that
"[p]ublic attention tends to be focused on particular incidents, which are gripping
and sensationalistic, but often misleading").
383
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currently plays a powerful but uncoordinated role in setting the agenda
of federal agencies." 4 The courts have only specific matters before
them and have limited statutory guidance from which to evaluate the
impact of a particular decision on the overall agenda, yet a substantial
proportion of the EPA's agenda is set by court orders.385 The scattershot nature of court decisions is not only an inefficient means of setting
environmental priorities, it is also unlikely to produce a rational allocation
of resources.
The debate over the Framework Approach, regardless of its outcome,
may have three significant benefits for the environmental agenda. First,
it may lead to a better developed and more realistic public understanding
of the environment, and to less litigation, and therefore a more stable,
strategically focused agenda. Second, to the extent aspirations for the
public good can be created or nurtured, the debate may provide the
setting to make this possible. 386 In contrast to market systems based on
the creation of rights or entitlement to pollute, an allocation of pollution
reduction responsibilities could have a positive normative message for the
387
environment.
384

See generally Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and

the Courts: Twenty Years ofLaw andPolitics,54 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoBs. 249

(1991) (examining the extent ofjudicial review of EPA decisionmaking). Courts
often require extensive documentation of agency decisions. The context provided
by Level I, II, and I1 goals could reduce the judiciary's focus on extensive
documentation of agency decisionmaking and increase its focus on whether the
agency action in question is an appropriate attempt to achieve the goals. See, e.g.,
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. U.S. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991); Babich,
supra note 353, at 10,598-99.
38 The courts reach decisions in individual cases that have significant
impacts on priority-setting without the obligation or opportunity to select among
difficult agency choices and without a substantive framework in which to
evaluate agency allocation of resources and exercise of discretion in rulemaking,
cleanup standards, or similar matters. The result is a mixture of stringent court
decisions and deadlines in some areas, see Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985 (9th Cir.
1992), and little or no judicial intervention in others (such as Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA") pesticide registrations generally).
386 In addition, Professor Sunstein has maintained that in setting ends-based
outcomes, "[t]he very generality of the question will work against narrow
favoritism." Sunstein, DemocratizingAmerica, supra note 26, at 967.
387 See Mashaw, supra note 224, at 722 (noting the negative political
symbolism associated with market systems that create rights to pollute).
Professor Carol Rose has suggested addressing the negative normative problem
associated with entitlement to pollute by "designat[ing] pollution entitle-
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Third, the debate over the goals at each level could begin to address
one of the most vexing second generation problems: the impact of
consumer and other diffuse source behavior on the environment. A
vigorous public debate may be essential to educate the public about its
role m causing many of the second generation problems, as well as its
responsibility for implementing responses. This focus on the responsibilities of the general public may arise both from improvement in the quality
of media coverage and from the public's increased engagement in the
debate itself. 8
2.

Other Democracy Implications
a. The Impact ofFactions

The allocation of emission reductions among sectors may address
many of the concerns about factional control of the environmental
regulatory process discussed by the democracy theorists. First, as
mentioned above, public debate over the establishment of emissions
targets may be more transparent and therefore harder to subvert than the
current decisions based on complex BAT-driven issues. With express
congressional allocations of emission reductions, it will be far harder to
avoid difficult decisions through unrealistic goals or through broad
delegations of complex technological solutions to the federal agencies, the
states, and ultimately the federal courts. In any event, if horse-trading,
factionalism, and burden-shifting are to occur, it may be preferable for
them to occur through the democratically-elected members of Congress
rather than through a highly technical process involving the federal
agencies and courts."8 9
The process of establishing the Level I, 11, and I goals itself may be
susceptible to factional control, an issue that should be considered in an
evaluation of any goal-setting process. Concerns about capture of the
Level HIT goal-setting process of the Framework Approach may be
addressed in part if Congress creates incentives for self-policing the
ment negatively, not as 'rights' but rather as 'emission debits' or 'penalties."' Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management
Strategiesfor Common Resources, 1991 DUKE L.J. 1, 36.
388 See, e.g., Sunstem, Democratizing America, supra note 26, at 967
(suggesting that an ends-based approach "should bring a salutary measure of
structure and sense to nsk regulation in general").
389 See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justificationfor the
BureaucraticState, 105 HARV L. REV 1511, 1570-72 (1992).

1996-97]

TARGETS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAw

allocation process among sectors by first establishing the total emission
reductions in each sector needed to meet the national Level I goal. In
addition, after the creation of emission targets for sectors, every sector
may have the incentive to ensure that every other sector will not pass its
costs off on another sector, creating an intrinsic policing mechanism to
undercut factional control.
b.

Government Accountability

The Framework Approach Level I, II, and III goals also demonstrate
the extent to which it is difficult to establish effective methods for
government accountability in the absence of both broad and specific
performance targets. In the absence of an effective Level I goal, review
of the performance of each branch of government often is based on
anecdotal information, rather than a systematic analysis of environmental,
economic, and social impacts. In the absence of Level II goals, the EPA
and the states are not judged by Congress or the public on the quality of
the environment. Instead, they are forced to measure and demonstrate
their performance based on "beans" - the number of permits reviewed
and processed or the number of enforcement actions.39 Furthermore,
in the absence of the explicit, allocated emission reductions envisioned by
the Framework Approach Level III goals, states have incentives to rely
on technology-based requirements in permits without fully investigating
or addressing whether different requirements may be necessary to achieve
desired ambient conditions.39 ' This combination of incentives limits
advances in environmental quality and induces expensive, duplicative
federal oversight of state- and facility-specific actions.
See, e.g., Stahl, supra note 35, at 21; see also EPA Officials Encourage
Regions to Step Up TraditionalEnforcement in FY 97, INsIDE EPA, Oct. 4,
1996, at 1 (noting "bean-counting" efforts).
9 The difficulty of allocating facility-specific or sector-specific emissions limits that are linked to ambient environmental conditions is substantial, however. The difficulty of implementing the Clean Water Act TMDL
program is perhaps the best example. See, e.g., Oregon: Final 303(d) CWA
List Released,Next Step Is Development of TMDLs, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA)
A-5, A-6 (July 18, 1996) (noting that at the current pace it will take 400
years to complete the Oregon TMDL allocation process); Water Pollution
Administration Efforts to Improve TMDL Program Under Way, EPA Official
Says, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA) A-5, A-6 (July 16, 1996) (noting the slow
implementation by states of the TMDL program).
390
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The Framework Approach Level I goal may provide a broad
performance measure for both the legislative and executive branches,
enhancing public assessments of their performance. The Level II and III
goals also may provide the EPA and the states with more clearly
identified performance standards.392 As a result, the goals may enable
the legislative and judicial branches to provide more effective review of
federal and state decisionmaking. With the Framework Approach Level
MI goals, the sources likely to be subject to greater emission reductions
(to make up for the benefits granted to other sources) also will have
incentives to serve as a check on congressional intervention in agency
decisionmaking,"3 and the media may have a greater ability to understand and explain trade-offs.394
c.

The Role of the States

The Framework Approach also clarifies the extent to which performance measures may be necessary for a return of greater decisionmaking
to the states. The history of the pre-command and control era discussed
in Part II suggests that several issues must be addressed if a "devolution"
to the states is not to recreate the problems that existed before the 1970s.
The context provided by the Framework Approach may present an
opportunity to address many of these problems.3 95
Overall, the state-federal role will be more susceptible to thoughtful
re-examination if all participants in the environmental reform debate have
greater certainty about the national objectives for the environment.
Although many states and emissions sources seek less EPA oversight, in
the absence of the easily measured and broadly accepted performance
criteria that are envisioned as the Framework Approach Level II goals,
See Stahl, supranote35, at 21.
...
See Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, supra note 90, at 217-18;
Kaufman, supra note 168, at 34 (noting that in recent years, more than 13% of
the EPA's budget has been earmarked). For a discussion of appropriations riders,
see generally Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through
Limitation Riders, 1987 DuKE L.J. 456; Plater, supra note 8, at 992 n.40 (noting
that "[c]ourts typically construe appropriation riders narrowly").
114 Following the establishment of the Framework Approach goals,
the
numerous congressional committees and subcommittees that claim jurisdiction
over the EPA also may have greater incentives to coordinate their activities. See
Ruckelshaus, supra note 230, at 27-29.
39' For a discussion of federalism concerns, see Stewart, Madison's
Nightmare, supra note 19, at 336.
392
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states have incentives to participate in a "race to the bottom" - to
compete for new industry by lowering environmental standards. Under
the Framework Approach, economic race-to-the-bottom problems may be
addressed by the establishment of defined environmental conditions and
the express allocation of emission reduction responsibilities.39 6 The
express allocation of emission reductions may reduce incentives within
sectors to seek out states with low standards. As discussed above, the
environmental conditions could provide a comprehensive set of environmental targets as a basis for assessing state performance, similar to the
current NAAQS and water quality standards, but across a broader range
of contaminants. These substantive environmental targets could facilitate
the movement away from "beans" as performance measures.
Cross-border migration of emissions is a second difficult issue
confronted by devolution to the states. Calculating cross-border migration
is difficult, and the incentives for states to allow migration off-site are
great. The Framework Approach may offer at least partial responses to
these problems. To some extent, cross-border concerns could be
addressed through watershed or ecosystem-based establishment of Level
II and Level HT allocations. In addition, the comprehensive nature of the
exercise, and its substantive basis, may create an atmosphere in which
states are less likely to avoid their fair share of emission reduction
responsibilities.
Agency capture on the state and local level is a third concern
regarding devolution. Capture of state and local agencies, however, like
cross-border problems, may be mitigated somewhat by the existence of
clear sectoral and geographic performance standards. In sum, the Level
I, II, and II goals may provide a starting point for reducing the overall
federal involvement in state decisionmaking with less concern about
sacrificing environmental quality.397
B.

The Impact of the FrameworkApproach on the Environment

As discussed above, the Level I and II goals highlight the extent to
which the
current environmental regulatory system is unable to prioritize
1
In fact, the EPA recently has begun an effort to return greater decisionmaking to the states using performance standards. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
396

PROTECTION AGENcY, STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

(1995).

...
Minimum uniformity requirements could still be required where necessary
to maintain a national market. For example, compare the preemption provisions
in the FIFRA use restrictions with the provisions in the FIFRA labelling
restrictions. See 7 U.S.C. § 136(v)(a)-(b) (1994).
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among the most important environmental problems, whether based on
risk, public perception, or any other grounds.398 The Framework
Approach goals also highlight the inability of the current environmental
regulatory system to address second generation environmental problems.
The adoption of the Framework Approach goals may provoke a debate
regarding the roles and responsibilities of the general public in the second
generation environmental problems. The debate, in turn, may educate the
public about its role in creating and resolving the second generation
399
problems.
As discussed in Part VI.A.1, the Level I allocations also may
address a frequently-noted shortcoming of the current NAAQS and water
quality standards: the obstacles to federal sanctions or other enforcement
mechanisms to force achievement of these ambient standards. Scholars
who assert that the remaining environmental problems can be solved
through greater use of coercive authority by the EPA and the states
(whether through EPA sanctions to achieve the existing ambient
standards, increasingly stringent technology standards, or increased state
regulatory and enforcement activities) assume that the federal and state
agencies can draw upon a limitless reservoir of public goodwill. The
recent backlash against regulation, and the fact that the EPA's budget has
remained almost flat in constant dollars over the past fifteen years despite
the growth in the economy and profusion of environmental statutes, are
indications that the goodwill, and thus the federal and state agencies'
coercive power, has limits.
The determination of Level 11 and HII goals also may be a prerequisite
to substantial expansion of a whole range of innovative implementing
mechanisms. In the absence of the context provided by the Level I and
III goals, the great majority of the current incentives for executive branch
decisionmakers and legislative reformers counsel against innovation.
Without context in the environmental debate, decisionmakers have little
basis to defend an agreement with industry or environmentalists because
the decisionmakers have little or no way of demonstrating to critics that
the agreement will achieve desired environmental conditions. The
398 See supra notes 173-81 and accompanying text. There have been several
recent congressional efforts to require agencies to prioritize their efforts, such as
the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107
Stat. 285 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 31, & 39 U.S.C.
(1994)).
399 See, e.g., Henderson & Pearson, supra note 352, at 1468 (noting that
"aspirational commands may serve to change attitudes toward environmental
protection").
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decisionmakers also have little or no way of demonstrating that emission
reduction costs are not unjustifiably large or are not simply being shifted
from one sector to another. As a result, government agencies are more
likely to use command and control regulatory approaches.
At least four types of flexible implementation schemes may be more
possible under the Framework Approach:
" Voluntary Programs. Voluntary programs could be easier to
develop and coordinate if overall emissions responsibilities have
been established. These programs seek to achieve a variety of
objectives ranging from implementation of sophisticated environmental management systems to voluntary toxic release reduction
programs. Currently, numerous programs exist, and critics have
maintained that they are not providing adequate environmental
gains. Clear national goals at each level could provide a straightforward test of whether these programs are meeting significant
objectives.
" Covenants. Covenants or other voluntary agreements among
industry, local communities, public interest groups, and regulators
could be easier to develop because emission reduction targets
would be explicit, thus clarifying the objectives and responsibilities of the parties. Regulators and environmentalists would know
that they are not giving away the store. Industry would know that
the regulators will be able to hold firm to commitments for an
extended period.400
" Emissions Trading.Emissions trading would be easier to expand
to new constituents and new media. Expansion of pollutantspecific trading such as the sulfur dioxide allowance program and
newly-proposed air and water emissions trading would be
facilitated by an explicit determination and allocation of desired
emissions levels. On a more general level, the Level III allocations may enable the development of programs in which economic sectors trade a wide variety of emission reduction requirements
among themselves.
" Pollution Prevention. Pollution prevention efforts could be
encouraged if the focus on total sectoral emissions creates

4 For a review of recent proposals to develop industry-community
compliance contracts based on emissions caps, see Pedersen, Can Site-Specific
Pollution Control PlansFurnish an Alternative,supra note 342, at 10,488-90;
CongressSaid to ConsiderLegislationto LetEPA EnterAlternativeAgreements,
26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1581 (Jan. 5, 1996).
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incentives for new designs and technologies that reduce or
eliminate emissions. Regulators, industry, and environmentalists
arguably would have increased incentives to pursue pollution
prevention approaches.
Of course, a less optimistic view is also plausible. As discussed
above, in many areas of environmental law a focus on risk-based
determinations and flexibility has translated into little or no action to
protect the environment.40 ' To produce environmental benefits, the
flexibility envisioned above would have to be closely linked to the Level
II and I goals, and the goals would have to be enforceable.
Nevertheless, under the Framework Approach, each of these changes
would take place in a regulatory setting that is more focused on second
generation sources and cross-media transfers of pollutants. 4 2 The Level
I emission reductions, by clearly defining emission reduction responsibilities for consumers and others, may create incentives for reducing
emissions from these second generation sources. Similarly, the Level II
allocations may limit incentives for cross-media transfers of pollutants.
C. The Impact of the FrameworkApproachon the Economy
The Level I, II, and Il goals of the Framework Approach reveal
three fundamental economic shortcomings of the current system: (1) an
absence of certainty in environmental requirements; (2) inflexibility in the
implementing mechanisms for achieving environmental outcomes; and (3)
high transaction costs. The absence of certainty is in part a function of
the fluctuations in the overall environmental agenda discussed above. As
Congress reacts to environmental crises by enacting new statutes that
impose new, unexpected requirements, and as the pace of regulatory
development shifts with changes in the public concern about the
environment, future requirements become difficult to predict. The absence
of certainty also occurs on a lesser scale, as agency delays and changes
in policy, and judicial review of rulemakings and permit decisions, lead
to extended periods of ambiguity. This absence of certainty and lack of
finality also leads to changes in regulatory requirements over time periods
that bear little relationship to the capital investment planning horizon of
40 3
industry.
See, e.g., Houck, Risk Management, supra note 175.
See, e.g., Guruswamy, supra note 185, at 517 (noting the growing
importance of integrated multi-media approaches to environmental protection).
403 See, e.g., Houck, The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants,supra note 72, at
401

402
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Greater certainty could be produced by the Framework Approach
goals in two ways. On the national level, certainty may arise from the
more stable environmental agenda discussed above. In addition, certainty
also could arise from the establishment of Level I emission reduction
targets. If the temptation to frequently redistribute burdens is resisted,
economic sectors will know their emission reduction requirements for an
extended period in the future. As a result, the Level m targets could
provide the basis for more effective investment decisions.
As discussed in Part VI.B.3 above, the Framework Approach goals
also may address concerns about regulatory inflexibility. Reduced
emissions control costs may arise from the opportunities for regulatory
innovation and flexibility provided by the existence of Level II and III
goals. By permitting movement away from BAT-driven requirements, the
Level II and I goals thus may reduce the over-control and under-control
problems inherent in technology standards.
The Framework Approach also highlights the extent to which
transaction costs are generated when individual companies, sectors, or
geographic regions attempt to avoid or redistribute environmental
compliance costs. The high transaction costs incurred by industry when
it seeks to demonstrate that emission reductions need not be made or to
shift the costs of controlling emissions have been the subject of many
scholarly papers and of the discussion in Part VI.A above.404 Government, industry, and environmental interest groups all lack the necessary
context to decide when to compromise or settle differences about the
extent or allocation of responsibilities." 5 The absence of explicit
allocations encourages this activity in the environmental regulatory
system, and it undermines the effectiveness of the NAAQS and water
quality standards, in particular.

10,554 (noting that "[ait bottom, the struggle is not over the ability not to
pollute, but over lead time and competitiveness").
" See, e.g., Stewart, Madison's Nightmare, supra note 19, at 341. For a
general discussion of the costs of evading regulation, see David N. Laband &
John P. Sophocleus, An Estimate ofResourceExpenditures on TransferActivity
in the United States, 107 Q.L EcoN. 959, 969 (1992).
405 The Coase Theorem (postulating that when transaction costs are low,
parties will bargain around whatever legal rules exist) may be inoperative in
many situations involving environmental requirements because the legal rules are
unclear and are shifting, or they explicitly prohibit transferring responsibilities.
See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 LL. & EcoN. 1, 10
(1960); Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among
Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. Rav. 623, 672-76 (1986).
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In contrast, the Framework Approach may reduce transaction costs by
clearly identifying responsibilities at Levels II and III. The establishment
of national goals for environmental conditions and aggregate emission
reductions, and the transparency of clearly defined, allocated responsibilities may discourage attempts to avoid responsibilities altogether. In
addition, the self-policing, zero-sum situation created by the allocated
reduction requirements may discourage efforts to transfer responsibilities
through litigation and other means.4" 6 To the extent litigation occurs,
the existence of the Level I, II, and ]I goals may produce more effective
decisions by providing courts with greater context in which to evaluate
particular agency decisions.4 °7 By clearly articulating the "game plan"
of the executive and legislative branches, the Framework Approach thus
may not only reduce transaction costs but also may improve court
oversight of agency decisionmaking."'
Of course, the economic impacts of the Framework Approach would
not all be positive. The initial establishment of the Framework Approach
goals could provoke an initial burst of transaction costs as parties attempt
to lobby and litigate to shape the development of the goals. In the long-term, if the Framework Approach goals were constantly subject to
amendment, the transaction costs could remain high.
Changes to the Framework Approach goals also could undercut the
certainty regarding emission reduction requirements. Changes to a sector's
requirements could result from scientific advances, litigation, new public
opinion, or new political choices. Although changes could undercut the
benefits accruing from the certainty of the investment horizon for
industry, it is realistic to expect that a significant, if periodic, evolution
of the Framework Approach goals would occur.
In addition, fewer final government actions (e.g., regulations and
permitting decisions) may be needed, resulting in fewer actions to litigate.
407 See Alabama Power Co. v. U.S. EPA, 40 F.3d 450, 455-56 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (interpretation of a statute that leaves the EPA with the need to look
elsewhere to find emission reductions). But see Lynn M. Gallagher, Clean Water
Act, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 135 (Thomas F.P. Sullivan ed., 13th
ed. 1995) (asserting that the existing Clean Water Act goals already provide
significant guidance to courts and the EPA).
408 See, e.g., Farber, supra note 8, at 1296. For example, the relative
importance of any particular environmental regulation is much more understandable, and actions to achieve the standard are subject to more intelligent
interpretation by courts, when the value of achieving the standard is expressed
in terms of achieving an agreed-upon state of the environment and allocation of
sectoral responsibilities.
406
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In addition, pressures on the goal-setting process could lead to delays
that could undermine its benefits. The acid rain trading program, which
is largely regarded as successful, was the product of many years of
contentious scientific and policy disputes, although the actual establishment of emissions limits and allocation of emissions rights in Congress,
as well as the implementation of the program by the EPA, proceeded
relatively quickly. In contrast, a long-standing attempt by the EPA and
the states to allocate emissions rights within watersheds under the TMDL
provisions of the Clean Water Act has been slow to develop." 9 The
experiences of the acid rain and TMDL programs may suggest that an
initial legislative allocation of responsibilities is necessary to avoid
extended
delays in establishing and implementing an allocation sys4 10
tem.
Finally, the Framework Approach also may generate a new focus on
second generation sources, which could bring to the fore conflicts
between point sources and second generation sources that have been only
latent until now. These conflicts could block development of the
Framework Approach goals and produce delays and litigation regarding
the implementation of the goals. At the same time, it may be precisely
these types of issues (e.g., determinations of responsibilities between
point and non-point sources) that should be resolved through the type of
process envisioned by the Framework Approach and that cannot be
avoided indefinitely by the command and control system.
CONCLUSION

The turbulence of the environmental debate over the last decade
suggests that the command and control system may not provide viable
solutions to the remaining environmental problems. The incrementalism

" See supra note 142 (noting that at the current rate it will take Oregon 400
years to fully implement the TMDL program).
410 Litigation over the implementation of the system also could undercut the
efficiency and certainty of the Level II and II goals. The acid rain trading
program, for example, has not been developed without litigation, although the
litigation has not impeded the program. See, e.g., Indianapolis Power & Light
Co. v. U.S. EPA, 58 F.3d 643 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (reviewing the EPA's interpretation of allowance trading program provisions). Litigation regarding the TMDL
program to date has largely involved environmental groups' attempts to force the
EPA to implement the program more quickly. See supra note 142 (noting that
approximately 15 lawsuits have been filed to require implementation of the
TMDL program).
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that has characterized environmental reform efforts of the last decade is
certainly understandable: the environmental regulatory system is critical
to the future of environmental health and safety, enormously expensive,
and an important role of government in our democratic system. Reform
efforts that threaten to undermine the environmental gains, increase
economic impacts, or upset important constituencies therefore meet with
substantial skepticism.
Yet the threads of a genuine reconceptualization of environmental law
are beginning to emerge. The importance of environmental outcomes or
performance indicators is becoming clear, as is the potential democracy
benefit of a debate and decisions about those outcomes. Despite real gaps,
the growth in data collection and ecological understanding in the last
twenty-five years, as well as the development of a floor of BAT and
other requirements, may provide both the means to assess and to debate
desired environmental outcomes, and the means to ensure that existing
environmental protections will not be swept away before the efficacy of
substitutes is clear.
The Dutch experience suggests that incremental reform may not be
the only, or even the best, way to achieve the potential environmental,
economic, and democracy benefits of environmental laws. Although the
differences between the Dutch and American systems and the feasibility
of establishing an ambient conditions-based system, in particular, raise
difficult questions, the three-level Framework Approach may provide a
conceptual design that will lead us to ask new questions about environmental law reform and ultimately to re-establish the missing link between
environmental outcomes and environmental law.

